PARTNERS FOR RESILIENCE

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The Netherlands Red Cross | care | Cordaid | Climate Centre | Wetlands International | In cooperation with: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Final Report

External End Evaluation

Partners for Resilience

2016-2020 programme

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Abbreviations

CBO	Community-based organisation
Climate Centre	Red Cross Climate Centre
CSO	Civil society organisation
D&D	Dialogue and Dissent
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EQ	Evaluation Question
GPG	Global Policy Group
HoA	Horn of Africa
IRM	Integrated Risk Management
JC	Judgement Criteria
KM&L	Knowledge Management and Learning
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands
NL	Netherlands
PfR	Partnership for Resilience
PfR SP	Partnership for Resilience Strategic Partnership
PME	Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
SG	PfR Steering Group
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference

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Executive Summary

Introduction: This evaluation was commissioned by the Steering Group (SG) of the Partnership for Resilience Strategic Programme (PfR SP), which is funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) for the period 2016-2020. The programme is implemented by the Netherlands Red Cross, CARE, Cordaid, Wetlands International, the Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre, and their over 50 in-country partners under the lead of the Netherlands Red Cross. These partners constitute the Alliance. The overall aim of PfR SP is to make vulnerable people more resilient to crisis in the face of climate change and environmental degradation and to enable sustainable inclusive growth. To achieve this overall aim, PfR lobbies and advocates for the adoption of Integrated Risk Management (IRM), a framework, which promotes principles and dedicated working methods aimed at integrating disaster risk management, eco-system management and climate change adaptation. The overall PfR SP programme is made up of one Global programme, 4 regional programmes (Asia; Latin America; Horn of Africa and West Africa) and 10 country programmes: India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Uganda, Mali, Guatemala and Haiti.

Objectives of the evaluation as stated in the Terms of Reference for the evaluation:

1. **Assess the validity of PfR's Theory of Change (ToC)**, including Key Assumptions made, in relation to capacity strengthening of CSO's and engagement with stakeholders in IRM;
2. **Assess the effectiveness, relevance and sustainability of PfR in strengthening the capacity of CSO's** to lobby and advocate for Integrated Risk Management (IRM) in the policy, practice and investment domains;
3. **Assess the effectiveness, relevance and sustainability of PfR's engagement with stakeholders in IRM**: to understand the extent to which a) outcomes have been achieved that are steps towards the PfR objectives (changes in policies, practices and investments in favour of IRM) and b) what the contribution of PfR has been towards achieving or not achieving these planned outcomes;
4. **Review the governance arrangements of the PfR programme** and to generate actionable recommendations for future PfR programming, with a specific focus on facilitating Southern ownership, Southern leadership and South-South cooperation[1], and linking/ creating synergy of our work at the different levels (local to regional to global) through identifying good practices and bottlenecks.

The programme: The Alliance was formed in 2011 to implement the PfR I programme (2011-2015), which had a strong focus on service delivery. The follow-up PfR SP, worth EUR 50 million, was formulated to respond to the MFA's "Dialogue and Dissent" (D&D) funding framework for Dutch NGOs. In so doing, the focus shifted from community development work to lobbying and advocating for the adoption of IRM sensitive policies, investments and practices, at sub-national, national, regional as well as global levels. This required a considerable shift in the Alliance's modus operandi. The programme has taken its cue from global policy frameworks on Disaster Risk Reduction (Sendai), the Framework Convention on Climate Change (Paris Agreement), the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) as well as the New Urban Agenda (UN Habitat). These have provided the programme its overall legitimacy and reference for its global, regional and country level engagements. According to the programme's overall ToC, the pursuit of improved policies,

[1] As of the beginning of 2020, the Alliance decided to move away from using the terms "Southern" or "South-South" when referring to activities in the countries of PfR implementation or when referring to colleagues and PfR stakeholders working in PfR countries. The ToR and the four objectives for this evaluation were however written before this decision was taken. The Inception Report, which defined the evaluation matrix in which these terms were used in the EQs, the JC and the Indicators, was also approved before this decision was taken. In line with this decision, the evaluation team did not use these terms in the findings, conclusions and recommendations. But PfR management asked the evaluation team to keep the original text of the ToR and the evaluation.

increased investments and better practices in the realm of IRM should be realised through the strengthening of lobby and advocacy capacities of (mainly) civil society implementing partners in the 10 countries so that IRM-related issues could be promoted on a sustainable basis at the country level, but also at regional and global levels.

Methodology: The evaluation was carried out between December 2019 and May 2020 by a team of 10 evaluators. As of March 2020, the evaluation was hampered by the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. The evaluation team was however able to adapt the evaluation approach. With the exception of the Horn of African programme (where access to interviewees from regional organisations proved difficult) no specific difficulties were encountered. All workshops and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) were held digitally, with the exception of the Mali workshop, which was face to face. The evaluation was conducted along four phases: Inception, desk review, field data collection and analysis/ report writing. The evaluation was structured around 7 core evaluation questions and associated judgement criteria plus indicators, which were based on the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria.

	Evaluation questions	Evaluation criteria	Data collected
EQ 1	To what extent was the PfR SP programme relevant and coherent for the promotion of IRM?	Relevance and coherence	**Five case studies** were conducted form PfR's work in Indonesia; Mali; Uganda (all via field visits); Horn of Africa and the Global level (desk study). Complementary **desk research combined with FGDs** was carried out for the remaining PfR countries (Ethiopia; Kenya; South Sudan; Guatemala; Haiti; India; the Philippines). FGDs were held with PfR stakeholders from Haiti, India, Kenya, Philippines and with the Global Policy Group. **Over 250 documents** were collected on a range of issues with an average of some 30 documents per case study. **More than 150 people** were met for interviews, during workshops and FGDs. These included Alliance members in the Netherlands and other parts of the world, the respective PfR countries, international organisations, PfR country governments, contracted as well as non-contracted CSOs and CBOs, the media and parliaments. Interviewees included two officials from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and former Alliance staff members. Four outcome harvesting **workshops** were held (Indonesia, Mali, Uganda and Horn of Africa), one sensemaking and governance workshop with 23 senior PfR Alliance staff members, and one meeting with the PfR Steering
EQ 2	To what extent has the PfR's support been of added value and complementary to what non-PfR programme actors have been doing in support of IRM and have the efforts of the Alliance and the NL MFA been complementary to each other and of added value to both?	Added value and complementarity	
EQ 3	To what extent has the PfR Alliance been effective in applying good practices in the design, delivery and monitoring of capacity strengthening support for IRM to PfR contracted and non-contracted partners working at national and sub-national levels?	Effectiveness (of engagement)	
EQ 4	To what extent have PfR implementing partners and communities built internal capacities and engaged, including with support of the five PfR partners, to advocate and lobby for IRM at local, national, regional and global levels?	Effectiveness (and direct outcomes)	
EQ 5	To what extent has the enhanced advocacy and lobbying capacity (and activities) among PfR contracted partners and other non-contracted CSOs led to enhanced policies, better investment mechanisms and improved practices for IRM at national, regional and global levels and to more resilience of vulnerable communities at national level?	Impact	
EQ 6	To what extent has the PfR support contributed to structurally strengthened	Sustainability	

	and sustainable engagements of its implementing partners to promote IRM at national, regional and global levels?		Group to discuss findings of the draft evaluation report.
EQ 7	To what extent were the internal governance mechanisms, management approaches and working processes of the PfR Alliance efficient and well-coordinated?	Efficiency and coordination	

Findings: The evaluation findings highlight important areas where the PfR SP was successful in strengthening the lobby and advocacy capacity of implementing partners as well as other stakeholders active in the domain of IRM. The findings also show the extent to which the PfR SP contributed to shaping and influencing adoption of IRM-related policies, investments and practices. However, the findings also highlight areas of weakness and missed opportunity, which will require further attention going forward. An overview of key findings is presented in the following table.

Key results and achievements
✓ The programme was successful in drawing the attention of policy makers and practitioners at country, regional and global levels, to the benefits of an integrated approach to disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation and eco-system management; ✓ The programme was able to balance coherence and diversity, maintaining a clear and shared common agenda whilst allowing programme implementation to respond to the priorities and needs of country partners; ✓ PfR SP was largely successful in strengthening the capacities of implementing (contracted) partners and CBOs at country level to lobby and advocate IRM, thereby laying the foundations for longer term promotion of IRM; ✓ Across the 10 countries, good (in some low-middle-income countries even impressive) results were achieved in influencing national, sub-national and community level authorities to adopt and champion IRM policies and practices; ✓ The Global Programme was successful in bringing IRM-related experiences from country level into regional and global policy dialogues and reviews, this being something that other global stakeholders value and recognise as one of the programme's area of added value; ✓ During the more recent period of PfR SP implementation, the programme sharpened its focus on inclusiveness, vulnerability and gender which is relevant in view of PfR SP's impact statement that aims to enhance the resilience of vulnerable people in the face of climate change and environmental degradation; ✓ The Alliance collaboration, while displaying areas in need of further attention, was beneficial to the respective Alliance members as it created opportunities to address IRM jointly and to reach out to other Alliance members' partners and networks thereby creating synergetic effects.
Areas requiring additional attention
✓ The all-PfR SP Theory of Change and its underpinning assumptions and lessons learnt were not updated based on lessons of experience, which undermined its value as a strategic management tool; ✓ Alliance members recognised the need to address the capacity needs of government actors in selected country contexts but the issue was not systematically addressed in the review of the programme's capacity strengthening strategy and approaches;

- ✓ The IRM investment domain, i.e. mobilising resources for IRM investments and making investments IRM proof, scored less well as compared to the policy and practice domains, due to lack of clarity of objectives and insufficient expertise and guidance to ensure impact;
- ✓ While PfR SP put a strong focus on robust planning, monitoring and evaluation (PME), knowledge management and learning were not given the prominence they deserved, until more recently, and were not sufficiently integrated with PME processes;
- ✓ PfR SP's efforts to connect global policy frameworks on IRM downwards into regional and country level policy processes was inadequate. This was due to capacity constraints as well as the divers and complex policy contexts with which it had to deal.
- ✓ Developing regional programmes from scratch with overall limited resources was challenging because Alliance members were unfamiliar with regional policy processes which have their own (political) character, priorities and networks and which had to be discovered as of 2016 when the regional programmes started.
- ✓ Whilst, PfR Alliance staff from countries and regions were increasingly involved in strategic discussions over the life of the programme, their role in the governance of the Alliance and the strategic management of the programme has been limited.

Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions & Recommendations in response to Evaluation Objective 1: "Assess the validity of the ToC"

Conclusion 1 – The Theory of Change marked a good start for PfR SP but was insufficiently built upon and worked with as a strategic tool during the course of the programme's implementation

The programme's ToC formed an important reference for the overall framing of PfR SP and its translation towards the respective country programmes. It helped to communicate the essence of change from PfR I to PfR SP and served as a compass to guide implementation. But the PfR SP did not review the (overall linear) assumptions made and did not update the ToC during implementation while there was evidence that some elements needed attention, notably questions relating to the linkages between the country, regional and global levels, how to address capacity gaps of government officials and departments, private actors as well as other stakeholders from civil society and how to position the PfR SP engagements in very different country contexts. At country level, ToCs were updated based on the intimate knowledge of the respective policy and institutional environments but not having adjusted the overall ToC to reflect on learnings, meant that it lost some of its utility as a tool to steer the programme.

Recommendation 1 – Revisit and update the PfR's overall Theory of Change (ToC) to take into account lessons of experience and the realities of a programme that works in many different contexts and spans the local, regional and global levels.

Conclusion 2 – There is broad agreement that the PfR programme is highly relevant and of added value in line with its objectives

Among stakeholders interviewed, there is broad agreement about the relevance and added value of the programme. The four global policy frameworks (SDGs; Sendai; Paris Agreement and Urban Agenda) are considered strategically well-chosen and shape legitimacy for the Alliance's engagement. Its ability to bring experiences from the local level into regional and global exchanges were mentioned as a particular asset of the programme. With its focus on promoting IRM, as a way to work holistically on issues related to disaster risk management, eco-system management and climate change adaptation, the Alliance has managed to

create a niche for itself. However, due to the wide scope of IRM, continuous attention is required to adequately select the content-related priorities of the programme. This has proven challenging at times due to the different mandates, preferences and organisational interests of the respective Alliance members.

Recommendation 2 – Build further on the niche developed by PfR in the domain of IRM but further clarify the priorities that should be followed based on objectives derived from the global policy frameworks, .

Conclusion 3 – PfR deployed a sophisticated approach to lobbying and advocacy but there is space to add a political lens to the analysis of country, regional and global processes

PfR SP stakeholders, Alliance staff and implementing partners alike, generally deployed a lobby and advocacy approach that can be characterised as "constructive engagement". Stakeholders worked closely with government and different actors from civil society to promote IRM via information sharing, sensitising, training, studies and the provision of technical assistance. This way of advocating was welcomed by country actors dealing with IRM and resulted in support from government entities. As such, IRM stakeholders avoided taking governments boldly to task for decisions or actions that could be threatening to the environment or livelihoods. While this approach built on an understanding of local (volatile) contexts and potential sensitivities it did not provide opportunities to address more politically sensitive issues. A more structured and tactical approach to challenging governments and investors to rethink plans and their effects on vulnerable people was used in some selected cases but was not adopted more systematically. A "political economy lens" to analyse the wider institutional and interest-driven environment of an engagement area was not systematically practiced during the analysis of contexts and how this might influence PfR SP's choice of interventions and modalities of engagement.

Recommendation 3 – Enrich context and actor analysis relating to PfR engagements with questions pertaining to political aspects of the country and institutional environment in which activities are planned and implemented.

Conclusions & Recommendations in response to Evaluation Objective 2: "To assess strengthening of CSO capacity".

Conclusion 4 – Capacity Strengthening - a strong focus, but the programme needs to further refine its capacity strengthening approach and instruments

The capacity strengthening of implementing partners for lobbying and advocacy was at the heart of PfR SP and received adequate attention throughout the programme. A demand-led approach was followed, informed by country context and the needs of partners. It was underpinned by a capacity strengthening strategy and implemented through a range of tools developed specifically for PfR SP. These tools were informed by good practice but Alliance members and implementing partners had different experiences using the tools, several calling for a more simplified approach. In line with the D&D funding framework, PfR's capacity strengthening approach focused primarily on addressing the needs of CSO implementing partners. But lessons of experience pointed to the need for a more inclusive capacity strengthening approach that embraced a broader range of state and non-state actors. Experiences showed that IRM-related lobby and advocacy requires addressing the capacity needs of all partners concerned and to make resources available to address these needs. While D&D funding did not make provision for doing so, PfR SP dealt with this dilemma pragmatically by embedding capacity strengthening activities, like sensitisation and information sharing, within their broader lobbying and advocacy work that targeted a range of other actors, including government. This was however done without the benefit of strong conceptual, operational and methodological guidance.

Recommendation 4 – Update PfR's capacity strengthening strategy and toolbox, to reflect the multi-dimensional character of capacity strengthening processes and make resources available to support the capacity needs of all relevant actors involved in IRM policy, investment and practice processes.

Conclusion 5 – Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation: A complex and laborious system was created with good elements to be further explored. Donor accountability demands put a strong footprint on PME but knowledge and learning elements gained gradually ground during the life of PfR SP.

Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (PME) was a central element of the PfR SP from the onset and was informed from two angles. There were, first, the donor accountability demands and reporting experiences for PfR I service delivery, which led Alliance staff and partners to develop a strong "accountability footprint" in PME. The second angle was the wish to include in PfR SP a strong knowledge and learning based element to inform the review and update of the assumptions and content orientation of the programme adaptations. This second angle was not strongly pursued at the beginning of PfR SP but gained more ground over time, for example by it being made a strong element of the bi-annual and highly appreciated PME workshops, the part-time recruitment of a knowledge management and learning (KM&L) officer and the deployment of KM&L and communication trainings and guidance. But the potential for linking it more institutionally within PME and making KM&L a fully integrated part of PME has so far not been explored. As for PME reporting, stakeholders found it as too cumbersome to use and called for a simplification of the reporting format. The related "outcome monitoring" approach was, moreover, never fully owned by Alliance staff members at the different levels of the programme.

Recommendation 5 – Simplify the Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation approach to make it less "accountability heavy" and more learning focused. This can be achieved by integrating PME with KM&L more structurally, operationally and institutionally, and by providing further guidance and support on the use of the outcome harvesting methodology.

Conclusion 6 – The programme displayed concerns for and developed well-targeted actions to address inclusiveness and vulnerability. It also adopted a stronger position on gender mainstreaming over the course of the programme

The need to include different vulnerable groups into PfR's work was evident from all country level programmes. Attention for vulnerable and marginalised communities was strong in the design of PfR SP but it was less explicit in the monitoring and evaluation of the programme's activities and efforts. The need to give more emphasis to vulnerability was recognised and resulted in the development of inclusive resilience building guidelines in 2020. Attention to gender, while strongly mentioned in the 2016 PfR SP fund application document, saw a rather slow start. With some noteworthy exceptions, the focus on gender was not sufficiently resourced, and has so far not been structurally rolled out across the entire programme. Alliance staff members as well as partners expressed a wish for more orientation and training on gender.

Recommendation 6 – Promote gender mainstreaming across the programme by building on the constructive steps already taken, including the gender marker assessments, and by developing a gender mainstreaming strategy and guidance note. Further strengthen current approaches to inclusiveness and vulnerability by supporting the implementation of the inclusive resilience building guidelines.

Conclusion 7 – Ownership of IRM is growing among organisations funded by the Alliance, but also those associated with PfR activities. Prospects for the sustainability of IRM-related lobbying and advocacy at country level depend on context and remain uncertain at this moment.

The participatory implementation approach deployed by PfR SP and the flexibility of adapting a broad intervention logic, to country contexts and local priorities shaped strong ownership and local leadership. Moreover, the ability to address different content domains more holistically and to connect them to the

benefit of vulnerable people attracted the attention and interest of country and regional actors. It also tapped into the concerns of policy makers and technocrats mindful of the need to balance economic growth, environment and social protection and who need to find ways to domesticate global commitments and tackle real-life threats. But sustaining interest and action is uncertain and will depend largely on the ability of IRM leaders to attract and mobilise human resources, ideas and funding to pursue efforts further. The strength of CSOs across PfR countries differs strongly and in fragile contexts, in particular, the IRM agenda will be difficult to sustain without further external financial support. So far, attention to strengthening fund-raising capacities of national CSOs has been limited, nor has the programme articulated a clear exit strategy..

Recommendation 7 –Draft a programme exit strategy to ensure a smooth handover to local partners and to ensure that alternative funding opportunities and capacity strengthening support are identified that can sustain efforts beyond the life of PfR SP.

Conclusion 8 – Implementing the IRM approach across three levels – country, regional and global – has been a well-recognised innovation but remains overall a work in progress

With the start of PfR SP, a decision was taken to work across three levels (country, regional, global) and to upwardly connect PfR country activities with regional and global policy processes and vice versa, downwards. This two-directional orientation would feed practical experiences from countries to the regional and global levels and support the implementation of global commitments at regional and country levels. This was highly ambitious and the objective has only been partially met. The programme scored high in terms of connecting country processes upwards, providing useful inputs to global and regional events and initiatives. The Global Policy Group managed to find appropriate entry points and relevant networks to connect with resulting in concrete IRM-related changes. The Global programme's ability to deal with related downstream activities was more limited because of capacity constraints and the diverse and complex policy contexts with which it had to deal. The regional programmes started from scratch in 2016 and developed slowly due to capacity constraints, the necessity to build up relationships in complex and, for PfR SP, unfamiliar regional policy processes. Moreover, IRM-related concerns have not necessarily been a high priority for regional organisations compared to, e.g. peace and security or trade. Most results were achieved by the HoA programme which was the best resourced regional programme. As for the other three regional programmes, returns on investment need to be questioned. Various trajectories were formulated but how these would be guided by a ToC at the regional level and how these trajectories would be connected towards the global level and the countries, has remained unclear.

Recommendation 8 – Connect IRM-related priorities derived from the global policy frameworks more strongly across the three levels (country, regional and global), pay particular attention to further develop and enhance the performance of the regional programmes and strengthen the translation and uptake of global IRM-priorities, derived from the global policy frameworks, into relevant country priorities and processes

<u>Conclusions & recommendations in response to Evaluation Objective 3:</u> "Assess engagement with stakeholders in IRM"

Conclusion 9 – IRM-related lobbying and advocacy for improved policy and enhanced practices was successful but results relating to investments, a domain conceptually not fully clarified among PfR stakeholders, were fewer

PfR SP's lobbying and advocacy achievements for better policies, enhanced investments and improved practices varied substantially across PfR countries, the regions and the global level. Overall, PfR SP scored well on promoting IRM-related policies and practices at country level with achievements in relation to policy change at the national level ranging from "impressive" in a country like Indonesia, to "rather limited" in fragile countries like Mali or Haiti. Policy-related changes at the sub-national, local and community levels could,

however, be recorded in all countries. Practice-related achievements and the ability to translate policy into practice at the community level were highly valued among policy makers and practitioners across countries. Working at the regional levels, on the contrary, has proven tedious and the ability to influence policy change and investment related processes have been limited. Questions should be asked about the extent to which the Alliance – as a relatively limited group of like-minded organisations – can leverage change in regional contexts which have their own capacity challenges to deal with. At the global level, PfR was able to strategically engage in selected global policy processes and it became a well appreciated additional actor, in particular for its ability to bring in views and experiences from the country levels. Achievements relating to the investment domain, have lagged behind, although in a number of PfR countries achievements were recorded. Challenging for PfR SP was that the IRM investment domain was not adequately defined resulting in different interpretations and diverse approaches being pursued.

Recommendation 9 – Retain PfRs focus on influencing IRM policies and practice, but strengthen guidance on how to support the investment domain including how to strategically lobby and advocate for IRM investments. A stronger strategic focus should be accompanied by the mobilisation of relevant expertise to spearhead this area of work at global, regional and country levels.

Conclusion 10 – The Alliance managed to strengthen its own capacity and was successful in strengthening the capacity of implementing partners to lobby and advocate for IRM at the sub-national and local levels in particular. At the national, regional and global levels, Alliance members were the principal actors to lobby and advocate for IRM.

Alliance members needed to invest in their own lobby and advocacy capacities, which took time at the start of PfR SP but gradually became a property of the Alliance. Depending on context, demands and opportunities, the Alliance worked with different types of CSOs either as contracted or non-contracted partners. The lobbying and advocacy carried out with and by these organisations took place mainly at the sub-national level though in a number of countries the Alliance collaborated with experienced CSOs to promote IRM at the national level. Overall, the PfR SP was successful in strengthening the capacities of these partners to an extent that some could undertake IRM lobby and advocacy activities with little additional support, while others – in particular the smaller organisations or those new to this area of work –still require close accompaniment and support. In several countries, Alliance members felt that government counterparts also required capacity strengthening and included support activities deliberately as part of their strategy of “constructive engagement”. Across PfR countries, Alliance members remained the prime actors promoting IRM at the national level but often worked collaboratively with other like-minded organisations. In the regional and the global programmes, lobbying and advocacy was nearly exclusively performed by staff of Alliance members.

Recommendation 10 –Continue to focus on strengthening the capacity of national and local CSOs to lobby and advocate for IRM but invest more in their capacity to engage at the national, regional and global levels.

Conclusion 11 – The collaboration with non-PfR partners, including the Netherlands MFA, was only partially successful

PfR SP engaged strongly with government actors and at different levels and found ways to interact with them constructively. Linkages with non-PfR partners from civil society, including media, were mostly strong while engagement with knowledge institutions and the private sector was more limited and depended on the opportunities arising from a particular country context. International development cooperation actors were less on the radar of PfR SP actors at the country and regional levels. The absence of a strong drive to establish connections with parallel funding initiatives within the sector, even from colleagues working within Alliance members, was notable. At the global level, various contacts were successfully established

with UN organisations, international alliances and development banks to influence IRM-related policies. This created selected off-springs for research and new partnerships. Collaboration of Alliance members with the MFA at headquarters level has been constructive and very positive. In contrast, the overall minimal collaboration between NL embassies and the PfR SP and vice versa at the country level needs to be highlighted. The general pattern shows a very limited contact or even complete absence of contacts with some notable exceptions such as in the Philippines. One of the explanations reported – besides embassies having limited staff – was that priority is given to embassy funded and accompanied programmes.

Recommendation 11 – Seek more collaboration with non-PfR partners and donors in order to leverage funding, share experiences and scale up the lobbying and advocacy on IRM, also with the Netherlands MFA and its embassies in order to create synergies with resilience-related Dutch funding.

Conclusions & recommendations in response to Evaluation Objective 4: "Review the governance of the programme."

Conclusion 12 – The governance of the Alliance is complex, but it somehow works

At headquarters level, staff from across the five member organisations confirmed that working through an Alliance agreement was constructive and overall successful but at times challenging. Core staff found that despite challenges and certain imperfections, it was possible to collaborate institutionally, to build trust, to keep implementation on track and to promote IRM-related issues as a shared concern. Moreover, the ability to promote synergies was highlighted. The Alliance governance and management structure provided ample opportunities in both formal and informal settings to bond, as well as to establish connections and interactions with Alliance members' own networks. But it was felt that there is scope to rationalise the multitude of internal working groups, which are costly and which can be a source of confusion and miscommunication. As for the SG, core members expressed the view that difficult strategic management issues prepared for the SG should be addressed more clearly because, at times, the SG was seen as playing too much of a "balancing" instead of a steering role. The involvement of a limited number of colleagues from PfR country and regional programmes on strategic management issues increased over the course of PfR SP and is regarded as highly positive.

Recommendation 12 – Strengthen strategic leadership and management at SG and PWG level to ensure that diversity does not undermine programme coherence and further explore ways to enhance local ownership of the programme.

Conclusion 13 – Resources for managing and guiding the partnership administratively and on content issues were insufficient

PfR's administration and day-to-day management was well set up and led to a routine that allowed for an overall smooth implementation of the programme. But human resources for key coordination positions at headquarters level and for respective programmes at country, regional and global levels were not sufficient making it difficult to combine compliance-related tasks with content and strategic management related issues. The 33% position to guide the overall programme on PME (in addition to the respective PME support by the respective Alliance partners) was not enough witness to findings about the PME system. Country team coordinators have generally been overburdened with a variety of tasks they have to perform at country level but also for linking effectively with the regional and global levels. The Alliance created several global positions for capacity strengthening, human diplomacy and knowledge management (part-time). Whilst relevant for orienting the PfR SP towards a learning-based lobby and advocacy approach, these were not sufficient to serve all the needs and demands from the respective engagement levels. Attempts were made to reinforce these global support positions with additional expertise drawn from within as well as outside PfR

countries on an as needs basis but these were insufficient. For example, demands for better guidance and training on gender could only partially be met. Meanwhile, the human resourcing of the Global Policy Group, including its coordination arrangements, were signalled as an issue for improvement during the PfR Mid-term Stock Taking in 2018 but to date has not been acted on.

Recommendation 13 – Better resource PfR in the domain of coordination and management as well as for positions which are key to implementing the content related aspects of the programme at regional and country levels, i.e. capacity strengthening, KM&L, gender and investments

Conclusion 14 – The financial management arrangements of the partnership highlight the "centrifugal" risks of the Alliance structure

The Alliance agreed on a financial management arrangement through which the overall budget was allocated according to the parity principle (top down) but taking into account plans originating from countries, regions and the global level (bottom up) specifying the respective areas of work per trajectory for which one of the Alliance members is responsible. This arrangement, underpinned by other institutional factors limiting collaboration, has tended towards a certain "siloing" of the PfR SP that encourages each partner to prioritise its own work. While at headquarters level a way of working has been found to mitigate this practice, i.e. revising financial allocations to countries based on emerging new country level priorities or lower absorption rates, this flexibility has not necessarily filtered down to all regions and countries. This has also prevented Alliance members to find more effective collaborative arrangements in some cases and made the allocation of resources for priorities dependent on a positive spirit of collaboration at country level, in particular. The existence of an upfront unused "11th country budget" was perceived as a very useful arrangement by headquarters as it helped to flexibly accommodate unforeseen spending requests.

Recommendation 14 – To mitigate the centrifugal forces built into the financial management of the Alliance, examine the different financing scenarios that accommodate MFR requirements and institutional interests of Alliance partners with a particular focus on opportunities and constraints embedded in more pooled and flexible funding arrangements.

Overall conclusion 15 – The overall achievements of PfR SP are largely positive and in line with expectations but the real mission of the Alliance deserves further discussion and clarification

Overall, the Alliance managed quite well to set up this programme and from there to implement it effectively. PfR SP had a considerably different focus compared to PfR I and required a significant overhaul of past approaches. Some of this searching and testing took time but over the course of the programme's implementation – broadly speaking as of 2018 – PfR found some type of rhythm and routine to internally govern and manage the implementation. The new way of working exposed several flaws, but the Alliance displayed strong interest in learning and followed up with corrective actions. The programme remains highly ambitious, however, and resources were clearly not sufficient to score on all fronts. The wide geographical spread and the engagement across country, regional and global levels could not be covered adequately. In terms of capacity strengthening for lobbying and advocacy, the findings from the evaluation confirm that lasting change requires a constructive and well-informed engagement between different layers of civil society and government. The latter, however, was not prominently conceptualised in the PfR's ToC suggesting that a more inclusive capacity strengthening approach is pursued in the future.

Recommendation 15 – Discuss with international cooperation agencies and development banks to what extent a continuation of PfR may include (as part of its capacity strengthening approach) complementary support to government actors as part of a multi-stakeholder approach.

1. Introduction

This evaluation report responds to the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the External End Evaluation of the Partners for Resilience Strategic Partnership (PfR SP) programme 2016-2020. The programme is implemented by the Netherlands Red Cross, CARE, Cordaid, Wetlands International and the Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre (Climate Centre) and their over 50 in-country partners under the lead of the Netherlands Red Cross. The ToR can be consulted in Annex 1. **The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the implementation process and the results of various components of this programme and to draw lessons of experience for learning purposes.** The overall aim of PfR SP is to make vulnerable people more resilient to crisis in the face of climate change and environmental degradation and to enable sustainable inclusive growth.

PfR's approach towards achieving this overall aim is to lobby and advocate for the adoption of Integrated Risk Management (IRM), a framework, which promotes principles and dedicated working methods (see below) aimed at integrating disaster risk management, eco-system management and climate change adaptation. The programme's intervention logic is guided by a Theory of Change (ToC), which is explained in the ToR and further discussed throughout this evaluation report. **The entire PfR SP programmes consists of 15 programmes, of which 10 are implemented at the country level, four at the regional level and one at the global level.** These are: Asia (India, Indonesia, the Philippines), Horn of Africa (HoA), i.e. Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda, West Africa (Mali) and Latin America (Guatemala, Haiti). At the global level on policy processes linked to the Sendai framework on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or Paris Agreement), the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and the New Urban Agenda (UN Habitat).

The overall objective of the evaluation as spelled out in the ToR is to inform relevant stakeholders and to attain a robust understanding of the successes and failures of the PfR programme. This overall objective was supported by four sub-objectives:

1. **To assess the validity of PfR's Theory of Change**, including Key Assumptions made, in relation to capacity strengthening of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and engagement with stakeholders in IRM;
2. **To assess the effectiveness, relevance and sustainability of PfR in strengthening the capacity of CSOs** to lobby and advocate for Integrated Risk Management (IRM) in the policy, practice and investment domains;
3. **To assess the effectiveness, relevance and sustainability of PfR's engagement with stakeholders in IRM**: to understand the extent to which a) outcomes have been achieved that are steps towards the PfR objectives (changes in policies, practices and investments in favour of IRM) and b) what the contribution of PfR has been towards achieving or not achieving these planned outcomes;
4. **To review the governance arrangements of the PfR programme and to generate actionable recommendations for future PfR programming**, with a specific focus on facilitating Southern ownership, Southern leadership and South-South cooperation[2], and linking/ creating synergy of PfR's work at the different levels (local to regional to global) through identifying good practices and bottlenecks.

[2] See footnote 1, under the Executive Summary.

This report provides firstly, background information about PfR SP and the methodology deployed for conducting this evaluation. This is then followed by a section on findings recorded and analysed along seven evaluation questions and 21 judgement criteria, agreed with the PfR evaluation management team during the inception phase. The report ends with a set of conclusions and recommendations. Various annexes are attached, including the reports of the five case studies; three country programmes Indonesia, Mali, and Uganda, the HoA regional programme and the Global programme.

2. Methodology

The evaluation was carried out between December 2019 and May 2020. As of March 2020, the evaluation was hampered by the outbreak of the Covid-19 crisis but the evaluation team could adapt its methodology so that the evaluation could proceed. The assessment of the Global programme and the three country programmes did not encounter specific problems. As for the HoA programme, access to interviewees from African regional organisations was however difficult due to Covid-19.

During the inception phase, an **evaluation matrix** was developed comprising 7 Evaluation Questions (EQ), 21 Judgement Criteria (JC) and 69 Indicators. Data were collected via an evaluation comprised an elaborate **document review, (virtual) individual interviews and (virtual) focus group discussions**. Those were conducted in The Netherlands, also with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during calls with PfR staff and partners based in various countries across the globe and during **country visits to Mali, Uganda and Indonesia**. End of mission outcome harvesting workshops were conducted in person (Mali) and virtually (Uganda and Indonesia).

Information for the HoA case studies and the Global case study were conducted via virtual calls, virtual focus group discussions and virtual workshops. To triangulate findings from the cases, complementary focus group discussions took place with PfR country programme representatives working in Haiti, India, Kenya and the Philippines, as well as a complementary virtual focus group discussion with the Global Policy Group.

The data were processed along a structured collection and analysis process. The principal tool were so-called “data grids” which were set up for each case study (Indonesia, Mali, Uganda, HoA and Global), the other HoA countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan) and the remaining PfR countries (Guatemala, Haiti, India and the Philippines). These seven data grids were structured along the Evaluation Matrix to collect the information gathered per JC. The analysis per JC was summarised and served as the basis for analysing and formulating the responses to the Evaluation Questions. The data grids, interview and focus group discussion notes and workshop reports were numbered and stored in an online database accessible to the evaluation team. These notes and reports were structured – to the extent possible – along the questions of the Evaluation Matrix to facilitate the processing and analysis of data gathered.

During the validation and sensemaking phase of the evaluation a virtual workshop was organised, to discuss first findings of the evaluation. This was divided in two parts of 2 hours each and attended by 23 senior PfR Alliance staff members. Participants came from headquarters, India, Mali, Indonesia, Uganda and Kenya. A Synthesis Report and Discussion Paper to inform this workshop was submitted a few days ahead of the workshop. In total, more than 150 people were met for interviews and focus group discussions over a period of five months (see Annex 4). The full explanation of the team’s methodological approach can be found in Annex 2, while the evaluation matrix used across the cases and in this final report can be found in Annex 3.

3. The PfR programme – an overview

The PfR SP programme is founded on the work of the five PfR Alliance members who have worked in the areas of disaster risk reduction, ecosystem management and restoration, climate change and community-based development for many years. Concerns for vulnerable people in different parts of the world and their resilience as well as their potential to contribute to sustainable inclusive economic growth, brought the five PfR Alliance members together when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the Netherlands (NL) made funding available for different types of partnerships in 2011. PfR I was born against this background, which can be seen as a pragmatic response of the Alliance members, to deal with shifting Dutch funding arrangements for Netherlands NGOs as of 2010/2011. It could also be seen as a step towards working more comprehensively across like-minded organisations on issues of shared concern with an objective to create synergies and achieve better results.

PfR I (2011 to 2015) helped to create a better mutual understanding of the different partner's origin, priorities, networks and ways of working at the level of The Hague as well as at country level. At headquarters level, in particular, a level of trust was created during this first phase. This made the five Alliance members decide to apply for a continued collaboration, formulating a PfR SP proposal for the "Dialogue and Dissent" (D&D) call, well noting that the focus of this new funding would represent a considerable shift from that of PfR I.

In response to this new D&D funding opportunity, a EUR 50 million programme was designed that departed from PfR I and from the previous ways of working of the respective Alliance members in the domain of international (development) cooperation. **PfR SP was not meant to be a traditional project implementation and service delivery programme but a partnership to lobby and advocate for improved policies, increased investments and better practices on Integrated Risk Management (IRM) at sub-national, national, regional as well as global levels** (see also box 1). This approach would help, as the impact statement of the PfR SP programme reads, to make *"vulnerable people more resilient to crisis in the face of climate change and environmental degradation, enabling sustainable inclusive economic development."*

Box 1: Integrated Risk Management – Underlying Principles

> The Alliance's approach to IRM dates back to 2012. It is built on eight principles, which should to be promoted in an integrated manner throughout all PfR activities. These are i) work on different timescales; ii) recognise geographical scales; iii) strengthen institutional resilience; iv) integrate disciplines; v) promote community self-management; vi) stimulate learning; vii) focus on livelihoods; viii) form partnerships. Content-wise, IRM promotes better policies, enhanced investments and improved practices pertaining to different sectors working on disaster risk reduction, ecosystem management and climate change adaptation. It promotes further linkages between these different domains so that relevant disaster, ecosystem-related or climate issues can be addressed more comprehensively.

Source: Partners for Resilience. A new vision for community resilience, Nov. 2012

According to the programme's overall ToC, the pursuit of improved policies, increased investments and better practices in the realm of IRM should be realised through the strengthening of lobby and advocacy capacities of (mainly) implementing partners in the 10 countries so that IRM-related issues could be promoted at the country level, but also at regional and global levels. Each Alliance member would bring into this partnership its comparative organisational and professional advantages and cater this PfR programme to the circumstances of the respective country contexts, well noting that such a catering would only be effective if PfR's national and local partners would be active in the setting of priorities,

definition of engagement areas (or trajectories in PfR parlance) and the selection of stakeholders to work with. Moreover, Alliance members would work in a more holistic manner by i) working and relating with a multitude of partners (see box 2) ii) connecting the different levels of engagement and iii) targeting the lobby and advocacy work towards policy change and policy development at the local, regional and global levels including, for example, global policy frameworks such as Sendai.

Box 2: Working through and relating with a multitude of organisations

There are six types of organisations through which the Alliance works or which the Alliance relates to for lobbying and advocating IRM.

First, there are the Alliance member organisations in the respective PfR countries. These are registered CSOs, some under the umbrella of the "mother" organisations (e.g. Cordaid Kenya), sometimes partners of the same network organisation, but with a local registration (e.g. Wetlands Sahel).

Second, there are the implementing (contracted) partners. Among those partners are local/ national CSOs with a strong tie with one global network organisation: e.g. Karina in Indonesia that is part of the global Caritas family, similar as Cordaid is, or CARE Guatemala, part of the CARE International family, like CARE Netherlands), and the National Red Cross Societies which are part of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and with which the Netherlands Red Cross has bilateral ties with. Also part of this second group are independent organisations, contracted by Alliance members (e.g. IMPACT Kenya, ECO-Uganda). The five Alliance members work in total with more than 50 of such in-country partners.

The third group are the non-contracted partners, local organisations with whom there is collaboration but no contract: local CSOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) such as farmer groups or village committees, which are supported by PfR, e.g. in the field of capacity strengthening for lobby & advocacy and with whom PfR works together to lobby and advocate for IRM.

The fourth group are CSO networks, fora and alliances, which PfR has worked with for the same purpose and which require a dedicated approach to capacity strengthening.

Fifth are government departments and their officials at national, sub-national and municipal level, which are targeted for capacity strengthening as part of a wider engagement strategy.

The sixth group is civil society – more generally defined – including the media, universities, think tanks and other communities of practice active in relation to IRM-topics.

With this ToC formulated, the Alliance members increased their ambition level considerably compared to their earlier work during PfR I. Whilst elements of these more ambitious agenda were present within PfR I already (in particular lobbying and advocacy), they were not strongly pursued according to interviewees as well as the evaluation of PfR I.[3] PfR SP would become an intervention tool to connect different stakeholders and the sectors they are working in, establish linkages between actors and their organisations both horizontally, across sub-national and national levels, as well as vertically, between sub-national, national, regional and global levels. The ultimate aim was to promote IRM as a more effective way to prevent and prepare for the consequences of climate change, environmental degradation and natural

[3] One of the recommendations was to step up efforts to engage in dialogue with national governments to enhance enabling policies and programmes for resilience.

disasters. This builds on an underlying assumption, based on the respective Alliance member's experiences, as well as findings from science, that a more holistic approach to climate change adaptation, ecosystems management and restoration, and disaster risk reduction would help build community resilience in a more (cost-) effective and sustainable way. The regional level became a new level of engagement under PfR SP. The global level, which had been pursued during the latter part of PfR I, was to be addressed more structurally by setting up the Global Policy Group and the creation of a global position for humanitarian diplomacy/global level coordination.

As such, this programme stretching across 10 countries, four regions, and the global level, would help to leverage change by strategically engaging on targeted entry points where policy issues and decisions on investments are promoted and decided on. The promotion of improved practices would help to shape the arguments and evidence (communicated through dedicated knowledge and learning products) for triggering policy change and investment decisions at the higher levels, but also to improve the situation of selected local and vulnerable communities in dealing with the consequences of climate change, environmental degradation and natural disasters. This approach built on past case experiences when working at the community level so as to bring in the perspectives of these communities for the engagement at higher levels.

This rather comprehensive ToC in support of IRM could be described in a nutshell as a kind of oil to lubricate the complex machinery of policy making as well as public and private resource allocation in support of IRM-relevant domains, while keeping in mind that all of this is done ultimately to assist vulnerable people in the countries as well as regions of intervention. From the evaluation team's reading, and further discussed in the following section, several of the PfR Alliance member staff entered into this ambitious programme with an awareness that the change from PfR I to PfR SP would constitute a considerable leap forward, which would require a shift of focus and a different way of working and engagement. The change meant primarily a shift away from attention to direct service delivery to communities under PfR I towards primarily capacity development for lobbying and advocacy of CSO under PfR SP. It would also require a different type of mindset to make all PfR staff at country, regional as well as global levels look into one direction.

4. Findings

Findings for this evaluation were collected according to an evaluation matrix developed during the inception phase (see Annex 3). Findings are documented against each JC and a summary of the findings is formulated at EQ level.[4] As highlighted above, the findings draw on the desk review, interviews, FDGs and workshops as well as the country case findings (plus findings from non-case countries) and on findings from the regional and global programmes. Where possible, separate sections with more specific information on the regional and global programmes are included at the end of each JC, though references to these programmes are also made in other parts of the findings section where appropriate. The seven EQs that guide this evaluation respond to the evaluation criteria of the OECD/DAC as requested in the ToR. They are listed in the following box 3:

[4] Following a suggestion made by the SG, the findings in this chapter are recorded in a different order compared to the original evaluation matrix. EQ 2 and its findings are now placed at the end of the findings section under EQ 7. Consequently, the numbering of all other EQs and JC was changed.

Box 3: Evaluation questions

EQ 1 – **On relevance and coherence**: To what extent was the PfR SP programme relevant and coherent for the promotion of IRM?
EQ 2: **On value added and complementarity**: To what extent has the PfR's support been of added value and complementary to what non-PfR programme actors have been doing in support of IRM and have the efforts of the Alliance and the NL MFA been complementary to each other and of added value to both?
EQ 3: **Effectiveness of engagement** (from inputs to results/ capacity strengthening support): To what extent has the PfR Alliance been effective in applying good practices in the design, delivery and monitoring of capacity strengthening support for IRM to PfR contracted and non-contracted partners working at national and sub-national levels?
EQ 4: **Effectiveness and direct outcomes** (capacity strengthening results & processes): To what extent have PfR implementing partners and communities built internal capacities and engaged, including with support of the five PfR partners, to advocate and lobby for IRM at local, national, regional and global levels?
EQ 5: **Longer-term outcomes and impact** (change): To what extent has the enhanced advocacy and lobbying capacity (and activities) among PfR contracted partners and other non-contracted CSOs led to enhanced policies, better investment mechanisms and improved practices for IRM at national, regional and global levels and to more resilience of vulnerable communities at national level?
EQ 6: **Sustainability**: To what extent has the PfR support contributed to structurally strengthened and sustainable engagements of its implementing partners to promote IRM at national, regional and global levels?
EQ 7: On **efficiency and coordination**: To what extent were the internal governance mechanisms, management approaches and working processes of the PfR Alliance efficient and well-coordinated?

The segments covered by the EQs are indicated in the ToC visual below, figure 1, and are based on the evaluation objectives and questions as formulated in the evaluation ToR.

Figure 1: **Theory of Change - PfR programme with proposed evaluation questions included**



4.1. EQ 1: Relevance and coherence

EQ 1: To what extent was the PfR SP programme relevant and coherent for the promotion of IRM?

The evaluation question on relevance and coherence was examined against five judgement criteria: i) responsiveness to local contexts; ii) linkages to global frameworks; iii) collaboration among Alliance members and iv) gender and inclusion of vulnerable and marginalised groups and v) the validity of PfR's ToC and its assumptions.

Summary response: The overall conclusion is that PfR SP has been highly relevant, based on a programme that was able to balance coherence and diversity. This allowed PfR to respond to different local contexts. Linkages to global frameworks have helped shape legitimacy for IRM promotion and global frameworks were localised to a certain extent. A major achievement is the degree of collaboration including shared vision and joint action across PfR Alliance members at all levels projecting a strong and consistent position with respect to IRM promotion. Recent efforts to further strengthen the programme's attention on inclusion and resilience should be appreciated. There are, however, some weak spots, particularly the clarity of purpose and focus of the regional programmes, under-utilisation of potentials for linking country, regional and global levels, and a weakly articulated strategy towards mainstreaming gender. The development of a ToC was well suited for this programme, and the overarching ToC was clear. As changes occurred over the course of the programme, it was unfortunately not used to its full extent as a strategic tool.

On responsiveness to local contexts: The programme has been highly relevant and enjoys a high level of ownership among most stakeholders. This can be attributed to the programme design that sought to balance coherence and diversity. This enabled PfR SP to adapt and respond to different contexts (which were well understood by Alliance members) in terms of what was worked on, with whom the Alliance members worked, and how efforts around lobbying and advocacy and capacity strengthening were operationalised. This has resulted in a rich tapestry of engagements, that allowed to 'work with the grain', tied to the common denominators of i) promoting IRM and ii) strengthening lobbying and advocacy capacity. In so doing, PfR has largely remained relevant to changing contexts.

On linkages to global frameworks: References to global policy frameworks helped shape legitimacy for the promotion of IRM concepts, and also helped to 'localise' these frameworks to a certain extent, both at the national and regional level (although work at the regional level started only later). Country programmes have taken their cue from the global policy frameworks (primarily the Sendai Framework, the Paris Climate Agreement and the SDGs), which has helped give the programme its legitimacy as a partner of governments to domesticate international commitments. The New Urban Agenda was a relevant reference point in a few PfR countries only. There were some weak spots, for example with regards to the clarity of purpose and focus of the regional programmes, which were basically started from scratch and with limited knowledge about regional dynamics in the four regions of engagement. The mechanisms for facilitating linkages between the national and regional levels have not been fully developed, given the comparative novelty of the regional programmes, resulting in a certain disconnect

between national and regional policy processes. Overall, the potential for linking country, regional and global levels has thus far been under-utilised.

On collaboration among Alliance members: While there was a shared understanding among PfR Alliance members about the concept of IRM, the focus on lobbying and advocacy under PfR SP demanded a much more collaborative way of working. There is clear evidence that over time, the level of collaboration, whether in terms of joint planning and strategising, or participation in joint activities, has increased, with variations from country to country. To accommodate the different institutional mandates in the country contexts, at times, Alliance members had to split up the concept of IRM (i.e. climate change adaptation, ecosystems management and DRR) to allow the different Alliance members to work in their respective sectoral domains. But such divisions did not undermine the underlying coherence of the programme approach and IRM concept, and attests to the validity of the concept as it was understood by the Alliance members. Linked to this, a shared understanding of how to advocate and lobby for IRM was promoted among Alliance members, with findings showing that an approach of "constructive engagement" prevailed. Most partners relied on their established ways of working, entry points and existing mandates, which in some cases required a level of balancing with the mandates, interest and capacities of other Alliance members.

On gender and inclusiveness: Gender has been accommodated differently across the country, regional and global programmes. Overall, the view is that more could have been achieved if there had been an explicit gender mainstreaming strategy in place to guide actions at each level. That said, actions aimed at addressing gender within the context of IRM were implemented in most programmes and some important results were reported. The application of CARE's Gender Marker assessment tool proved helpful in pinpointing the readiness of Alliance members at country level to embrace gender and provides a basis for further strategising and internal capacity strengthening around gender. For the regional and global programmes, it proved more of a challenge to determine how best to approach gender since these programmes do not have presence or implement 'on the ground'. However, an important step to give more profile to gender in the global programme was realised when PfR was accepted as a partner in the Network of African Women Environmentalist (NAWE) in March 2019.

By design, PfR SP targets and engages the vulnerable and marginalised in society, especially those most exposed to risk and least able to mitigate and respond. However, beyond this broad classification, it was not always clear what is meant by vulnerable and marginalised groups and how to mainstream the work with these groups into programme design, implementation and reporting. This was recognised and resulted in a study and guidance published in early 2020 on how to promote the inclusion for resilience of the most marginalised groups into programmes. Across the country programmes, there are examples of working both directly with such groups at community level but also of working indirectly through influencing policy frameworks that impact on their lives. There are also instances of the Alliance advocating on behalf of such groups, but also instances where Alliance members facilitated the participation of marginalised groups in specific policy processes or events.

On the ToC: Finally, the ToC approach was well suited for a programme geared towards influencing policy processes. In light of the multi-layered interventions levels PfR did well to design a generic ToC based on the understanding that it would be calibrated at the different national, regional and the global levels. The generic ToC was overall clear and its focus on CSOs as vectors for change and pathways for changed fitted the D&D framework. While this generic ToC helped country teams to formulate their respective ToCs and build ownership at national level, the underlying assumptions guiding the country

and regional ToCs are difficult to discern, including the rationale for selecting certain trajectories and the relative focus given to the three principle IRM domains. In this regard, the generic ToC was found rather simplistic in the way it expected policy processes to be influenced – in reality countries resorted to multiple pathways to influence policy processes, engaging with a plethora of actors, which were found more appropriate in given contexts, in addition to working with implementing partners. This different application of the rather uni-directional generic ToC was not well reflected in the country-level ToC. Whilst some countries have adjusted their ToC, the over-arching programme ToC remained unaltered. For example, the direct engagement with state institutions was not well reflected, neither providing a clarification on how to work in parallel to ongoing capacity strengthening engagements and how this can contribute to capacity change; or how to make use of opportunities for change before capacities are necessarily strengthened; finally, the interplay and linkages between country level processes and interventions at the regional level was not captured by the generic ToC. Such lessons of experience from the field that saw different pathways being pursued did not result in an adjustment of the generic ToC. This lack of adjustment means that the generic TOC has lost some of its relevance and this has implications for the overall steering role that it can play. Overall, there is ample evidence that country programmes have demonstrated an intimate knowledge of their policy and institutional environments and have carefully selected strategies and employed tactics to achieve significant results. But more could have been done to use the ToC to its full potential, as a strategic tool to assess the underlying assumptions, and guide effective action, draw and share lessons of experience and facilitate reporting.

JC 1.1: The PfR SP programme was adapted to local contexts and has shown responsiveness and adaptiveness to the priorities and needs of their implementing partners and communities in terms of their capacity strengthening and to communities in terms of tackling IRM challenges

Country programmes: **The design of PfR SP was well adapted to local contexts and priorities at country level.** It was implemented by five Alliance members who knew the countries well from other and earlier engagements relating to disaster risk management, community development, environmental protection or ecosystem management in the countries concerned. Most PfR SP activities also benefitted from lessons learned during PfR I, which had been implemented in most of the PfR SP countries. This was for example the case in Mali where PfR SP changed its approach rather substantially compared to PfR I. A good knowledge of other organisations or networks to possibly collaborate with, such as in the case of Uganda, also benefitted the design and implementation of PfR SP. In Indonesia, Alliance members and their contracted partners identified provinces, districts and villages where they believed they have a relevant role to play. Working with the grain and therefore knowing well what needs and priorities exist at the community level is part of the Alliance member's DNA and helped to implement a range of activities throughout PfR SP, which were highly appreciated. The formulation of the working areas for the respective engagements, called 'trajectories' in PfR parlance, was built on this knowledge as well as insight on the priorities of each country's leadership and the functioning of their administrative systems and policy making processes.

The PfR SP's responsiveness to government priorities, at the national, sub-national or local levels, depended clearly on the extent to which a country had a well-functioning government, with structures, policies, institutional arrangements and knowledgeable officials. These factors determined the way in which PfR SP could target its engagements and it should not be a surprise that the evaluation team found big differences between middle-income countries like Indonesia or India and others like Mali or Haiti, which suffer from conflict or natural disasters. In the case of Indonesia, for example, the Alliance members and their implementing partners could work extensively with government stakeholders at

different levels, make use of government processes, sensitise them on IRM and lobby and advocate successfully for changes in relation to relevant policies or regulations. In Mali, good contacts existed between PfR SP stakeholders and the national government, but government capacities and institutional mechanisms are weak, making it difficult for supporting organisations to lobby and advocate for change in this institutional sphere. In this context, PfR SP's attention was directed mainly towards the community and municipal levels combined with some (mainly awareness raising) engagements at sub-national and national levels.

Regional and global programmes: The programmes were predominantly designed by Alliance members though informed by inputs from a variety of stakeholders from outside the Alliance. PfR SP's global and regional programmes started in 2016 as new undertakings, though the global programme had its roots in several engagements that had taken place at the global level prior to 2016. Attempts were made to orient these programmes towards needs and priorities identified at the transnational level, though the process has been difficult. There were no clearly articulated demands from country stakeholders to bring IRM-related issues into the regional or global domain. The principal mechanism deployed by the Global programme were consultations with representatives of PfR SP countries as well as consultations with informed stakeholders from outside the realms of the programme. The evaluation team could not trace how intense these consultations were. Given the nature of these programmes, focusing on global and regional policy frameworks, the main interlocutors for Alliance member staff were stakeholders from international organisations, national governments and civil society working in the policy domain with specific mandates to engage in regional and global policy processes.

As for the regional programmes, interview records show that the creation of such programmes was triggered by a felt need among Alliance members to build linkages between the country level and the global level. Regional initiatives, such as ministerial consultations at the Asian or African level on Sendai but also other global policy frameworks, shaped an argument to engage at a level where IRM-related topics could be influenced. Insight on how this could be given shape and on how best to engage with the complexities of regional organisations, was limited when the programme started. From the findings it appears that an approach was followed that built on trial and learning, and which would gradually shape an understanding on how to engage. In the case of all regional programmes this took time. The Regional HoA Programme, endowed with more resources compared to the other regional programmes, has made most progress to date, focusing on influencing selected regional and continental policy and investment processes and targeted regional policy actors, as well as, to some extent, the media and investors. Its achievements are discussed under EQs 5 and 6.

Overall, for programmes at all levels, PfR SP applied a mix of demand and supply driven approaches to respond to priorities and needs with a predominance given to a so-called "demand inducing" approach. The latter pattern was observed from Indonesia, Mali and Uganda, but also mentioned during Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with PfR stakeholders from India and Kenya. In these cases, PfR identified and joined opportunities to work with (government) stakeholders, made efforts to demonstrate the added value of IRM and made use of these processes to engage them and promote IRM concepts, in the policy and practice domain in particular.

JC 1.2: The PfR Alliance programme has been aligned with the regionally and globally agreed priorities on IRM

<u>Country programmes:</u> Global policy frameworks were used mainly as reference points to articulate country programmes and to situate the promotion of the IRM concept in a regional and global policy context. The Sendai framework on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) stood out as the principal reference in all countries visited (Indonesia, Mali, Uganda) though the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or Paris Agreement) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) were also regularly mentioned. The fourth global policy framework, which PfR included in its work, the New Urban Agenda (UN Habitat), was a relevant reference point in some PfR countries only, i.e. Indonesia, Philippines and Kenya. Other international and regional policy agreements beyond these four were also referred to such as the Ramsar Wetland Convention in Mali, Indonesia and Uganda. The relevance of any one of these policy frameworks for a country programme depended also on the focus of trajectories and the interests of the respective PfR Alliance member leading it.

References to these policy frameworks helped to shape legitimacy for promoting the IRM concept and helped to open doors to diverse actors especially from within government. They also helped to "localise" the global agreements within existing country policy frameworks and to connect them with national processes. In Uganda, for example, PfR was actively involved in the domestication of the Paris Agreement, through trainings to members of parliament working on climate change and foreign affairs. In Mali, PfR assisted the government with the review of the implementation of the Sendai Framework at country level.

In Uganda, Mali and Indonesia, no specific references have been found in relation to aligning with regional frameworks relevant to the promotion of IRM at the national level. This missing link, as was mentioned by interviewees, is due to the relative novelty of the regional programmes and the absence of clear approaches at country level on how to connect regionally on IRM.

<u>Regional and global programmes:</u> The four global policy agreements, mentioned above, are at the core of the Global programme. Up until 2018, advocacy focused on the inclusion of IRM principles in follow-up statements at the global level. As of 2018, the attention shifted more downward towards national level implementation, engaging with country teams for example on the Voluntary National Review processes of the SDG Agenda or the ratification of the Paris Agreement and the related submission of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC). From the documents reviewed, these latter downward oriented processes still remained at an initial phase during PfR SP. While there is evidence from Mali that efforts have been made by PfR to work on the implementation of one of these global policy frameworks, the SDGs (compilation of a National Review), evidence from other countries could not be found. PfR regularly mobilised relevant inputs from different countries to support regional and global events organised in relation to the global policy frameworks and was highly valued for these inputs. This is explained in more detail under JC 2.1. below.

At the level of PfR's regional programmes, the global policy frameworks provided an equally relevant point of reference but it took a rather long time before an initial set of activities begun. The HoA programme started to work as of 2018 with the African Union on processes around the Sendai Framework and with IGAD, to promote IRM in relation to DRR and the Paris Agreement. Attempts were made to align the work of the HoA programme to regional priorities by mapping IRM needs in relevant regional policy frameworks. The West Africa regional programme set off in 2018 and aims to contribute to the implementation of the ECOWAS DRR Strategy by integrating IRM principles and the development and implementation of a cross-border contingency plan for Mali, Guinea Conakry and Burkina-Faso. Little progress has, however, been reported so far from the West Africa programme.

JC 1.3: PfR Alliance members share and align their approach regarding IRM

Country programmes: Among PfR Alliance members there is an overall shared understanding about the content and purpose of the IRM concept, which was already formulated and promoted under PfR I. IRM has worked well as a "chapeau" and thereby as an integrating concept for their collaboration. It embraces their respective working areas and expertise with a perspective to – potentially – bridge silos, create linkages and synergies between trajectories. Acting under such a broad framing brought along some challenges as discussed in the next paragraph, but it allowed the Alliance to stay together and to let each Alliance member find its place and accommodate country specific preferences and priorities. The benefit of having this broad concept to work with should, therefore, not underestimated. **The focus on lobbying and advocacy demanded a more collaborative way of working under PfR SP and helped to connect the engagements of Alliance members at the local and sub-national levels with policy related issues at the national level.** Whilst each partner retained its area of specific expertise, interest and own networks, considerable efforts were made to collaborate. The structuring of a country programme whereby different Alliance members participated on a systematic basis in more than one trajectory helped to break down barriers and to avoid working in silos. Evidently, the extent to which different Alliance members managed to create synergies differed from country to country. Evidence of good and productive forms of collaboration were found in Indonesia, India, Kenya and Uganda. In Indonesia, for example, one of the five trajectories (which operated at the national level) also served as an advisory service for the other trajectories.

The promotion of IRM as an essentially multi-sectoral concept did confront the realities of institutional barriers. Alliance members had to deal with this pragmatically. To be relevant in complex institutional contexts at the national level, which are often organised around sectoral foci such as environment, civil protection or water management, and to be heard when advocating for policy change, the IRM concept had to be broken down into its three principal components, i.e. climate change adaptation, ecosystems management and DRR. This was the case in Uganda and Indonesia but did not undermine the coherence of country programmes. In Indonesia, the IRM concept was moreover not pushed too hard with a focus rather on promoting the ideas and principles enshrined within it and engaging the government on terms and concepts they were familiar with. The Mali case shows a slightly different picture where IRM was strongly promoted to shape identity and ownership (see box 4).

Box 4: The promotion of IRM in Mali helped to give PfR an identity

In Mali, the IRM concept has helped to create the buy-in of different stakeholders. This was particularly so at the local level and shaped an identity around which different interest groups, herders, fishermen and farmers, could gather and seek solutions on a range of ecosystem- and conflict-related issues. The principal focus of the Mali country programme was on ecosystem management and DRR. Some challenges were observed in connecting local change dynamics to the promotion of IRM at the national level and the improvement of the National Strategy for DRR, which was the objective of one of the three country trajectories. Despite these challenges, the three Alliance members used IRM as the common basic concept and worked well together in terms of joint planning and review of the country programme, lessons learning and joint training.

Closely linked to a shared understanding of IRM was an overall common understanding among Alliance members on how to advocate and lobby for IRM. **Findings point out that an approach of "constructive engagement" towards lobbying and advocacy with government prevailed, premised on information sharing, sensitisation and awareness raising through dialogue, advisory support and process facilitation**. It was only in a limited number of countries, such as Kenya that a dissenting position was

pursued. But the Kenya PfR country team was conscious of the difficulties to engage with government. By raising an awareness campaign, including local and national media, around the potential risks of the proposed Crocodile Jaws dam, the team took an evidence-based approach to their advocacy. Beyond the specifics of Kenya, when engaging constructively, the respective partners relied mostly on their established ways of working, entrance points and their mandates but that has not been easy in all situations. In Indonesia, for example, the National Red Cross Society, which is an auxiliary institution of government had to reflect carefully on how it could best engage in advocacy work.

Regional and global programmes: From the Global programme and the HoA programme, similar findings can be recorded. Each of the five Alliance members have brought their own expertise and experience and have complemented one another based on their respective comparative advantage. **At the global level, the concept of IRM helped to connect and to build a broadly coherent approach, which was useful to project PfR's engagement internationally,** for example during international policy events when there was a reason to engage with all five Alliance members towards the same issue. On other occasions, it was useful to split up so that individual Alliance members could engage in smaller policy events at the global level, for example when Cordaid focused on the New Urban Agenda (UN Habitat) or when the Climate Centre focused on the Paris Agreement.

The HoA programme developed an IRM-advocacy manual to harmonise the understanding of IRM across Alliance members and also country teams. Given that advocacy is a new aspect of PfR SP (not a core focus in PfR I), and considering that the HoA programme is new to regional level advocacy, this manual helped fill a skills-gap. The manual was complemented with a training given to all country teams in the region. In doing so, the HoA regional programme has built its own capacity and the capacity of the country teams on the skills needed for IRM advocacy work.

JC 1.4: Gender considerations and inputs from vulnerable and marginalised groups have been included, represented, addressed and mainstreamed in design, implementation and M&E.

Gender in country programmes: With regards to the design of the country programmes, **the extent to which gender was addressed explicitly in country-level theories of change and trajectories varied.** Some countries included an explicit reference to women or gender in their ToC (Indonesia, Mali), or explicitly included it as part of their trajectories, such as Mali and Guatemala, and later Indonesia. The capacity strengthening plans and the Dialogue Capacity Frameworks (DCF) include gender and inclusiveness considerations at the organisational levels, pinpointing where additional training was needed with regards to gender, both amongst Alliance members and among implementing partners. Gender has also been addressed in the Capacity Strengthening Goals 2020 (as was the inclusion of marginalised groups).

Some good results have been achieved, for example in Mali where land ownership was granted and codified in land transfer deeds to women, and where the representation of women in disaster prevention and management committees increased to 40%. In Indonesia, a national training programme on gender-sensitive IRM planning was developed by CARE with the Ministry of Villages, which is now being used to train community empowerment officers. In Guatemala, PfR developed a monitoring and evaluation system together with the Gender Unit of the National Disaster Reduction Agency.

Overall, most country teams noted that the mainstreaming and integration of gender considerations could have been stronger, e.g. through more targeted training and sensitisation on gender dimensions in specific policy domains. This includes Uganda and Mali, but also India and the Philippines.

Some countries noted the need for a stronger focus on gender *equity* instead of equality – e.g. in Uganda, where the country team would like to go beyond the representation of more women and spend additional efforts on women and women's issues. Another example is Guatemala where the country team felt it might have focussed too much on women's organisations, and neglected other CSO in its efforts to strengthen the integration of IRM and gender. The PfR team in Kenya realised it had done quite a bit on gender mainstreaming, but this had not been documented well enough to ensure learning and sharing. The fact that CARE was not present in Kenya was seen as a missing element by the country team to strengthen gender work even further.

In several country programmes, PfR country teams benefitted from the expertise of CARE in applying a gender lens in the programme design and implementation. This was noted for example in the cases of Uganda, Mali and Indonesia but was no guarantee to systematically mainstream gender across all trajectories and Alliance members. In Indonesia, gender was an explicit focus in one trajectory, which was led by CARE. The results of the CARE Gender Marker self-assessment tool in Indonesia (introduced in 2019, as in all other PfR countries) however revealed the need for considerable additional work to be done to ensure the four other Alliance members were able to promote gender adequately across the other trajectories. In Uganda, the CARE Gender Marker tool was introduced to analyse how the programme addresses gender and allows for suggestions for further improvement. This was appreciated but the extra time and resources required to apply the marker and implement the recommendations were seen by several interviewees as prohibitive. **The lack of an overarching PfR gender strategy and guidance on gender was identified as one of the missing elements in the overall PfR SP design to ensure stronger gender integration across all Alliance members and trajectories.**

Gender-disaggregated reporting (notably in the annual report) is mainstreamed to a certain extent, in the sense that some countries (for example Mali) provide gender-disaggregated data on how many men and women attended trainings, meetings, etc. Separate thematic sections are foreseen in annual reports requesting the country programmes to reflect specifically on gender as well as inclusion. Some country programmes revealed some inconsistent reporting against these reporting requirements, including Uganda but also Indonesia and India.

<u>Gender in regional and global programmes:</u> The interpretation of working on gender and inclusion at regional and global levels differs from the national level, since these do not work directly with communities. As such it is deemed more difficult to directly integrate the concerns and interests of marginalised groups in its work (while there was a sense that there was room for improvement, see below). For regional and global programmes, working on inclusion and gender mainly meant linking up with or promoting (better implementation and knowledge of) country programmes, initiatives and policies that address women and marginalised groups.

There is a noticeable difference in the way regional programmes have addressed gender. For example, the HoA programme was developed based on the rationale that there were issues common across the region, including, amongst others, the changing gender structures as a result of climate change (for example changing social and economic roles of men and women in pastoralist communities). Gender is incorporated in the HoA programme's regional ToC, with the objective to promote risk screening, within one of the trajectories, and the expectation that this would lead to more gender-sensitive IRM investments. Other regional programmes, such as the West Africa programme do not address gender at all. It is however, unclear, if this was a deliberate choice. Regional programmes, including the HoA programme, have reflected on where there is room for improvement. Examples include facilitating the participation of vulnerable and marginalised communities in meetings with regional policy makers in the AU and IGAD.

At the global level, the approach to gender was to build on examples, experiences and lessons from the country programmes and to incorporate these into the lobbying and advocacy work of the GPG. For example, in the urban trajectory, a finding relating to the different needs of women in spatial planning has been integrated into the key messages, which the GPG has brought to global fora. The GPG also worked with UN-Environment on various occasions and was accepted as a partner in the Network of African Women Environmentalists (NAWE), launched on 8 March 2019 by UN-Environment together with Africa Development Bank (AfDB), UN Climate Centre Technology Network, UNDP, FAO, Waangari Mathai Foundation and UN Women. The Network is meant to play an important role in promoting women change leaders on the climate change adaptation and restoration agenda. The GPG also recognises that addressing gender equality requires long-term investments into shifting societal behaviours and norms. At a more practical level, gender is addressed by ensuring equal representation of women and men at global events and the GPG supports the rejection of so-called 'manels' – man-only panels. There is also a good gender balance in the GPG team.

Inclusion in country programmes: Overall, the design of country programmes has been geared to vulnerable and marginalised communities at greatest risk of disasters. This is also reflected in the selection of contracted CSOs, such as in the Philippines and India, which have an explicit mandate to work with the most marginalised sections of communities and to help build their resilience. The target audience in Mali's three trajectories is defined as 'vulnerable groups' (herders, anglers, women, young people), but also people with disabilities. In Indonesia, the selection of localities for three trajectories that engage at community level, was moreover determined by consideration of existing demographic, disaster risk and socio-economic data, generating a positive bias towards supporting communities that have a higher proportion of vulnerable and marginalised groups.

Some promising results have been achieved. In India, for example, implementing partners were able to unlock investments and financial support for IRM interventions, earmarked for poor rural communities by tapping into a national act that ensures protection for the rural poor. In Uganda, PfR promoted the inclusion of disadvantaged communities, not only as a general principle in its advocacy but also actively supported consultation and uptake of vulnerable community voices in policy-making processes at the national level (see box 5 below).

Box 5: Supporting vulnerable groups in Uganda

> PfR practice activities have strengthened capacities of vulnerable communities to reduce the impact of disasters and pursue IRM through supporting community groups and strengthening village saving and lending associations. PfR Uganda partners have also facilitated the inclusion of community voices in national policy processes by supporting regional consultation of communities logistically and financially, and sometimes by applying political pressure. Although PfR partners made much progress in better involving women in the activities, the programme did not have a strong focus on gender equity.

However, reporting results and outcomes of the overall impact of PfR on marginalised groups remains rather opaque and hidden. This may be attributed to the lack of clear definitions or denomination of who exactly these groups of vulnerable or marginalised people comprise and what the sources/ causes of marginalisation and vulnerability are. While defining who constitutes a vulnerable community in a certain area or locality is a sensitive undertaking, it was done to some extent in some programmes. In Indonesia, the country programme team noted it drew on existing data and evidence on national demographic, socio-economic and environmental data for the initial selection of provinces, districts and villages. In Haiti, the

Artibonite river basin region was added to the programme in 2017 based on the potential that increased effort around IRM could have on large communities vulnerable to flooding in the area. But this type of explicit reasoning on who constituted a vulnerable community and why precisely, was not done systematically across the programmes. In many instances, the concepts of vulnerability, marginalisation and inclusion, but also gender and women, are used intermittently creating some overlap and confusion. This has hampered both gender and inclusion-disaggregated monitoring and evaluation of impacts and results on specifically targeted (groups of) women and vulnerable groups. Such shortcomings were recognised during the PfR Mid-term Stock Taking in October 2018. A study on inclusion was undertaken in 2019 and **in 2020 a "PfR Step-by-step Guide to Inclusive Resilience" was published to provide IRM trainers and practitioners with guidance on how to mainstream inclusion of the most marginalised groups into their programmes**.

Inclusion in regional and global programmes: **As with gender, the regional and global programmes do not interact directly with marginalised and vulnerable communities.** A range of references were found to vulnerable groups and inclusion in the GPG's work, but the work is more steered towards including and representing issues pertaining to inclusiveness, without addressing them directly. A similar approach was taken by the HoA programme. Here, inclusion is seen more from the point of view of calling for inclusive policies that are sensitive to the needs of marginalised groups such as pastoralists, women etc. In this way, there is recognition that by working on regional programmes that address marginalised groups it would help amplify the interests of these groups. The global programme set out to amplify the actions at the local level, and aimed to leverage it in global policy fora and discussions. While for gender, some good examples were noted (see above), this was less explicitly the case with respect to the inclusion of vulnerable groups. According to interviewees, there would be an opportunity to pay more attention to this in the future as, for example, in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which displays a growing attention for IRM-related issues, including attention to vulnerable communities.

JC 1.5. The PfR's Theory of Change and the underlying key assumptions in relation to capacity strengthening of CSOs and the engagement with other stakeholders on IRM has been valid[5].

Clarification concerning this complementary JC: A ToC is a living document that serves as a road map to guide the way in which a programme conducts its engagements/influencing strategies in order to achieve desired outcomes. Compared to a log-frame approach, which sets out a linear cause and effect relationship between inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts, a ToC provides a more nuanced understanding and appreciation of a variety of actions that are deemed necessary to shape and influence outcomes, especially in complex and uncertain environments. In this regard, a ToC is very much suited to programmes such as PfR that seek to influence policy processes, rather than to directly deliver programme activities itself. Underlying any ToC aimed at policy influencing, are a set of assumptions related to the understanding of how policy is formulated and executed and on how external actors can engage to influence such policy processes. A ToC, however, remains relevant only so long as its applicability is continuously interrogated and adjusted based on lessons of experience. In so doing, it provides an important tool for strategic management.

[5] This JC was not part of the original evaluation matrix. Collecting and analysing the findings across the evaluation and taking into account the request of PfR as formulated in the ToR to assess the validity of the ToC, the evaluation team decided to include a separate judgment to discuss this issue in more detail.

Findings: For a programme such as PfR which works at global, regional and country levels, it is challenging to come up with a one-size-fits-all ToC as contexts matter and rarely do policy process follow standard and replicable pathways. **PfR did well therefore to set a generic ToC on the understanding that the ToC would need to be re-calibrated to make sense in different contexts at global, regional and country levels.** This also helped to shape ownership among country and regional partners in particular.

An overriding feature of the programme ToC was that the adoption of IRM policies, investments and practices would be best achieved by empowering implementing partners to lobby and advocate for IRM in relevant policy processes. This would also be important from the perspective of sustainability and creating downward accountability. To empower such CSOs, Alliance members would need to invest in strengthening their capacity to play this role. The assumption was that such CSOs existed already in some shape or form, and that they were willing to take up this mandate.

Findings from the evaluation reveal the following:

- **The generic ToC presented a very clear and cogent approach that positioned CSOs as the vectors of change, premised on an investment in their capacity to lobby and advocate for IRM.** Given the programme's overarching D&D focus, it is understandable that the TOC presented such a pathway for influencing change, and in so doing privileging the role of civil society. (It is noted however that the regional and global programmes, whilst part of the PfR SP design do not figure prominently in this ToC.)
- Whilst the ToC was formulated as a guiding rudder, only, **allowing countries in particular to formulate their own localised ToC responsive to country level realities and helping to build local ownership**, the ToC had significant influence on the resourcing and structuring of the programme - for example on how capacity strengthening was positioned as a tool to empower CSOs to lead on IRM lobby and advocacy, and on how programmes were expected to report on results achieved through the programme monitoring and evaluation (PME) system.
- **Countries did go on to formulate their own country-level ToCs but it is difficult to fully appreciate the assumptions and subsequent pathways of change that underpinned these**, including the rationale for selecting certain trajectories and for the relative focus given to the three domains of policy, investment and practice. The relationship between the country and generic ToCs are also difficult to see.
- **In practice, all evidence suggests that the generic TOC was overly simplistic and uni-directional in the way it expected policy processes to be influenced. De facto, countries resorted to multiple pathways to influence policy processes.** These for sure included working through implementing partners but only where this made sense. In addition, Alliance members identified alternative pathways that were appropriate in the given contexts, including working directly with state institutions, and working with a broader spectrum of different types of civil society entities at community and national levels. Findings from the evaluation demonstrated that the strengthening of implementing partners has to be done in parallel to other forms of engagement given that capacity strengthening is not a one-shot exercise but rather a lengthy process. By contrast, policy processes can pop up unexpectedly at any time, so windows of opportunity need to be seized and one cannot always wait for capacities to be first strengthened. Findings also demonstrate that the ways of working in a middle-income country where the functioning of the state is stronger and where budgetary resources are available are quite different from those that are suited to weaker institutional environments or circumstances of insecurity.
- **Such de facto adaptations from the generic uni-directional ToC are however not well expressed in the country level ToCs and remain implicit rather than explicit, even though in most countries some adjustments to their respective ToCs were made.** Equally, the lessons of

experience from the field that saw different pathways being pursued, did not result in an adjustment of the generic TOC. Therefore 5 years on, one finds the same generic ToC in place even though its resonance and applicability has been brought into question. Ideally a revised ToC would have been formulated that would have reflected the more multi-dimensional change processes that have been pursued. The lack of adjustment means therefore that the generic ToC has lost some of its relevance and this has implications for the overall steering role that the generic ToC can play. It is also noted that the inter-linkages between the country, regional and global ToCs were not well captured in the generic ToC nor the respective country level ToCs.

- As for the formulation process, considerable efforts had to be invested for the drafting of country-specific ToC and relating trajectories, but this helped to bring country teams more closely together for planning – and later – implementation and reporting.

There is ample evidence that country programmes have demonstrated an intimate knowledge of their policy and institutional environments and have carefully selected strategies and employed tactics to achieve significant results. But in the view of the evaluation team, more could have been done to use the ToC (at generic and country levels) as a strategic tool, in order to critically question the underlying assumptions of the programme and to draw consequences from the analysis made.

4.2. EQ 2: Value added and complementarity

EQ 2: To what extent has the PfR's support been of added value and complementary to what non-PfR programme actors have been doing in support of IRM and have the efforts of the Alliance and the NL MFA been complementary to each other and of added value to both?

The evaluation question about added value and complementarity was explored from the vantage point of judgement criteria addressing i) PfR engagements with non-PfR supported actors and ii) its engagements with the MFA.

Summary response: The evaluation found that at the country and regional levels, opportunities to engage horizontally with like-minded funders have been generally underexploited – but Alliance member have targeted a broad spectrum of state and non-state actors and stakeholders in the promotion of IRM (as will be more explicitly discussed under EQ 3). The GPG has carried out its engagements at the international level well and has generated 'upward' added value, such as by creating visibility for country-level work in global fora. At the regional level, as could be noted from the HoA case study, various initial contacts with a variety of international and regional organisations were pursued by regionally as well as globally operating PfR Alliance staff members.

On engagements with non-PfR supported actors: At country level, greater efforts could have been made to purposefully promote synergies with like-minded initiatives funded by international partners, especially with respect to leveraging funding opportunities. Dedicated efforts to work with other D&D partnerships funded by the MFA were also not found. This more siloed approach with respect to engagement with other projects or funding organisations can be contrasted with the significant engagement by Alliance members with a variety of different non-contracted country stakeholders at national, sub-national and community levels (as further discussed under EQ 3).

By contrast, the GPG has more purposefully engaged with a multitude of different actors at the international level as part of its outreach and lobbying role. This has helped to draw attention of the international community to PfR work including at the country level. Added value was generated by the GPG by creating visibility for country-level work within global for a, thereby adding to the strong brand and positive reputation for PFR's knowledge and expertise obtained from the field. Overall, exchanges with donors have so far not led to substantial additional funding or programming with the exception of the ECO-DRR programme that started in May 2019.

On engagements with the MFA: The Steering Group (SG) as well as Programme Working Group (PWG) members have interacted constructively with different departments of the Netherlands MFA, which led to added value and complementarity for PfR and the MFA. Interactions strengthened knowledge on policy directions of the Netherlands government and allowed for feedback on where the programme could be strengthened. Alliance members and the MFA officials share a strong motivation to collaborate around the objectives of the programme, however, due to competing demands, the contact time between the Alliance (members and representatives) and the MFA is limited and not as extensive as MFA officials would have liked to see. The MFA has however opened various doors to facilitate the participation of PfR as a credible partner on IRM related discussions in international forums.

At regional and country level, the extent of engagement with the Netherlands MFA has been rather modest and, in some instances, almost non-existent. Though it is recognised that in some countries, albeit modest, the embassy has facilitated access to various country-level stakeholders and initiatives. At the country level, this is attributed to a number of factors namely, lack of ownership of PfR SP by embassies due to it being centrally designed and funded, limited alignment with MFA country strategies and priorities, and – most importantly – both a shortage and high turn-over of staff. As a result, in several PfR countries of engagement, the potential of strategically partnering and seeking complementarities with the work of the Dutch embassies have remained untapped.

JC 2.1: The PfR support has been complementary and of added value to efforts of non-PfR supported actors for IRM at local, national, regional and global levels

Country programmes: The country programmes have engaged with a wide variety of non-PfR supported actors at local and national level, who have very diverse capacities and capacity building needs. The extent of engagement with these different partners has varied considerably. These non-PfR supported actors and partners at local and national level can be defined as: (1) Non-contracted partners (CSOs, CBOs and their platforms), (2) government officials and their respective departments, (3) other actors of civil society, including the media, academics and the private sector and (4) offices of international cooperation agencies in PfR countries and the organisations funded by their programmes (from government and civil society). This JC focuses primarily on the last category though some findings with regard to the country level are included.

Overall, the outreach by PfR at country level to create added value and seek complementarity with non-contracted organisations has been mostly directed to government departments, CSOs, CBOs and their platforms. The horizontal collaboration with the media and the private sector has been more limited. Connections with the international donor environment and efforts to seek complementarities with other donor-funded initiatives that focus on resilience and environment have been – according to the findings – rather modest, with some exceptions.

- In Indonesia, PFR funds have been used to develop a city-wide Urban farming master plan based on the experiences of an Urban Farming pilot project funded by the Ford Foundation and Cordaid in Jakarta. PFR SP has also collaborated with USAID APIK programme to engaged the Ministry of Spatial Planning, to prepare guidelines on how to include climate risk management and climate change in spatial planning.
- In Uganda, there is some evidence of a shared analysis with the Climate Action Network Uganda and joint advocacy activities to promote IRM in the national climate change policy and bill. But there is little evidence that active steps were taken so far by the Uganda country team to explore complementarities (and identify investments opportunities) with other projects in the domains of climate change, DRR, wetlands management or resilience.
- At a multi-country level, PfR has since 2019 collaborated with UNEP in a project called ECO-DRR (see box 6). The programme is funded by the European Commission (DG DEVCO) and aims to upscale community-based ecosystem-based disaster risk reduction (ECO-DRR). It is being implemented in Haiti, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia and Uganda, where UNEP is working with PfR country teams on a daily basis.
- A somewhat disappointing example is recorded from Mali. The Ministry of Environment receives significant funding from the World Bank to implement a climate change related programme ('Strengthening Climate Resilience Project for Mali', total project cost $ 33 million), aimed to improve the provision of and the access to the country's hydro-meteorological, early warning and emergency response services. But exchanges or collaboration with PfR are non-existent.

Box 6: ECO-DRR an example of partnering, upscaling and fundraising from new sources

> *"Since last May 2019 PfR is working in a partnership with UNEP on a DEVCO funded project ECO-DRR, around upscaling community-based ECO-DRR, 2019-2021. Therefore, UNEP is working with country teams on a daily basis. We see how the two programmes (PfR SP and ECO-DRR) can build synergies, in carrying forward implementation and upscaling. UNEP is usually better at networking and higher-level policy making, but less good in field implementation. It is useful for UNEP to work with PfR partners. And the integrated DRR approach is quite similar to Ecosystem-based Disaster Risk Reduction' (ECO-DRR). UNEP can build on PfR's existing work".*

Source: Karen Sudmeier-Rieux, Senior advisor, Disaster Risk Reduction Crisis Management Branch Policy and Programme Division, United Nations Environment Programme, 24 March 2020

Regional and global programmes: Overall, as interviewees noted, PfR has its 'brand' and has gained a good reputation. It is recognised for its knowledge, expertise and its ability to bring experiences from the country level into global fora. **Non-PfR actors consulted for the global case study noted how the PfR Alliance helped to leverage the different strengths of the respective partners the Alliance worked with.** The GPG established partnerships with governments, inter-governmental organisations, academia and practitioners, in particular to strengthen GPG trajectories on climate change and ecosystem management. These partners included amongst others, the Global Centre on Adaptation and UN Environment; coalitions such as the IFRC-led One Billion Coalition, the UN Secretary General's A2R initiative on Resilience, GFDRR, ISDR's 20 Resilient Cities initiative; and networks like BRACED, the Global

Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction (GNDR) and the Environment and Humanitarian Action Network. In the gender domain, GPG reached out to various networks on the climate change adaptation and restoration agenda to bring women change leaders into the international debate. In March 2019, GPG was accepted as a partner in the Network of African Women Environmentalists (NAWE) as described under JC 1.4.

In the HoA, the African Union and African regional organisations, which are semi-political bodies, and which PfR SP works with are selective about which civil society actors they engage with and in what ways. PfR therefore relied on the Red Cross and its affiliation with the IFRC which has a liaison office at the AU on disaster response. As a result, trust was built and visibility was realised within the AU. There are examples of stand-alone activities organised by the HoA-programme with academia and international development actors, with for example USAID, WISER, Global Framework for Climate Services. But these are more experience sharing and learning opportunities and there is no evidence of these ad-hoc activities having added value to the participating organisations. Nor is there evidence of follow-up and collaborative/complementary activities that were carried out with other non-PfR actors.

Another added value of PfR (through the GPG) was that it facilitated PfR Alliance members at country level to connect with the global level and share experiences, priorities and perspectives. One interviewee noted that this ability to upscale lessons from the local to the regional and global level was seen as a key added value of PfR by international partners. Given its presence in ten countries, PfR was seen as being able to influence decisions at various events at the global and regional levels (see box 7).

Box 7: Upscaling local lessons to the regional and global levels

Concerning the UNFCCC, some PfR country teams joined (different) international country delegations attending the Conference of the Parties (COP) meetings, as well as other regional and international conferences. PfR was present during the COP24 held in December 2018 in Poland. The Uganda team helped with the preparation of a parliamentary delegation to the COP25 in Madrid in 2019, while Indonesia joined the country delegation and participated in the COP meeting and side events. PfR Mali programme staff participated also in the Africa-Arab DRR preparatory conference in Mauritius (2016), the Global Platform for DRR in Cancun, Mexico (2017) and the Africa-Arab DRR preparatory conference in Tunis, Tunisia (2018), where PfR Mali staff participated in a panel in relation to the preparation of the Asian Ministerial Conference on DRR in Mongolia (2018) and shared experiences originating from the Mali Mopti region. PfR Guatemala took part in the government delegation to the Global Platform for DRR in Cancun, Mexico in 2017 were it shared experiences on how to bridge (coordination and information exchange) gaps between different government institutions as regards IRM. In 2019, PfR members participated in the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction meeting in Geneva, and formulated ten targeted policy recommendations based on IRM for the meeting. Other events were the Habitat III Conference in Quito (2016), the event on the SDG implementation in New York (2018).

JC 2.2: The PfR programme and the resilience-related efforts of NL MFA were complementary to each other and of added value to both the PfR Alliance and NL MFA

Overall programme and GPG: **Overall, the GPG worked well with different departments of the MFA, which generated added value and complementarity for the programme and the Ministry**, in terms of i) ensuring a continued policy exchange on the programme's direction; ii) creating visibility for the Netherlands' work around resilience and DRR, and iii) creating access for PfR to global policy making fora.

According to interviewees, the consistent interactions provided insight on policy directions of the Netherlands government and allowed for feedback on where the programme could be strengthened. At PfR headquarters level, Alliance members and MFA officials have demonstrated a strong motivation to collaborate around the objectives of the programme, which are deemed important and relevant. Twice a year, the MFA has a policy exchange with PfR, one focussing on the annual plan, and one on the annual report. Once per year, the MFA meets with senior PfR management and leadership, including SG members. Other (informal) exchanges with MFA officials take place at SG and PWG level in relation to PfR but also with other departments of the MFA (outside DSO and IGG) in as far as it concerns resilience, ecosystem management or climate change adaptation. Due to limited time available to MFA officials, it has not proven possible to organise more substantive exchanges with the programme despite high interest to do so.

The GPG established partnerships with different departments at the MFA in The Hague in the context of global policy frameworks and international events and conferences, which helped identify which opportunities could be optimised. This was particularly the case with officials from the Inclusive Green Growth (IGG) Department. For example, the IGG was instrumental in facilitating access for PfR to Task Forces designing sessions on resilience for the Technical Expert Meetings (TEMs). Such engagements further opened doors for PfR to be considered as a credible partner in the organising committee for the TEM in 2018. The MFA also connected PfR to the Stockholm Environment Institute after which PfR secured a speaking slot to advance the community resilience agenda during the Paris Agreement's COP23 preparatory meetings. PfR was also included in the Netherlands delegation to the COP23 in Germany in November 2017.

For the urban trajectory of the GPG, PfR engaged the MFA and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment during the preparatory meetings (which took place in 2016 in Indonesia) to explore opportunities for PfR's inclusion in the Netherlands Government Delegation during the New Urban Agenda (UN Habitat III meetings) meetings in Quito, Ecuador. **These good relations opened other doors to higher political echelons**, including for example the organisation of a CSO meeting with Minister Kaag of Foreign Affairs at the COP24 upon a request by the MFA. Other Ministries too were able to provide PfR access to high-level policy making forums, for example the Dutch Embassy in Rome and access to meetings advancing the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2417 on Hunger and Conflict.

Country and regional programmes: In most PfR countries, the interaction between country teams and Dutch embassies have been limited to irregular exchanges, stand-alone workshops or particular events hosted by Dutch Embassies. Some of the challenges holding back more strategic engagement include: i) insufficient staffing levels at Embassy level; ii) high staff turnover in some of the embassies; iii) insufficient ownership at Embassy level, as the PfR programme is managed at headquarter level. This has created difficulties to accompany such a project over a longer period of time and to engage with PfR actors, including implementing partners, non-contracted partners and CBOs in a more strategic manner. These observations correspond with the findings of the 2019 IOB Evaluation of the functioning of strategic partnerships between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and civil society organisations.

According to interviewees, there is a perceived limited ownership of PfR SP by MFA officials compared to projects directly funded by the embassies. PfR Alliance staff members noted that the limited collaboration in some countries was due to the fact that food, water or climate were not priority topics in those specific embassies or in the Multi-Annual Strategic Plans. In some instances, the limited engagement with Dutch Embassies is in contrast with good intentions and ambitions set out at the start of PfR SP.

- In Uganda, a discussion took place in the early stages of PfR on how the Netherlands embassy could play a role. This included the question on how the embassy could help increase access to government, private sector and other IRM stakeholders to provide more opportunities for dialogue in IRM, facilitate sharing of lessons and best practices among strategic IRM stakeholders, etc. The modest engagement was primarily the result of limited human resource capacity.
- In Mali, at the start of PfR SP in2016,, efforts were made, facilitated by the Netherlands Embassy to engage more strategically with other projects funded by the Netherlands government. But there is no evidence that this resulted in any follow-up or complementarity of action. And there is little evidence that the Netherlands Embassy saw the PfR programme as a strategic or complementary programme for its support to resilience in Mali. The Embassy's principal instrument in support of resilience is the PADIN II funded project, implemented by CARE Mali but there are no apparent synergies between PADIN II and PfR.

Different types of experiences were recorded from other countries of engagement. In Ethiopia, the role of the embassy in its relation with PfR was mainly defined by its convening power to ensure access to specific government stakeholders, in Kenya, in the facilitation of contacts with the private sector. In India, the engagement and contacts between PfR India and the Embassy increased after the launch of the 'Water as Leverage for Resilient Cities in Asia' programme, with jointly held meetings and further engagement to share PfR results. Also, in Kenya, the engagement with and by the embassy only improved in the later phases of the programme. The absence of an embassy in Haiti and Guatemala was an obstacle to working more closely with other resilience related efforts of the MFA. A positive example comes from the Philippines, were the pivotal role of the Dutch Ambassador was noted in ensuring that the Alliance could contribute as part of the Dutch expert team in the Manila Bay Sustainable Development Master Plan. In the Philippines, there were also exchanges between the embassy and Alliance members on climate financing and public investments strategy.

Another finding from the case studies was that no particular linkages or targeted engagements existed with other D&D activities funded by the MFA. In Mali, for example, there is the Water, Peace and Security Partnership (WPS) which also works in the Niger Delta where PfR SP is implemented. There are no records of collaboration with this partnership, yet Wetlands International is one of the six WSP partners.

Given the apparent limited attention given to the PfR programme in some countries, Alliance staff members have stopped making dedicated efforts to connect pro-actively with officials from the Netherlands Embassy. As such, the potential of strategically partnering and seeking complementarities with the work of the Embassies and with the objectives of the MFA more widely, have remained untapped in these countries. This is notably visible for example in Indonesia, where exchanges between PfR and the NL Embassy are very limited, while Indonesia and the Netherlands have a long-standing track record of working on urban water management, soil subsidence and the prevention of urban flooding in Jakarta and its surroundings.

At the regional level, there is very little evidence of a strategic engagement between the regional PfR programmes and the MFA that might have created clear complementarity and added value at the regional level. There was also no evidence of synergies sought with other Netherlands funded resilience programmes or embassies in any of the regional programmes. These findings need to be seen, however, against the background of the PfR regional programmes being comparatively new, and also the fact that Netherlands embassies largely carry national (and not regional) portfolios in the countries they are present.

4.3. EQ 3: Effectiveness of engagement

EQ 3: To what extent has the PfR Alliance been effective in applying good practices in the design, delivery and monitoring of capacity strengthening support for IRM to PfR contracted and non-contracted partners working at national and sub-national levels?

The evaluation question on capacity strengthening approaches was examined through three related judgement criteria: i) the extent to which capacity strengthening work is guided by a participatory and structured capacity diagnostic process; ii) how capacity strengthening work is informed by a strategy and clear plans and iii) the extent to which capacity strengthening progress is monitored and reported on.

Summary response: PfR SP recognises capacity strengthening as a process and not a single event and has invested considerable efforts to develop an approach that supports capacity strengthening of country level stakeholders. The programme has scored quite well from the perspective of tools and formats used to support diagnostic work, planning of interventions and reporting. Overall, these are considered robust and relevant. However, there was insufficient technical backstopping provided to the country level to ensure effective use of available tools. Efforts were also made to provide strategic direction through the formulation and later updating of an overall capacity strengthening strategy. However, this strategy has fallen short in terms of its comprehensiveness because of its more narrow focus on strengthening the capacity of implementing partners and CBOs only. In so doing, it has not addressed the equally important work of strengthening the capacity of other stakeholders, in particular, government actors. Whilst it is understood that the D&D funding instrument specifically targeted civil society actors, there remains a strong case for providing complementary support to such other actors.

Focus of capacity strengthening: Considerable capacity strengthening work has been carried out as reflected in the PME reports. Country stakeholders recognise that capacity strengthening is a process rather than a one-time event and have applied a range of techniques to strengthen capacity. These include coaching, knowledge sharing, advisory support, peer learning as well as more conventional training. Because of the focus on implementing partners and CBOs in the monitoring framework, the attention to capacity change among other actor groups, government actors in particular, was not systematically captured. While the need for capacity strengthening of government actors was a regular theme of discussion at overall programme as well as country programme level, the key attention remained on the capacity strengthening of implementing partners and CBOs. This was clearly needed for contexts where these organisations had a lack of lobby and advocacy capacity but in other country contexts questions were raised why the capacity strategy approach was not more comprehensive.

Capacity diagnostic process: The “capacity of whom and for what” question was guided by the programme’s overarching ToC, which positioned implementing partners as the main target of capacity strengthening support so as to empower them to sustainably lobby and advocate for IRM. It was recognised that other stakeholder groups (government actors as well as other non-IRM related organisations from civil society) might also benefit from capacity strengthening support, however, such support was not classified or reported on as part of the programme’s capacity strengthening intervention nor featured in the ToC. In practice, country partners – in low-middle income countries such as

Indonesia - found it inappropriate to work in this more focused way and de facto distributed their capacity strengthening support across a wider range of stakeholder groups. The tools for capacity diagnostic (see below) were however used primarily to determine the needs of the implementing partners, making it difficult to judge the basis on which capacity strengthening support to other stakeholders, including governments, was determined.

The dialogue capacity framework (DCF) tool is considered by evaluators to be a robust and relevant tool. However, evidence points to it being cumbersome and time demanding to apply and not necessarily appropriate for all entities. As a result, it has not been used systematically and the quality of inputs has varied considerably. A general finding is that additional resources (time, money and expertise) were required to ensure its effective use. Based on diagnostic work, country programmes have prepared plans for capacity strengthening activities and have reported on progress made. As earlier indicated, this planning and reporting is restricted mainly to the support provided to implementing partners, and did not include other targeted stakeholders. In the case of the regional and global programmes, the main target of capacity strengthening support has been the Alliance members themselves, due in large part to the fact the Alliance took a decision to not work with CSOs at this level.

Capacity strengthening planning: Capacity strengthening plans are developed during the course of the PME workshops and build on the results of the DCF, however, as reported before, the DCF has not necessarily been administered routinely nor comprehensively in all cases. In addition, a Capacity Strengthening Goals 2020 planning and reporting framework has been used to guide capacity strengthening work across all countries, but this has so far not been implemented uniformly across all countries. With the exception of generic questions about the changing context in country annual reporting and planning documents, neither the design process nor the planning of capacity strengthening activities has paid a particular attention to the political dimensions of the context in which these activities are implemented. That said, it is evident that country programmes have implicitly taken account of political dynamics.

Capacity strengthening progress monitoring: The DCF provides a mechanism for tracking changes in capacity over time. Its effectiveness, however, depends on a systematic and routine reapplication of the tool on at least an annual basis. There is evidence from several countries that this has been done but evidence is more limited on the extent to which this also provided a solid basis for progress monitoring, the adaptation of sequencing and the prioritisation of interventions. Similarly, the Capacity Strengthening Goals 2020 planning framework provides an additional way to identify needs, track progress and adjust priorities. What is possibly missing from both tools are a set of indicators to facilitate the tracking of changes in capacity. Country stakeholders noted a lack of strategic guidance from headquarters with respect to capacity strengthening, although the evaluation team is aware that an update of the capacity strategy developed in 2016 was produced in 2018. Some believe it would have been useful to prepare country level strategies that reflect the country context and that better embed capacity strengthening within the country level ToCs.

JC 3.1: The PfR has designed capacity strengthening interventions at country level on the basis of a structured and participatory capacity diagnostic exercise that has examined different dimensions of capacity and engaged local stakeholders in the diagnostic process, including taking account of local contextual/ political dynamics.

Country programmes: The overall ToC of the PfR SP envisages the programme to "strengthen the capacities of civil society organisations so that these CSOs could strategically engage, in partnership with other CSOs, with government, private sector stakeholders and leaders and decision makers". From the evaluation one can distinguish six types of organisations that need to be considered when discussing capacity strengthening. These were described in box 2, chapter 3.

A focus on implementing partners and CBOs: Findings show that the principal focus of PfR's dedicated capacity strengthening activities and instruments were geared towards the second group while recognising that Alliance members were also in need of capacity strengthening to enable them to strengthen the lobby and advocacy capacities of implementing partners and CBOs. Following the ToC and the capacity strengthening approach and relating support was set up with this more narrow template in mind while, in reality, the PfR country teams had to engage with a much wider group of stakeholders to strengthen capacity in pursuit of IRM.

From the Uganda and Indonesia country case studies, it appears that PfR SP Alliance members did not conduct a general scanning or mapping of stakeholders to identify the different organisations the Alliance would work with for capacity strengthening. However, it is clear that Alliance members understood the political and policy context within which they engaged and were strategic in selecting partners and stakeholders to cooperate with in one way or the other. Findings moreover show that Alliance members in Uganda and Indonesia continued working with partners they had engaged with under PfR I. In Mali, a decision was taken to discontinue collaboration with national CSOs, which PfR had collaborated with during PfR I and to work instead at the community level. A SWOT analysis of various CBOs was undertaken as well as an analysis of the context, including a study on the status quo of the decentralisation process in Mali.

Diagnostic instruments: The principal instrument for diagnosing capacity gaps of partner organisations and for proposing interventions to remedy these gaps was the Dialogue Capacity Framework (DCF). This was set up as a self-assessment tool, which implementing partners and CBOs worked with to the best of their abilities, sometimes on their own, sometimes with the support of Alliance members. The DCF is focused on the internal capacity dimensions of CSOs but does not include any specific questions or sections that demand for a contextual/political analysis and the capacities needed of the CSOs to respond to context. A dedicated instrument that would more systematically ask about the context/political contexts ahead of engaging in a capacity strengthening trajectory was not designed. However, generic questions about ongoing changes in the context were asked in the annual country reporting and planning documents.

Generally, respondents found the DCF useful but not always easy to work with. The Uganda case describes that the quality of input delivered by PfR partners in the DCF was very diverse, with some having provided detailed self-assessments but others only providing very brief and general information of limited usefulness. From the Indonesia case, there is evidence that the DCF tool – while useful in pin-pointing areas of need – was found to be quite complex to apply and time-demanding. Its value for assessing the capacity of networks, fora or associations (group four, above) was also questioned. It was felt that additional technical guidance and support on how to apply the DCF tool could have been provided from the headquarters level, a concern that points at limited PfR capacities to accompany the capacity strengthening processes across

ten PfR countries adequately. By contrast, there were no problems mentioned with regard to using the DCF tool in Mali. The DCFs are updated once a year, in English, and function as a tool for the PfR country lead to monitor, report and reflect on capacity strengthening needs, but in exchange with the respective PfR non-contracted partners at the community level.

Working with government actors: The engagement with government and their capacity needs with respect to taking on board IRM was a recurrent topic of discussion at overall PfR programme level as well as at country level. Findings from Indonesia, Uganda but also other countries such as India and Kenya show that government officials, required significant capacity support to broaden their understanding, appreciation and readiness to work with IRM concepts and principles (see box 8). Without their understanding and cooperation on IRM, lobbying and advocacy could not have been successful. Hence, capacity strengthening efforts were regularly directed towards government entities at national, sub-national and local levels as part of the Alliance's broader engagement strategy. It is not clear, however, how the support required by such government actors was diagnosed and followed up on as the diagnostic and planning tools and reporting formats available for capacity strengthening work were only used systematically to support CSO capacity strengthening. Instead, the support provided to government actors was categorised and reported on as part of wider lobbying and advocacy interventions. The reason for this apparent anomaly relates to the fact that the PfR SP is first and foremost a CSO capacity strengthening programme, which the Alliance needed to give visibility to in their reporting.

Questions were raised by various PfR stakeholders why the capacity strengthening of these government actors (but also other stakeholders, such as media), had not been conceptualised more clearly within the programme ToC. Doing so would have helped to clarify upfront how the programme was expected to engage with this actor group, as well as providing guidance on the tools to be used and the availability of budgets. It would also have provided a perspective on how a CSO capacity strengthening programme can provide complementary capacity strengthening support to other actors in what is ultimately a multi-actor environment and where success depends on capacity strengthening across different actor groups. Classifying capacity strengthening support to government actors, as part of the broader lobbying and advoacy work risks obscuring the strategic importance of this aspect of the programme's work. The findings from Indonesia, in particular, highlight the significant level of capacity strengthening support that in practice was targeted on government actors but which fell outside the scope of what was understood to be the programme's capacity strengthening work. Whilst the support provided was well received and addressed real needs, it could surely have benefitted from more strategic, operational and methodological guidance.

Box 8: Government officials are an important client for capacity strengthening

In the three case countries visited for this evaluation, PfR SP was valued for its understanding of the national and local priorities and its ability to support public sector actors in executing and promoting IRM-related objectives under their responsibility. This was only possible by closely working with government officials who were an important target audience at the same time. In several countries (Indonesia, Uganda and to some extent also Guatemala) government officials received support and technical advice from PfR, generating considerable added value around integrated risk management. A similar observation was made in India, where according to interviewees, PfR India was perceived as a neutral partner, with a good reputation as a knowledge institution regarding IRM and DRR. This has not always been easy. In some instances, like in Uganda, it was challenging to translate an understanding of IRM at the conceptual level into IRM-informed programming due to limited bureaucratic mandates, lines of accountability and institutional incentives. Several government officials were introduced to IRM through training and awareness-raising, and the PfR programme was consequently deemed as a source of expertise, research and updated information available to government officials.

Regional and global programmes: The Alliance decided that CSO capacity strengthening should not be the focus and task of the regional and global programmes. Consequently, neither the HoA Programme nor the GPG applied the DCF as a tool to strengthen dialogue capacities of particular actors. But there is evidence from both cases that Alliance members conducted a review of stakeholders to identify whom to work with and towards whom to target specific activities.

JC 3.2: The PfR has developed a capacity strengthening change strategy/ capacity strengthening plan at country level that reflects the findings of the capacity diagnostic process and which applies a range of complementary capacity strengthening tools/ instruments appropriate to addressing the identified capacity needs

Country programmes: The evaluation team was informed that a **capacity strengthening strategy** was drafted as part of the inception phase of PfR SP but it was not referred to by any of the country teams nor during interviews at headquarter level. According to the information received by the evaluation team, experiences gathered by the Alliance up to 2018 showed that some PfR country teams and organisations perceived capacity strengthening and lobbying and advocacy to be two separate issues. This led to an understanding that lobbying and advocacy was done primarily by Alliance member staff and their organisations, while the capacity strengthening of partner CSOs and CBOs was perceived as a separate issue. In response, an updated capacity strengthening strategy was drafted **in 2018 and an additional instrument – the Capacity Strengthening Goals 2020 – was developed to complement the Dialogue Capacity Framework (DCF)**. The aim of this effort was to focus the attention of Alliance members and implementing organisations again on the key purpose of PfR SP, i.e. the capacity strengthening for lobbying and advocacy of implementing partners. Whilst reinforcing this message, it was made clear that the programme did not want to impose anything and that a demand-driven approach was to be followed driven by the needs and priorities identified at country level.

From the country visits as well as the documents reviewed by the evaluation team it has been difficult to judge how far the updated capacity strengthening strategy and the Capacity Strengthening Goals 2020 are being actively used at country level. The linkages were not very clearly made or explained in the reporting documents received. The evaluation team could also not clearly trace (with the exception of some pointers from Indonesia, see below) to what extent a so-called “Joint Advocacy

Capacity Strengthening Strategy" was formulated for each country up to the end of 2020. This was one of the recommendations stated in the PfR analysis on capacity strategy (Janmaat 2019). These strategies should be based on the specific advocacy goals and the Capacity Strengthening 2020 Goals and help to think long term, i.e. to define the capacities that would need to be strengthened to sustain IRM beyond the end of this project.

Findings from Indonesia showed that the country teams would have welcomed a stronger guidance on capacity strengthening earlier on in the programme, including a clarification on the "why" of capacity strengthening so as to better guide their work at country level. It was felt that a country level capacity strengthening strategy would also have helped to localise generic guidance to country contexts. The guidance resulting from the capacity strengthening analysis (Janmaat 2019) was however welcomed and resulted in the conduct of a simplified assessment of needs from which three priorities were identified: advocacy, negotiation and knowledge management.

In terms of **capacity strengthening tools**, training has constituted a major component. This has often been accompanied by technical advisory and coaching support, study exchange visits with other PfR country teams, content sensitising meetings, the production of knowledge products to reinforce training and technical advisory inputs and financial support to kick-start the functioning of networks and forums in a number of cases. The bi-annual PME workshops were also referred to as highly relevant for mutual learning and capacity strengthening within the family of IRM stakeholders, i.e. Alliance members as well as their contracted and non-contracted intermediaries. There is also evidence of Alliance members assisting other members to better understand content issues, such as the example from Indonesia where Karina offered training to all Alliance members on techniques for lobbying and advocacy. In other countries, CARE shared its knowledge on the application of the gender marker tool. At the same time, Alliance members were aware that capacity strengthening is a process requiring at times also closer longer-term accompaniment rather than a particular one-time event. Human resources for such support was not always available according to comments made during field visits as well as focus group discussions with staff in Kenya and the Philippines. The specific interventions such as those listed above took place as part of an ongoing and organically evolving change process.

Regional and global programmes: As stated above, the Alliance decided that CSO capacity strengthening should not be the focus and task of the regional and global programs. In the HoA programme capacity strengthening concentrated on staff from PfR Alliance partners working at the regional as well as country levels, and the building of capacity of selected media organisations in the region to let them better understand the regional and global policy frameworks which PfR was dealing with. In the case of the Global programme, global consultations and conferences were used as opportunities for internal Alliance capacity strengthening, learning on the job, making people aware of the bigger agendas at play. The main beneficiaries have been staff from the various country teams, as in the case of Indonesia and Mali, whereas the programme's implementing partners or coalition members were not generally involved.

JC 3.3: The PfR has developed a results framework and arrangements for progress monitoring (dialogue) that facilitate the tracking of changes in capacity over time, adjusting the sequencing and prioritisation of interventions (flexibility and responsiveness), and for reviewing the quality of the partnership (mutual accountability for results)

Country programmes: The DCF, by design, provides a mechanism for tracking changes in capacity over time of targeted entities. Its effectiveness, however, depends on a systematic and routine reapplication of this self-assessment tool on at least an annual basis. **There is evidence from several countries that this has been done but evidence is more limited on the extent to which this also provided a solid basis for progress monitoring, the adaptation of sequencing and the prioritisation of interventions.**

In Indonesia, the Capacity Strengthening Goals 2020 offered a planning and results framework for capacity strengthening that draws upon the findings of the DCF. In some countries, such as Indonesia, the more recent plans, initiated after the capacity strengthening analysis (Janmaat 2019) were not based on the full application of the DCF tool but on a minor assessment exercise. Findings from Uganda provide evidence that regular monitoring has taken place, and that the level of detail of this exercise has increased over the years. Yet there has been no clarification in the Uganda planning documents on how the expected results would be framed and what the outcome and impact levels envisaged would be beyond fairly general statements on how these should relate to the broader objectives of the programme. In Mali, the DCF and reporting on capacity strengthening is regularly updated and reported, but the focus is primarily directed towards the realisation of work plans in the respective sub-regions. Because of the absence of a wider capacity strengthening plan at country level, this monitoring and reporting of capacity strengthening support is not elevated to the more strategic levels.

Guided by a focus on the capacity needs of implementing partners and the CBOs in the monitoring framework, the attention to capacity change among other actor groups is not made explicit in the reporting on capacity strengthening, as has been noted above. As a consequence, there is little written strategic reflection available on the contribution PfR has made to strengthening the capacity of other actor to engage on IRM.

Regional and global programmes: There are no findings which would particularly pertain to these cases. Like at country level, the Regional HoA programme and the GPG gather twice per year for a PME process and use the same elaborate reporting formats. Forward looking, the same reports are used for the planning of IRM trajectories, activities, milestones and outcomes but the reporting against planned activities and whose activities or engagements have been strengthened is difficult to trace.

4.4. EQ 4: Effectiveness and direct outcomes

EQ 4: To what extent have PfR implementing partners and communities built internal capacities and engaged, including with support of the five PfR partners, to advocate and lobby for IRM at local, national, regional and global levels?

The evaluation criteria on effectiveness and direct outcomes was explored through four judgement criteria: i) the extent to which targeted implementing partners have developed capacities which have been used to lobby and advocate for IRM; ii) extent to which PfR Alliance members themselves engaged directly in IRM; iii) extent to which PfR Alliance members at country level engaged in regional and international policy processes; and iv) evidence of any positive or negative unforeseen outcomes.

Summary response: The overall finding is that the PfR Alliance has been effective both in building the capabilities of implementing partners to conduct lobbying and advocacy as well as engaging themselves

directly in lobbying and advocacy processes. Implementing partners have enhanced their capacities and have increasingly shown an ability to be entrusted with lobby and advocacy responsibilities on behalf of the Alliance without a direct Alliance member assistance to lobby and advocate for IRM. The extent to which this has been realised varies with a number still being quite far from fully operating without the assistance of Alliance members. Many implementing partners function primarily at the sub-national level and neither have mandate or capabilities to operate at the national level. With respect to Alliance members, they have played a pro-active role engaging with national level actors and indeed in communicating and channelling country level experiences to regional and global levels. Whilst already quite strong, Alliance members nevertheless recognised their own shortcomings in relation to lobbying and advocacy work and invested in strengthening their own capacities alongside those of implementing partners. The role of the regional and global programmes in facilitating knowledge exchange on key policy processes between the different levels has contributed to IRM approaches but could have been more systematic and strategic especially in terms of promoting upward and downward linkages and information flows.

Capacity strengthening under PfR SP: The contexts in which the Alliance members engaged differed significantly and affected the ways in which they worked with CSOs, CBOs, government actors and other organisations of civil society. The focus was on strengthening capacities for lobbying and advocacy, both from a content as well as a process perspective, with some more limited attention to strengthening enabling capacities. The extent to which the targeted implementing partners and other organisations reached an ability to work on their own without direct support of Alliance members varied considerably depending on country context. Consequently, the capacities that needed to be strengthened varied significantly. For more experienced national CSOs, minimal input often sufficed, whereas at the sub-national and community levels, closer accompaniment helped to strengthen both lobby and advocacy as well as so-called enabling capacities. Such support will however need to be continued.

At the level of the HoA programme, capacity strengthening focused on regional policy makers, and the country teams of the four PfR countries. This comparatively Limited capacity strengthening support enabled the HOA programme to engage in selected regional and continental high-level and technical meetings in order to influence policies. The extent to which these policies were influenced could not (yet) be verified. Support to the media resulted in some improvements in the quality of news coverage on DRM.

At the global level, GPG strengthened its internal lobby and advocacy capacities for IRM by learning and obtaining information from the local and national experiences of PfR implementing partners. Vice versa, the GPG strengthened understanding of IRM and its relevance among the Alliance members, helping partners in PfR countries to broaden their networks and ameliorate their understanding of global policy frameworks and related processes. Global conferences were an important feature of this, which the GPG also used to broaden the support base for IRM globally.

Strategic engagement on IRM: Over the course of PfR SP, Alliance members engaged in lobbying and advocacy work with different levels of intensity at global, regional and country levels. At country level, whilst supporting CSOs to engage in lobby and advocacy work through their civil society support, the Alliance was actively involved in lobby and advocating work especially at the national level. This included participating in lobby and advocacy campaigns alongside other CSOs, building relationships and working directly with government departments and developing knowledge products and learning events for different stakeholders. The support provided to CSOs on lobby and advocacy ranged from direct support, to a rather loose accompaniment, to targeted behind the scenes support. Instances where Alliance members took a clear lead were mostly from the national level – with exceptions here and there depending on local realities and needs.

Engagement in regional and international policy processes: Knowledge creation and experience sharing happened in an upwardly fashion throughout PfR SP. Staff of Alliance members participated in regional and global events and provided inputs to panels, side events, working groups, policy papers or conference outcome documents. Many inputs related to events connected to or being part of the UNFCCC/Paris Agreement and the Sendai Framework on DRR. The GPG played a pivotal role in the efforts to link local realities to global dialogues, where regional and global programmes functioned as principal mobilisers to bring in colleagues in different events. While the evaluation team were informed that the GPG has provided guidance for national level engagement and developing strategies with country teams on how to promote global policy agendas, there is little evidence of Alliance members having taking this up strongly at country level. For example, there is no real evidence that Alliance members were ploughing back experiences or feedback upon return of international or regional meetings to local partners. There are also only a few examples of the GPG orienting its activities downward, to support the implementation of global agreements at regional, national and local level. This overall limited downward orientation of the GPG might be related to inadequate staff but also the absence of a more clearly communicated and actionable strategy.

Unintended positive or negative effects: Several mostly positive unintended effects and spin-offs from PfR support were reported, mainly from the country case studies. In Uganda, the intensive engagement with MEPs on climate and IRM related matters, notably on the climate change bill, eventually contributed to the establishment of a standing parliamentary committee on climate change. In Mali, the IRM coalitions became relevant and highly appreciated mechanisms for conflict mediation between herders, farmers and fishermen in an increasingly violence-ridden context. Engagement at global levels by the GPG for PfR SP were felt to have at least contributed to some spin-offs such as the realisation of the DEVCO-funded “ECO-DRR Project (2019-2021)” and the “Water As Leverage” Programme.

JC 4.1: The PfR support contributed to strengthening capacity of PfR contracted partners and other CSOs for IRM at local, national, regional and global levels

Country programmes: **An overall finding is that the support provided by PfR contributed to the strengthening of capacity of a diverse set of actors in the broad sense.** Alliance members worked in different ways with implementing partners, other CSOs and CBOs. The support provided depended highly on context and the existing expertise and overall capacities of the partners. **Most attention was directed towards enhancing the capacity to lobby and advocate for IRM.** Enabling capacities were strengthened as well in certain contexts but this did not emerge as being a priority need or area of comparative advantage for the PfR.

It is difficult to judge how far these efforts have contributed to real changes in the capacities of the targeted implementing partners. Findings from a PfR study conducted in 2019 on the capacity strengthening results of implementing partners are positive (see box 9).

Box 9: Findings from the capacity strengthening results of implementing partners

The ability of PfR SP supported implementing partners to engage on lobby and advocacy, primarily at the local and sub-national levels, has been documented in a recently conducted PfR study: *"For their longer term implementing partners, [PfR] country teams in Indonesia, Philippines, Kenya, Uganda are confident they have the advocacy capacities necessary to continue influencing decision makers. The ambition in these countries and in Ethiopia is that the implementing partners are able to raise awareness with and mobilise communities, build (advocacy) capacity of CBOs, and provide technical support for the application of IRM. Smaller or 'younger' organisations (at grassroots level often) are generally said to now understand the concepts of DRR, CCA or EMR, and IRM, and are able to implement concrete projects working with communities and government. But their capacities to influence decision makers often need further work in the coming years."*

Source: Janmaat 2019 p. 26.

The evaluation's own findings are positive but somewhat more cautious, noting that capacity strengthening remains a work in progress.

- From Indonesia it is reported that most evidence seems to be anecdotal or based on general observation. The fact that supported partners have been able to achieve results in their engagement has been used as a proxy to conclude that capacities have been strengthened. Beneficiary organisations in Indonesia moreover noted a better appreciation of IRM and a growing confidence to engage in lobbying and advocacy work. Without conducting a more thorough assessment of individual entities, it is however not possible to confirm categorically how far and to what extent capacities have been strengthened.
- From Uganda it is reported that the capacities of implementing partners to collaborate and mobilise a momentum for lobbying are in most cases (self-)assessed in place. This has resulted in an expansion of the reach of the PfR supported organisations through networks and steering committees and has enabled such partners to reach more IRM stakeholders, including mobilising marginalised groups. As might be expected the capacity strengthening needs of organisations based at the national level have been fewer than for those entities based at the local level. In Uganda, the programme worked together with experienced national CSOs, all having their own networks and content expertise. In such cases, very little additional input by Alliance members was needed.
- In Mali, by contrast, a lot of effort has been invested in building the enabling capacities of a number of CBOs. As a result, they are now able to sustain their activities on a reasonable basis. Capacities to lobby and advocate at the local and municipal levels have also been enhanced but the close accompaniment of Alliance members at these levels is still needed.

<u>Regional and global programmes:</u> In the case of the HoA programme as well as the GPG, capacity strengthening activities focused mostly on strengthened their own lobby and advocacy capacities but also to some lesser extent, the capacities of the policy actors with whom they have engaged.

The HoA team engaged with regional policy actors but also with the country teams from the four PfR countries in the region and in some cases the media. According to PfR SP reports, the latter has been able to use the support provided by the Alliance members to improve the quality of the news coverage on DRM. Some activities with communities in South Sudan and Kenya enhanced their understanding of the LAPSSET[6] project. The capacity building activities of the HoA programme, even if limited, enabled the programme to engage in regional and continental high-level and technical meetings in order to influence

[6] The Lamu Port - South Sudan – Ethiopia - Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor project will link Kenya with Ethiopia, Uganda and South Sudan. There are concerns that the Lamu's fragile coastal ecosystem could be destroyed through clearance of mangrove forests, oil pollution and degradation of the famed Old Town area of Lamu.

policies[7] –Examples are the 6th high-level meeting on DRR for Africa and Arab Countries in 2017 where the programme participated in some pre-conference events as well as side events during the conference. The HoA team also reviewed and made inputs into the African Regional Position Paper presented by the AU to the 14th African Technical Working Group on DRR in Hawassa, Ethiopia, in March 2019. Another example is the programme's participation and direct contribution to the Global Platform Declaration on Disaster Risk Reduction, in Geneva May 2019.

Meanwhile, the GPG strengthened its own lobby and advocacy capacities for IRM by learning and obtaining information on country level experiences. Also vice versa, the GPG shared knowledge and lessons learned with the PfR country teams, though this was not done systematically. This helped staff of Alliance members and their contracted and non-contracted partners in PfR countries to broaden their networks and ameliorate their understanding of global policy frameworks and related processes. At global level, the GPG strengthened its own support base for IRM, by bringing civil society together, mobilising other actors and alliances and partnering with governments. Overall, global consultations and conferences were used as opportunities for learning on the job, and making people aware of the bigger agendas and issues pertaining to DRR, climate adaptation and eco-system management so as to become familiar with and effective at international policy forums.

JC 4.2: The PfR supported, PfR contracted partners and other CSOs strategically engaged with IRM stakeholders in their environment at local, national, regional and global levels to promote IRM in policies, influence investment mechanisms in support of IRM and influence practice that takes on IRM.

Country programmes: Alliance members and their implementing partners worked together at different levels of intensity, to lobby and advocate for IRM. And in a number of instances, Alliance members engaged IRM stakeholders on their own. The extent to which Alliance members joined forces with implementing partners or engaged directly on their own depended on several factors: i) whether engagement took place at national, sub-national or community level; ii) the capacity of implementing partners to lead or work alongside Alliance members; iii) the topic in question. **The general pattern, as observed across countries, was that Alliance members were most hands on at the national, regional and global levels whereas contracted implementing partners tended to be most hands on at the sub-national and community levels with Alliance members working from the background with contracted partners in the lead.**

In Indonesia, most of the results recorded at the sub-national level could indeed be attributed to the direct engagement of implementing partners such as community development NGOs and non-contracted partners, such as the provincial and district level DRR fora. Alliance members provided support from behind the scene but would engage directly with government authorities at these levels as and when required.. One example is CIS-Timor, a CARE-contracted partner, which is based in NTT province (Timor) and has been leading on the implementation of the trajectory focusing on incorporating IRM initiatives in community-based development plans and budgets. In Uganda, various implementing partners engaged in lobbying and advocacy at the national and sub-national levels have scored results. Organisations like FAPAD could bring in their own networks, knowledge and expertise on IRM-related issues. Other organisations able to engage in a similar way include Impact and Mid-P (Kenya), ACCORD (Philippines) or UNNATI (India). Such implementing partners have been involved in sub-national and national lobby and advocacy processes but not in PfR supported activities or processes beyond the country level.

[7] However, the extent to which policies were influenced could not be verified by the evaluation team.

Examples of successful collaboration with **non-contracted civil society organisations** in the field of IRM can be drawn from across various PFR countries. In Indonesia and Uganda, non-contracted partners which the Alliance works with are well-organised and well-positioned national CSOs. Country programmes took this into account and calibrated their actions to the capacities of non-contracted partners, or to their needs on a case-by-case basis.

- In Indonesia, there was no systematic or explicit approach to collaboration with non-PfR supported actors. Alliance members and contracted partners rather collaborated with these non-PfR actors on a case by case/as-needs basis in the execution of their trajectory activities. This was seen as generating added value and complementarity of efforts, for example in the form of joint analytical work, adopting common positions, co-funding of activities and broadening of networks.
- In Uganda, the PfR country team made use of the newly adopted CSO law in 2016 that aimed to improve CSO engagement in policy-making through consultative processes. The team decided to partner with selected NGOs and jointly advocate and lobby towards the government, creating complementarity vis-à-vis one another. Another approach has been the sensitisation of key actors resulting in cascading effects (see box 10, below).
- In Mali, PfR supported community-based coalitions that had been created as of 2016 engaged strategically with different partners in support of IRM, such as mayors, directors of sector departments or prefects. This would take place with strong support provided by Alliance members who, according to coalition members, would still be required to accompany their work if PfR was to continue. By contrast, engagements at the national level were exclusively realised by Alliance members.

Box 10: Cascading effects in Uganda

Sensitising key champions (such as members of parliament or key government officials) on IRM concepts and principles can have a cascading effect in spreading the uptake of the IRM approach. This is visible in the work of the Parliamentary Forum on Climate Change in Uganda, which has in several instances been able to mobilise its members to push processes forward (for example by putting the debate on the climate change bill back on the rails) and use political leverage, ensure uptake of IRM principles in policy processes or promote IRM-related practices (such as wetlands restoration) among their constituents.

There is also some evidence of a growing engagement with media and knowledge organisations in support of IRM. The growing capacity in external communication and media engagement has been noted in several PfR country programmes, but Alliance members recognise this as an area in need of further attention.

- In Indonesia, PfR's engagement with media encouraged their participation in DRR forums with the result that they are now more informed and sensitive in their treatment of disaster events.
- In Kenya, PfR worked with local radios to disseminate information about IRM practices and policies in local languages.
- In Uganda, PfR's ability to multiply impact through IRM stakeholders and broaden outreach through media, for example through participation in the people's parliament TV show on the NTV network was cited as an added value but in need of further support.
- In Guatemala, the alliances with universities built up during PfR I were expected to take charge of the generation and transmission of IRM-related knowledge - mostly by using existing forums and discussion processes for learning and innovation. This approach scored some results, for example when the Interuniversity Platform on IRM was included in the National Plan on Risk Management in Guatemala City.

- In Mali, initial contacts with a journalist network concerned with environmental issues were established but so far not further pursued.

Regional and global programmes: As for the GPG, the team engaged with PfR implementing partners at the national level but always in a support role towards the PfR country teams who took the lead at national level. According to the GPG team, this has helped Alliance members and implementing partners in their lobbying and advocacy efforts. I.e., it created some space so that conversations about IRM and the implementation of the global police frameworks at the national level could take place and bring in a different, i.e. international, perspective. There are no specific findings for the HoA Programme with regard to this JC.

JC 4.3: The five PfR Alliance members assisted and facilitated lobbying and advocacy for IRM beyond national borders with a view to influence decisions at regional and global levels

Country programmes: Under PfR SP, considerable efforts were made to share knowledge and experiences from the national level with the regional and global levels. Such upwardly channelled inputs were highly appreciated by actors operating at the global level (see also JC 6.1) and enhanced the legitimacy of PfR among actors operating at the regional and global policy levels. According to findings, Alliance members participated in various regional and global events and provided inputs to panels, side events, working groups, policy papers or conference outcome documents. Many inputs related to events on the Paris Agreement and the Sendai Framework on DRR.

The PfR Uganda country team members participated, for example, in the lobbying and advocacy for IRM at the global level in the context of the Paris Agreement's Annual Conference of Parties (COP) meeting. The PfR Indonesia country lead was equally involved in the COP. PfR staff participated in various panels and working group meetings relating to the Sendai Framework, for example in relation to the Asian Ministerial Conference on DRR in Ulaanbaatar, July 2018 or the Global Platforms on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in Cancun (2017) and Geneva (2019). Staff of Alliance members in Mali engaged at the West African regional, pan-African and global level in the lobbying and advocacy for IRM which translated – to the best of their knowledge – the views of local partners. There is however no evidence that Alliance members provided feedback to national stakeholders or supported CSOs and communities (for example through dedicated meetings or workshops) when returning from such regional and global meetings.

Regional and global programmes: The added value of the GPG in coordinating the efforts of the individual Alliance members towards global policy frameworks, linking local realities to the global dialogues, is clearly established from the findings. Over the course of PfR SP, a lot of attention of the regional programmes as well as the GPG were oriented upward, i.e. providing examples, good practices, experiences and viewpoints from the community and local levels into regional and global policy events and thereby amplifying PfR's work. The PfR's regional and global programmes thereby functioned as the principal mobilisers and organisers and brought colleagues into events at the regional and global levels. The HoA team took the lead in organising PfR inputs to the Africa-Arab DRR preparatory conference in Tunis (2018) during which various staff from Alliance members participated. They worked with various government representatives, which led to more long-term advocacy with the African Union (AU). The GPG assisted and facilitated access to networks and contacts linked to the AU.

There are numerous examples of how the GPG and PfR country teams worked together to influence regional and global processes (upward). From the findings it appears that a major lobby and advocacy work was devoted to the Sendai Framework on DRR and the Paris Agreement and the SDGs. The GPG and the PfR Mali country team, for example, devised a strategy that enabled PfR Mali to engage the Mali

government and advocated for the inclusion of civil society in Mali to contribute to the Mali Voluntary National Review Report, which was presented at the SDG High-Level Political Forum in New York. The GPG also facilitated PfR country staff to participate in several regional meetings to promote the Sendai Framework, as mentioned above, but team members noted that it was challenging to link outcomes of regional platform meetings to the global platform meetings on DRR. Several other global and regional events relating to the Sendai Framework and the Paris Agreement were mentioned throughout the text above (see JC 2.1, in particular). External partners operating at the global level, including the MFA, see this ability of the programme to share concrete practical experiences obtained from the field and to link different policy domains (e.g., making the Sendai framework more sensitive to the impacts of climate change) as the key added value that PFR brings to global debates.

But there are relatively few examples that highlight instances where the GPG oriented its activities more systematically downward. For example, there have been no plans made for the GPG to visit country programmes systematically and follow up with country actors (identified by the PfR country teams) on how global objectives could be better followed up at country level. The PfR Inception Report of 2016 proposes that the implementation of the global agreements at regional, national and local levels will be the next big task. Therefore the focus should shift from influencing the agreement texts, which was done under PfR I at the global level, to accompanying the implementation of these frameworks under PfR SP. The overall finding of the evaluation team is that, despite this announced shift in the 2016 Inception Report, the 'downward orientation' of the GPG has been rather modest. This may be attributed to limited staffing but possibly also to the absence of a more clearly articulated engagement strategy to support the country level.

However a number of examples could be identified where the GPG did work more systematically with PfR country teams and helped to translate the objectives of the global policy agendas or frameworks to the national level and thus link global dialogues to local realities. In Mali, the GPG departed from its policy work and instead focused on monitoring, reassessing, enhancing attention and raising ambitions with respect to the implementation of global policy frameworks at the national level. This included collaborating with the SDG National Review process.

Such types of work, in Mali and elsewhere was carried out organically, making use of opportunities arising. For example, GPG launched the Heatwave Guide for Cities at the Climate Action Summit in New York (2019) and trained country partners in India. Another example relates to DRR. Departing from the GPG's work around the Sendai Framework at the global level, the team has been monitoring Target E of the Sendai framework to develop national DRR strategies.

It appears that PfR's work at the global level would have benefited from a more clearly communicated and actionable strategy. The first draft of a ToC for the GPG's work was written in January 2019 and senior staff from Alliance members, while highly valuing the work of the GPG, commented that it is not always easy to understand why the GPG engages on certain trajectories, how and when. It all takes place "somewhere and is difficult to trace". The GPG though produced a global engagement plan per trajectory and this was based on some form of strategic and annual planning, including conversations held at various levels. This constituted in essence the compass the GPG used to manoeuvre its multiple engagements.

A more specific finding in relation to the HoA programme and its connecting with country programmes is that, de facto, it has engaged in regional processes mostly on its own, guided by its observations of ongoing regional policies, or relevant investments that needed to be made IRM-sensitive. It was assisted by the GPG in some instances for example in terms of establishing contacts with

the AU as well as the Great Green Wall initiative. How this programme built on the experiences of country programmes is not clear (from country programmes to regional programme). There is however some evidence that national dimensions were addressed during regional processes (from regional processes to national realities) – for example, the mobilising of a community position on LAPSSET, or supporting the development of a wetlands policy for Ethiopia under the agreement on the NBI Cooperative Framework. There is also evidence of regional level knowledge and capacity 'tricking down' or enhancing the capacity of country teams. This has for example been the case in the programme's development of an IRM advocacy manual, as well as its gap analysis report on the state of selected regional policies. Exchanges between PfR staff at the regional and country level generally help to identify trans-national issues and to reflect on how country teams and the regional programme could influence together regional processes. However, there is no evidence that demonstrates that these exchanges have been followed-up and have resulted in advocacy on a given issue.

Finally, some findings from the Asia programme tell that PfR worked more systematically as of 2019 on the promoting IRM along three of its four trajectories. For example, the incorporation of IRM approaches into DRR and wetlands related national documents in India, the Philippines and Indonesia will enable country delegations to lobby for the implementation of the Sendai Framework during the Asian Ministerial Conference on DRR in 2020. The promotion of IRM in several regional events on climate change has resulted in the inclusion of IRM principles in outcome documents, technical papers and key messages. Similarly, IRM approaches have been advocated for in relation to the New Urban Agenda at regional level.

JC 4.4: Potentially unintended positive and negative effects of PfR support have (not) been identified and addressed by the PfR Alliance and its contracted partners and other CSOs

<u>Country programmes:</u> **Mostly positive unintended effects and spin-offs from PfR support were reported, though these were few. Alliance members also acknowledged that reporting on such unintended effects requires further attention and improvement.** Three examples can be shared of which one, from Indonesia highlights the sensitivities involved when engaging in policy lobbying and advocacy work (see box 11, below):

- In Uganda, the more intensive engagement with Members of Parliament on climate- and IRM-related issues through the Parliamentary Forum on Climate Change (PFCC) put climate change higher on the agenda of the Parliament's daily operation. This eventually resulted in the creation of a standing parliamentary committee on climate change, chaired by the PFCC chairperson. Although this was not a target outcome of the PfR programme, it is plausible that PfR activities on the climate change bill have contributed to this development and also had positive effects on the ability of the PfR Alliance to put topics of interest on the Parliament's agenda and mobilise political support. Indeed, it was noted that parliamentary debates often reflected discussions already held within the framework of the PFCC.
- In Mali, an un-intended positive effect was recorded from the interaction of coalitions at community level. These coalitions were originally set up to better deal with (scarce) natural resources among different interest groups. According to Malian Members of Parliament, they became very relevant and highly appreciated mechanisms to mediate violent conflicts between farmers, herders and fishermen. Some limited unintended negative effects were noted with regards the strengthening of CSOs in Guatemala, where the risk of backlash and criminalisation by the government were seen as something important to reflect on when addressing the implications of PfR work on CSOs in contexts of tightening civil space.

Box 11: A potentially negative unforeseen result from Indonesia

This example related to the early stages of engagement on the revision of the disaster management law where the Indonesian disaster management agency (BNPB) interpreted the actions of the CSO lobby, which included PfR members, as undermining its authority. This required some careful behind-closed doors discussions to clarify the position of CSOs, including PfR representatives to allay concerns of the agency. Subsequently, BNPB has evolved to be the main interlocutor of the PfR Alliance members with whom significant joint work has been carried out.

Regional and global programmes: No particular unintended results – positive or negative – were mentioned from interviews with stakeholders with respect to the HoA programme. But it was reported, from the GPG as well as other Alliance sources, that engagements by PfR SP at various policy levels created spin-offs, or at least contributed to these, for example the realisation of the DEVCO-funded "ECO-DRR Project (2019-2021)" (see box 6 under JC 2.1), the Manila Bay Development in the Philippines (see JC 2.2) and the "Water As Leverage Programme". PfR is a partner to the latter and has established collaborations with cities in India and Indonesia under the umbrella of this programme. It involves a range of international actors, including PfR, the Netherlands Government, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Global Centre on Adaptation, FMO and UN Habitat.

According to Alliance members, there have also been a range of other positive spin-offs in relation to the Tacloban Coastal Reconstruction (Philippines), Green Pearls and the Eco-DRR programme (both in Haiti). Moreover, IRM is promoted within the respective sister-organisations and networks of Alliance members (e.g. within the Red Cross family) and representatives of Alliance members engage regularly in international fora and conferences providing an opportunity to share IRM-related priorities and PfR's experiences.

4.5. EQ 5: Longer-term outcomes and impact

EQ 5: To what extent has the enhanced advocacy and lobbying capacity (and activities) among PfR contracted partners and other non-contracted CSOs led to enhanced policies, better investment mechanisms and improved practices for IRM at national, regional and global levels and to more resilience of vulnerable communities at national level?

The evaluation criteria on longer-term outcomes and impacts was judged from two criteria; i) evidence of adoption of policies, investments and practices related to IRM; and ii) evidence of PfR SP contribution to those observed outcomes.

Summary response: The conclusion drawn here is that the PfR SP has recorded significant results in a comparatively short period of time. This has been most obvious at the country level, where concrete results can be observed, and especially in the areas of IRM policies and practices. The domain of investment has been addressed and relevant achievements can be noted but in contrast to policies and practice recorded fewer results. At regional and global level, important changes have been influenced, but the slower and more complex character of regional and global policy processes and their distance from implementation means that observed change is less easy to detect. PfR SP has contributed significantly to the observed results but it would be wrong to attribute sole responsibility for outcomes to PfR. True to its nature, PfR as

a lobbying and advocacy programme has helped nudge stakeholders to adopt IRM. A precondition for success has been an underlying commitment to reform on the part of country governments and the identification of change agents ready to take on board innovative approaches. As such the programme's general approach of 'constructive engagement' and demand inducement has been mostly appropriate.

Evidence of adoption of IRM policies, practices and investments: PfR SP has recorded an impressive number of results at all levels. Especially at the country level, it has helped nudge national authorities to incorporate IRM principles in numerous laws, policies, plans, budgets and strategies. The most significant achievements have been recorded in the domains of policy and practice, whereas in the area of investment, achievements have been more limited. The latter should not come as a surprise as policies need to be adapted first in contexts where policy frameworks are not very sophisticated to pave the way for investments in response to policies or regulations. It has proven easier to gain traction and obtain tangible results where governments are strong, most typically in middle-income contexts. Conversely, it has proven more challenging in weaker economies or in situations of insecurity. A majority of results may be considered provisional outcomes as their impact depends on them being translated into actions that impact directly on the lives of vulnerable groups. This requires that momentum is maintained to ensure that commitments made are seen through to implementation. Meanwhile, a number of practice related outcomes have impacted directly on the lives of community members through adoption of new technologies and initiatives to prevent and mitigate disaster risks.

At regional and global levels, the results achieved may appear less concrete because they have advanced less far along the policy path and because in view of their regional and global focus, are further away from the field of implementation. Nevertheless, there is evidence of some important influencing of policy makers and stakeholders in terms of their knowledge and attitudes, reflected in various formal acknowledgements, statements of intent, and commitments to IRM. There are also records of engagement at the international level to mobilise funding and investments for IRM in several countries.

Evidence of PfR SP contribution to those observed outcomes: As a concept developed by PfR, it may be expected that the programme has played a significant role in the realisation of the IRM related outcomes, reported here. That said, the programme has not worked in a vacuum and recognises itself as part of a broader multi-stakeholder environment of actors and stakeholders. It may be concluded therefore that PfR has contributed to the results achieved, either to a lesser or greater degree, but one would caution against inferring sole attribution of results to the PfR alone. By its nature PfR is an influencing programme, a catalyst that nudges actors and stakeholders towards adopting IRM and in this respect must be considered a necessary but not sufficient contributor to the achievement of the results recorded. As in any policy influencing process, there are multiple factors that shape outcomes, of which one may be evidence-based policy advocacy, but there are others. As reported earlier, the approach of "constructive engagement" may be described as primarily "demand-inducing", therefore building on or seizing opportunities to shape on-going initiatives and to support existing policy champions. It is also not possible to establish the counter-factual – i.e. 'what if PfR had not been there?' - so it cannot be said with any degree of confidence whether the same results would have been achieved without PfR's presence. The evaluation team is however confident the programme has made a significant contribution. Certainly, from the perspective of local change agents and IRM stakeholders interviewed, the perception of the contribution made by PfR is positive. As reported in EQ 4, it is also evident that the contribution of implementing partners towards the recorded achievements would not

have been possible in the absence of the capacity strengthening and institutional support provided by Alliance members. As attested by various intermediaries, PfR SP has enabled them to appreciate the IRM approach and to develop lobbying and advocacy capabilities that has allowed them to engage stakeholders in a way that was not possible before.

JC 5.1: Over the course of the past 5 years, IRM policies have been enhanced, IRM investment mechanisms improved, and IRM practices changed for the better at national, regional and global levels and resulted in more resilience of vulnerable communities at national level

Country programmes – findings on the lobbying and advocating for IRM-related policies and practice: The findings in this section originate principally from the case studies in Indonesia, Mali and Uganda as these allowed the evaluation team to look into the results of PfR's work in more detail. This section, as well as the following section, JC 5.2, allows to discuss and present a very rich set of findings in brief, only. Elaborate information can be found in the three country studies in the annex and their respective appendixes, which contain the results of the respective outcome harvesting workshops.

There is good evidence that PfR SP helped to successfully address IRM-relevant policy issues in quite a number of countries, in particular where the public sector functioned reasonably well. From Indonesia and Uganda there is an abundance of evidence that strategic entry points were identified, approached and worked with to create changes in support of IRM in various national legislations, regulations or strategies. The PfR Alliance members created momenta for change by working with experienced implementing partners, and non-contracted partners and by forming multi-stakeholder platforms able to jointly articulate for change in support of IRM. A multitude of successes were also recorded in the practice domain, where PfR Alliance members and their national and local partners could build on work that had started under PfR I, for example in the implementation of flood-related early-warning systems in Mali, through which a stream of data could be supplied to national authorities and thereby assist in the area of civil protection. The sharing of good practices among local and community-based stakeholders helped also to enhance the use of natural resources, increase local production or strengthen the role of women resulting in reduced vulnerability at community level. As for investments, a more nuanced picture emerges from the findings suggesting that in many cases preconditions were shaped for investments to happen but resource mobilisation proved difficult to achieve. This is discussed in more detail further below. In most cases, outcomes remain provisional and the sustainability of the impact remains to be seen as further discussed in EQ 6.

Findings from Indonesia display a very rich set of outcomes. A main focus of the Indonesia PfR SP programme has been on engaging political leaders, decision makers and technocrats across different tiers of government on the value of incorporating IRM into disaster management policies, investments and practices. Primary interlocuters for the programme have been technical and planning departments of the Indonesian government. This has included various sector ministries and specialist agencies at the national level and their counterparts at provincial and district government levels. Through such technical level engagements, the programme has been able to have audiences with the political leadership, who in some instances have demonstrated commitment to taking on board elements of the IRM approach. Through these engagements, the lobby and advocacy "footprint" of the programme across the five trajectories of the country programme has been impressive (see box 12):

Box 12: IRM-related changes - Indonesia

- The programme engaged with 8 national level ministries/ agencies, engaged with 4 provincial governments and 8 district/ municipality governments and engaged with 30 village government structures.
- At the national level, the programme has contributed to the shaping and promulgation of approximately 27 separate government decisions/ actions that take on board IRM concepts and principles.
- At the provincial level, the programme succeeded in influencing 8 actions (across 4 provinces).
- At the district level, the programme contributed to approximately 19 actions (across 8 districts).
- At the village level, the focus of programme activities has been on mobilising interest and resources to implement IRM activities that can impact on community resilience and livelihoods. This has included: i) facilitating inclusion of IRM practices into the Village medium term and annual plans and budgets; ii) supporting villages to put in place required legal provisions to empower village authorities to apply IRM practices into their budgets. and iii) promoting technologies and know-how that enable communities to increase their resilience.

There is good evidence from Uganda that PfR activities made sense and contributed to more resilience of vulnerable communities, though such outcomes remain provisional and the longevity of the impact remains to be seen. From the local level, evidence confirms that projects were implemented according to IRM principles and that the PfR team has successfully promoted the uptake of IRM practices. PfR partners also worked to advocate for the integration and mainstreaming of IRM among local (district) authorities, although despite growing awareness and buy-in among district officials, there is only limited evidence on the extent to which this has been mainstreamed and upscaled in district planning and budgeting. At the national level, there is evidence that PfR engagement has contributed to an uptake of IRM principles in legislative and policy processes on climate change, DRR and ecosystems management, although these outcomes remain provisional as such policy processes have not reached their final stages yet and because the ultimate enforcement and implementation of such laws and policies depends on other factors and dynamics including the budgeting processes. Some key observations about outcomes, which can be consulted in more detail in the appendix of the Uganda report, are listed in box 13.

Box 13: IRM-related changes - Uganda

- There is growing awareness of the importance of IRM among policy-makers, government officials and civil society organisations working on climate change, wetlands management and DRR.
- IRM-relevant recommendations are adopted in the draft Climate Change Bill.
- Growing awareness has been witnessed among the wider population on the Climate Change Bill and its key features.
- IRM recommendations are adopted in the National Adaptation Plan for Agriculture.
- IRM-informed risk management measures are included in the draft Wetlands Policy.
- Views on IRM and climate change were integrated into the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment.

In Mali, see box 14, the programme focused in the first instance on the local level and on the build-up of coalitions at community level. Coalitions, accompanied by Alliance members, lobbied for change in the legal and regulatory sphere at the municipal and – to some extent – at the sub-national level, and used the coalitions to improve practices relating to eco-system management and the use of natural resource, but also as mechanisms to address conflicts between different interest groups (herders, farmers and fishermen). The following outcomes are listed but noting again that these are provisional and the sustainability of the impact remains to be seen given the protracted crisis and the conflicts, which the country is confronted with:

Box 14: IRM-related changes - Mali

- Improved social cohesion at community level; the coalitions became a platform for different interest groups (herders and farmers in particular) to dialogue and negotiate, thereby also reducing tensions over the use of precious resources (land and water) and increase of security;
- Better understanding of legal texts which allowed IRM stakeholders to better implement reforms, leading also to increased production;
- Increased production through better information provision, in particular via WhatsApp messages. For example about better production techniques or weather forecasts;
- Budget lines on IRM are included in the PDSECs (the Social, Economic and Cultural Development Plans) at communal and regional levels, though the government has no funds to plan substantial investments in this domain;
- Access of women to land, which helped to reduce vulnerability; land access documents were legally certified by authorities;
- Improved contingency plans at communal and regional level, allowing a better response to possible disaster;
- OPIDIN, the early warning flood system which was created during PfR I, is regularly used by authorities at the national level but also by sector departments and coalitions (but the production of OPIDIN data remains in the hands of Wetlands International and not the national authorities);
- Recognition of the role of the added value of IRM coalitions by public authorities, e.g. coalitions were invited to take part in the regional phase of the National Political Dialogue;
- The PfR Alliance, but not the IRM coalitions, is perceived to have an added value for the National Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction (RCC); inputs provided on DRR are very welcome.

The findings from these three case studies are broadly representative for PfR's engagement, which took place in (low) middle-income countries, like Indonesia, Philippines, India and Kenya, stable but still developing low-income countries like Uganda, Ethiopia and Guatemala, and least developed and conflict/ disaster-affected countries like Mali, Haiti and South Sudan. The synthesis of findings from Indonesia, Uganda and Mali illustrate that outcomes realised are highly context specific. In a lower-middle income country, like Indonesia, the engagement and the realised outcomes reflect the results of lobbying and advocacy in a rather sophisticated policy and institutional environment where policies have already been developed or are in the process of being prepared. The Indonesia case also highlights that in such environments, considerable progress can be made in promoting IRM at the sub-national and local levels while referring and linking to broader policy frameworks and regulations at the national level. In Uganda, PfR has done well to engage strongly at the national policy level as the attention to IRM was in need of strengthening among different institutional actors within government ministries and their departments. Experiences from the field at the community level, already developed and worked on during PfR I, could be fed into higher levels. In Mali, capacities among institutional actors but also among civil society are weak and hampered by resource scarcity and conflict. Hence a choice was made to concentrate in the first instance at the lowest levels, build up capacities among communities and gradually connect to higher levels. In this way, as the cases from different contexts illustrate, the choices for PfR engagement were well chosen and the result of a broad analysis and preparation, which has allowed for the achievement of outcomes that are contextually relevant.

Country programmes – findings on the lobbying and advocating for IRM-related investments: The 2016 Inception Report for the PfR SP programme lined out two lobby and advocacy goals in relation to investments. That "civil society strongly argues for IRM (proofing) of investments" and that "investments are earmarked for IRM and there is IRM proof for investments being implemented". A problem in judging success or failure of this domain is that there is no clear definition of what is meant with the term

“investments”. These could be public investments, private investments or funding originating from international agencies and development funds. It could also mean making investments IRM-proof or shaping the preconditions for more IRM sensitive investments in the future. **Notwithstanding this conceptual cloudiness, the findings point out that the investment domain was overall less successful compared to the policy and practice domains, despite various forms of engagement in support of getting investments for IRM mobilised.** A generic factor partially explaining this finding is that policies, regulations and investment plans need to be in place in order for investments to come in and to make a difference. In many contexts in which the Alliance engaged, policies were still in the process of being developed or had to be lobbied for in the first place.

Many activities took place with regard to shaping the preconditions for getting funding for IRM in the future. There were also activities that related to improving IRM-policies so that private operators could be guided when investing in particular environments. As for the first point, and as reported from Indonesia and Mali, the PfR Alliance was successful in advocating for the inclusion of IRM-relevant budget lines in national, sub-national as well as local budgets so that for the next five-year planning cycle funds would become available. This, as PfR stakeholders underlined, would shape the preconditions for getting funding in the future. There are also accounts of policy changes relating to investments, such as the successful drafting of specific regulations in Indonesia.

But PfR SP was less successful when trying to mobilise existing funding opportunities for IRM-relevant investments and there is little evidence about the extent to which PfR SP managed to make investments more IRM-proof. One reason was that the allocation of government funds for IRM-related budget lines did not take place, simply because the state or local authority had no funding available. Alternatively, an allocation did not take place because there were no budget lines for IRM-related objectives and plans. One of the exceptions is India, where IRM stakeholders, supported by PfR Alliance members, managed to convince actors at state level to adopt the national disaster plan to which a budget line with funding is attached. Indonesia also reports mobilisation of existing budgets to support IRM related activities in a number of village plans and village budgets.

There are several examples of the programme leveraging funds from non-PfR donor-funded projects or of collaborating with them. Overall, such examples have not been very well documented but various experiences can be cited. (See box 15, below, highlighting examples from Indonesia and from other countries which the evaluation team noted but for which little in depth information is available at country level). There is also little evidence of successful engagements with the private sector to leverage IRM-relevant investments or promote IRM sensitivity in the investment portfolios of multinational companies (with the exception of smaller successes in Kenya, India and Indonesia at the sub-national level and in the Philippines with regard to Manila Bay, see box 15). With regards to engaging the private sector, some interviewees pointed to the need for more support and leadership from headquarters, including a dedicated guidance on how to work with the private sector, especially in those circumstances where private sector investment can lead to conflicts with local communities over resources.

Box 15: Examples of leveraging other non-PfR funded projects from Indonesia and other countries

Indonesia:

- In Indonesia, the PFR programme was able to leverage on several non-PFR funded projects to influence policy processes and resource mobilisation:
- In one example, Karina/ Cordaid used the experience of a pilot project they had been involved in implementing in a neighbourhood of Jakarta financed by the Ford Foundation, to influence the city of Jakarta's Grand Design on Urban Farming. Rules governing the Ford Foundation project meant that funds had to be used for direct implementation and could not be used for advocacy purposes. The converse was true for PfR. PfR took advantage of this to use its funds to promote lessons learned from the Ford Foundation project.
- In another example, Wetlands International partnered with the Building with Nature project to promote sustainable protection of coastal environments. Building on previous policy engagement in Demak District, Central Java Province, as well as evidence and learning from on-site activities with communities led by Building with Nature in Demak, the two organisations jointly advocated for IRM-based coastal management and its integration into the district's development plan. 4 villages in the district have also taken the step to introduce regulations on coastal mangrove eco-system management.
- PfR stakeholders made also references to PfR's collaboration with the Water as Leverage Programme in Semarang, Indonesia, but documentation about the extent to which this has resulted in investments is limited.

Other countries:

PfR stakeholders informed the evaluation team about leveraging investments from other sources, but information in the reports are thin and interviews did not make particular reference to this with the exception of the Philippines.

- For the Philippines, multiple references were made to increased private sector investment in IRM, specifically in Manila Bay. The ongoing Sustainable Development Master-Planning is consistent with IRM through integrated water resources management in which PfR and its partners are actively participating. Awareness of the ecosystem benefits of Manila Bay is building as well as the need for investments in IRM. Multiple references were also made to Tacloban, the IRM plan in the Coastal Protection Strategy and investments made on the soft engineering component of the Strategy under the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
- In Haiti, references were made to the Green Pearl project regarding the application of risk-informed investments, i.e. to take into account local risks and ecosystems in the project.
- For India, whilst there were references to investments made, for example in leveraging resources from ongoing developmental programmes towards risk reduction measures, or establishing partnerships with private sector stakeholders, no particular references were made to investments from the World Bank.
- Several more recent initiatives and ongoing discussions have been mentioned such as the Climate Smart Livelihoods Strategies Programme for West Africa (former African Resilience Initiative), the Ivory Coast Resilience Project (funded by the Postcode Lottery) and exchanges in relation to the Dutch Climate and Development Fund – all highlighting that PfR is in the process of reaching out more to leverage complementary funding and investments.
- Information about some investment related activities led by the Global Policy Group can be found under table 1.

While these examples highlight good practice in soliciting close collaboration with other projects and leveraging funding and investments for IRM, there are also examples which show that there is room for improvement. One example, mentioned under JC 2.2, comes from Mali where PfR is implemented by

Alliance members which are also involved in PADIN II, a major resilience project funded by the Dutch Embassy in the same area (Niger Delta) where PfR SP is implemented. But linkages between both are very limited and discussions about PADIN II to possibly (co-)fund PfR identified investment areas have not yet taken place.

Regional and global programmes: Findings recorded in this section relate to case studies on the HoA programme and Global programme. These are presented in short in this report, the full findings can be consulted from the cases in the Annex.

As regards the HoA regional programme, there is evidence that the programme has managed to mainstream IRM sensitivity in various position papers, management plans and policies, as a result of its engagement. There is also evidence of high-level commitments made to promote IRM among policy makers, that could eventually materialise in outcomes related to changes in policy, investments and practice. Such (potential) outcomes need to be seen against the background of this regional programme being a rather young and new area of work for PfR; that staffing has been limited and that the work with regional organisations is tedious because higher-level policy decisions need to be agreed upon across their respective members. The most important ones in both categories are listed in box 16.

Box 16: IRM-related changes – HoA programme

Changes in policy, investment mechanisms or practices:

- IRM aspects have been integrated into the Declaration of the 6th high level meeting on Disaster Risk Reduction for Africa and Arab Countries.
- The Africa Common Position to the 2019 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, conference has included DRR, CCA and sustainable development (i.e. elements of IRM).
- The Nile Basin Initiative has an IRM-smart Wetlands management strategy, Conservation Investment Plans (CIPs) and wetland monographs for 3 transboundary wetland landscapes.

Potential changes in policy, investment mechanisms or practices:

- The Nile Basin Initiative has shown interest to mainstream IRM in Wetlands Management including supporting the development of Wetlands policy for Ethiopia.
- IGAD has committed to merging its DRR and CCA departments (2018).
- NEMA and LAPSSET accepted recommendations from the community level on LAPSSET and temporarily stopped the construction of a mega dam due to consideration of environmental issues raised by the local community.

- **Findings from the Global programme highlight that the effects of the GPG's efforts were overall positive and have contributed to enhanced IRM policies.** The extent to which outcomes could be achieved varied across the four trajectories of the Global programme. The GPG invested varying degrees of effort in each of them, depending on the availability of resources. Each trajectory operates in very different contexts and the starting point and enabling environment for each specific lobby activity varies. Across the four trajectories, intermediate outcomes include an increased awareness and acknowledgement by stakeholders of the importance of mainstreaming IRM in sector policies, investments and practice. In some trajectories, increased ambitions to act upon the objectives of the global agreements could be identified among either governments, CSOs, academia, or private sector at the global level. Evidence of increased coherence between legal/ policy frameworks and more coherent action is less obvious. Some evidence is identified on both enhanced

legal/ policy frameworks, laws and regulations, enhanced responsible public and private investments and enhanced investments, including through outcomes related to upscaling. The GPG has created space in the global arena and used it to enable CSOs to address issues related to IRM. The effects of these efforts on more resilience of vulnerable communities at national level could not be established in the context of this case study.

- Table 1 clusters intermediate outcomes and outcomes with a potential longevity along six types of change. Those have been recorded from GPG documents and interviews with Alliance staff members working in the GPG. The findings could partially be triangulated with other sources. The table contains a selection of results to illustrate the type of outcomes the GPG has promoted. A more elaborate list can be found in the annex in the Global programme case study.

Table 1: An illustration of outcomes achieved by PfR's Global programme

Type of Change	Example
Increased awareness and acknowledgement of mainstreaming IRM	● Sendai trajectory: WI, with PfR and PEDDR identified gaps in the Sendai Framework, or issues getting too little attention. Some of these issues have grown in importance and WI drew attention to these at every platform. ● SDG trajectory: In 2018 the Mali government presented its Voluntary National Review to the UN and PfR Mali paved the way for wider civil society contributions. The importance of risk-informed policies and decisions was highlighted and increased the awareness in the Mali government.
Increased ambitions among key actors	● Sendai trajectory: The GPG influenced the Global Platform on DRR and hence the stakeholders dialogue on the Sendai Framework implementation with regard to IRM-related issues: Ecosystems and Water-related risks, nature based solutions for peacebuilding, the role of wetlands in water stressed areas, Gender, Forecast-based Financing and Urban resilience (to reduce risks and to avert future disasters). ● Climate Change trajectory: PfR has the advantage of being present in 10 countries, which gives them an entrance point to join the country delegations to UNFCCC meetings. These meetings provide for important entry points to promote IRM as otherwise one can only play a role in side events. ● Climate Change trajectory: The Climate Centre participated as adviser to the formulation of the World Bank's Action Plan in support of the World Bank Group's "2025 Targets to Step Up Climate Action".
Increased coherence between legal/ policy frameworks	● Climate Change trajectory: A joint virtual meeting was convened during the UNFCCC COP 25 conference and the 33rd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. This event brought together for the first time senior figures from both conferences with the aim to raise ambition for greater action to address the humanitarian impacts of climate change. ● Climate Change trajectory: The Global Commission on Adaptation, which is convened by the Global Centre on Adaptation and WRI, is responsible for different action tracks. The IFRC leads on the disaster track which provided

	the GPG with an opportunity to connect with the UK which leads on the resilience track. The GPG played a thought leadership role, thinking about and defining goals and targets.
Enhanced legal/ policy frameworks, laws, regulations, enhanced public and private investments	● Sendai trajectory: Following the GPG's working session on green infrastructure at the Global Platform on DRR, the GPG was able to influence the Sendai monitoring document, providing input into (voluntary) indicators on Green Infrastructure. ● Climate Change trajectory: The GPG has helped shape the international adaptation agenda, strongly positioning resilience as a vehicle for implementation and funding mechanisms. Multiple texts now reflect the importance of ecosystems and landscape approaches, gender and also concrete ideas such as Forecast-based Financing.
Investments	● A research of the London School of Economics (2018) has been a key milestone to document case studies on investments from PfR's engagement in Kenya and Indonesia. This helped to strengthen PfR's own lobby positioning with the private sector and business networks on advancing advocacy on responsible investments. ● Sendai trajectory: The GPG generated a lot of attention for the 'building with nature' approach (case from PfR Indonesia), it now seeks development banks to invest. ● Climate trajectory: The GPG dialogues on Climate Finance created an entry and dialogue with the Green Climate Fund. This event was successful and provides an opportunity to scale up capacity strengthening on climate finance dialogues.
More space for CSOs	● International level: The GPG contributed to meaningful consultation and participation of local actors in the design and implementation of policy, practice and investment. The GPG has made sure that voices of communities at risk are heard in the policy processes (about realities of vulnerable groups, lessons learnt). This engagement resulted also in the inclusion of more community perspectives, and of vulnerable people in particular, into these international frameworks. ● National level: At country level the GPG could support the country teams by creating a more neutral space for CSOs to have conversations with policy makers. The exchanges were made less political, by bringing a different perspective so that local issues could be considered in a wider context.

JC 5.2: The enhanced capacity among PfR implementing partners and their networks and communities has contributed to the mainstreaming of IRM in sector policies, improved IRM investment mechanisms, changed IRM practices for the better at national, regional and global levels and resulted in more resilience of vulnerable communities at national level

Findings under this section relate to all programmes reviewed. The key question relating to this JC is to what extent the changes observed can be attributed to PfR SP interventions, whether executed by Alliance members or the contracted and non-contracted organisations, CBOs or other actors from civil society.

An answer to this question cannot be found easily as actors associated with or supported by PfR SP were not the only ones promoting or influencing change in relation to IRM-related policies, investments or practices, so attribution is difficult. Often, as discussed above, PfR's engagement took place in multi-stakeholder environments composed of government officials, other CSOs, CBOs, think tanks and media. There is also evidence that international cooperation agencies and development banks exercised a strong role in certain contexts through the funding of projects that relate to resilience, livelihoods, eco-system management or climate adaptation.

Interviewees from different countries agreed that PfR SP had contributed to helping communities to become more resilient to disaster and the impacts of climate change and better organised to manage natural resources and address environmental degradation - in some places even significantly. Officials appreciated the technical knowledge and expertise PfR SP was able to bring to bear and commented very positively on the networks and platforms that Alliance members were linked to. In Indonesia and Uganda, the direct engagement of Alliance members as well as implementing partners with government stakeholders has been considerable. In Mali, the strong engagement with communities and their interaction with actors at the local level, in particular, were highly praised. Details of these achievements are recorded in the respective case studies under EQs 5 and 6. Yet, across the countries, while most IRM stakeholders recognise the positive effects of PfR SP in advocating for better policies, improved regulations and enhanced and more widely spread practices relating to IRM, they also consider that PfR's impact has been more limited on making resources available for IRM. Though, as earlier reported, relevant preconditions were shaped in a number of contexts to facilitate the provisions of mainly public investments in the future.

From the feed-back obtained, it is plausible to conclude that PfR SP has catalysed the mainstreaming of IRM into policies and practices in different country contexts. The extent to which this has happened is difficult to assess fully. The annual country reports do contain sections where the country programmes contribution to change is recorded but Alliance staff members confirmed that they did not have a possibility to track and document all effects and off-springs of PfR's engagement, simply because some might be hidden in the work of others which PfR stakeholders are not fully aware of. In some countries, as the case material highlights, the effects are more visible at the sub-national, local and community levels while in others such effects could be observed across all levels. Evidence for attributing the realisation of investments to the lobbying and advocacy of local partners is weaker compared to partially impressive results on promoting IRM-related policies and practice. Effects at the regional levels are so far modest due to the young nature of PfR's engagement at these levels though there are differences between regions. – At the global level, feed-back obtained shows that effects have been mostly noted in the sphere of international policy environments. The below box 17 provides a selection of testimonies obtained from stakeholders across the different case studies conducted to highlight how the work of the Alliance and their local partners has been appreciated.

Box 17: Feedback from stakeholders[8]

Indonesia case: Yuli Utami (Head of Sub-directorate for Watershed Management Institutionalisation, MoEF, Indonesia) - *"KARINA's work in NTT (Province, Sikka District to target villages) is seen as the form of 'internalisation' of watershed management reaching out to the grassroot level that the Directorate is aiming for".*
Indonesia case: Maxi (Bappeda – Kupang District Development Planning Agency), Indonesia - *"Kupang District government appreciates CARE-CIS' approach: CARE-CIS did not come offering a new program but instead discussed together with the government on what is the government's program and priority and where they could support the program that is in line with their mission."*
Mali case: Honorable Paul Damango (Debuté, Bankas) and Honorable Youssouf Aya (Debuté Koro) – MEP Mali - *"Through the creation of coalitions, PfR has helped to strengthen and regulate the interaction of local partners at the community level. These have helped to reduce the conflicts between farmers and herders about the management of natural resources, in particular the access of livestock to water."*
Mali case: Husseini Sankaré (Deputy Mayor of Ouenkoro Commune (Bankass circle, Region of Mopti, Mali) - *"The project helped women to get access to agricultural land (certification and delivery of official documents via the 'Commissions Foncières' (the Commission which regulates the access, exploitation and control of land and renewable resources). In Bankass, 106 ha were given to women of which 65,5 ha via an 'acte de cession (assignment of descent)."*
Uganda case: Josephine Akia and Lawrence Kanakulya, PELUM (CSO, Kampala) - *"Some 45-50% of PfR recommendations were adopted in the development of the Climate Change Bill. Not all though, e.g. creation of Climate Change Authority and Climate Change Fund. Others were adopted, e.g. on green belts, indigenous communities, building resilience, decentralising interventions at community participation level."*
Uganda case: Ms Lucy - Ministry of Water and Environment, Wetlands Management Department (Kampala) - *"PfR was also involved in the drafting of the National Development Plan III – 2019: The Ecological Christian Organisation was invited to edit and facilitate the greening of the NDP III which allowed it to influence the plan to ensure that issues of climate, environment… were mainstreamed in various sectoral sections of the plan."* - MN 403 - Ms Lucy - Ministry of Water and Environment, Wetlands Management Department - 12 March 2020.
HoA case: Leah Wanabw – Senior Policy Officer, African Union Commission, Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture (DREA) - *"The Red Cross [which is the lead on the engagement with the AU], has very much brought in the concept of resilience to the language of the Common African positions on DRR taken to Global Platform for DRR], by actively participating in the extended African Working Group meetings on DRR. … and now when I think of DRR, I think of resilience. This is an association that the Red Cross has cemented."*
Global case: Bijay Kumar – Executive Director Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction (GNDR), United Kingdom, 25 March 2020. - *"PfR facilitates that CSOs can make inputs to global*

[8] Note these quotations are reconstituted from meeting notes and are not verbatim.

processes. Global frameworks and processes are not necessarily listening to people most at risks and PfR brings these perspectives to amplify the processes, as plans need to be informed by practice."

Global case: Andrew Simmons – Research Director Resilience Brokers, United Kingdom, 24 March 2020. - *"International frameworks like Sendai and the SDGs each recognise the need to work with all stakeholders, multilateral actors, development banks and the UN. But people working on SDGs or on Sendai don't know what is happening in the other movements. … PfR is unique in bringing a breath of fresh air to conferences. … There can be a tendency to have an over-representation of different topics, rather than having different perspectives, different types of responses, and modes of analysis. PfR brings in a call to action and shares knowledge that is critical to include in standard practice."*

4.6. EQ 6: Sustainability

EQ 6: To what extent has the PfR support contributed to structurally strengthened and sustainable engagements of its implementing partners to promote IRM at national, regional and global levels?

The evaluation question of sustainability was looked at on the basis of two judgement criteria: i) whether the effects of PfR SP are owned by PfR implementing partners and ii) whether PfR partners are able to lobby and advocate independently of PfR.

Summary response: Overall, the evidence shows PfR support has planted important seeds for sustainable engagements to promote IRM at different levels. Stakeholders have been interested to work with PfR SP and have engaged with Alliance members over a long period of time, in particular at country level. This has created ownership and mobilised endogenous actors to increasingly take leadership over lobbying and advocacy efforts for IRM. Evidence of ownership at regional level is less tangible, given the later start of the project. PfR SP and its implementing partners have worked intensely to craft the preconditions to sustain IRM-related initiatives, and have lobbied to include IRM in national and local strategies and plans. The actual resourcing of these IRM initiatives will depend on the ability of CSOs to mobilise (international) funding and on national governments to make budgets available.

Ownership of PfR effects by PfR implementing partners: The ownership of IRM varies across the different groups of stakeholders and organisations that Alliance members have engaged with. The PfR implementing partners owned and promoted activities especially at the sub-national and local level, often with the background assistance of Alliance – and were also able to reach out and engage national governments, which has potential to multiply IRM effects. Important progress has been made to promote the concept of IRM resulting in clear 'footprints' of IRM across the country programmes, in particular as regards the attention given to policies and practices, for example with the inclusion of IRM in climate change bills, national adaptation plans, but also district level risk reduction plans. At the regional level, according to the limited evidence collected, tangible results with regards to the ownership among regional partners are more elusive, given the later start of the programme. The GPG has aimed to strengthen the ownership of different implementing partners, while in practice these activities have

mainly been undertaken by Alliance members at the national level. Highlights of working towards greater awareness of global agendas among Alliance members are included under EQ 5. Beyond the interest that such awareness raising about global policy issue has created, it cannot be stated with confidence that this has also created ownership of the global agenda at national level.

Potential for continued support for IRM: Undoubtedly, PfR SP worked hard across the programmes to shape preconditions needed to sustain IRM-related activities in the future. A key indicator will be the ability and willingness to mobilise and allocate financial resources for IRM-related strategies and objectives. Working in a variety of PfR countries, with varying levels of public policy and public investment capacities, Alliance members and their national and local partners lobbied for the inclusion of IRM-related budget lines into national and sub-national development plans. Whether these will facilitate the allocation of public funding for IRM objectives will to a large extent depend on the ability of national governments to mobilise such budgets. As discussed under EQ 2 and 5, linking up with international cooperation agencies, and developments banks has been a weaker point of the programme. Such efforts demand tenacity and dedicated human resources, including expertise in international funding, which Alliance members thus far did not mobilise sufficiently.

JC 6.1: The effects of the PfR support are owned by the PfR implementing partners

Country programmes: This judgement criteria relates to the different organisations and individual actors the Alliance members have engaged with, i.e. contracted and non-contracted local CSOs and CBOs, but also government officials and different actors from civil society, including the media or knowledge institutes.

The overall finding drawn from all country data is that stakeholders have been very interested in working with PfR SP. Engagement over a period of time has contributed to creating ownership and mobilised endogenous actors to take leadership of lobbying and advocating for IRM at different levels. As highlighted under EQ 5, implementing partners owned and promoted activities at the sub-national and local levels, in particular, but – with the background assistance of Alliance members - were also able to reach out to higher levels. One example highlighted from Indonesia (see box 11 under JC 4.4) also shows how important it is to get the buy-in of government so that processes can get multiplied with the assistance of government actors.

There is also evidence that since the start of PfR SP, important progress has been made to promote the concept of IRM resulting in clear 'footprints' of IRM across the country programmes, in particular with regard to the attention given to policies and practices. For example, IRM has found its way into national climate bills, national adaptation plans but also district and village risk reduction plans, which would never have been possible without the ownership of national and local leaders. Working with experienced CSOs, as in the case of Uganda (see box 18, below) and giving them space to co-influence the agenda setting was another way of shaping ownership and endogenous leadership. Interviews from Uganda also show that training on IRM had a cascading effect through existing CSO networks and motivated several non-PfR supported organisations to integrate IRM into their strategic plans.

In Mali, experiences of PfR I showed that capacity strengthening of national CSOs did not lead to a real trickling down for strengthening capacities of community-based coalitions in support of IRM. The revised approach focused therefore on building and strengthening the capacities of IRM coalitions, which resulted in a high level of ownership and the creation of so-called "IRM-Champions", a family of stakeholders linking local actors with parliamentarians who are supportive of IRM at the national level.

Box 18: Working with local partners on equal footing in Uganda enhanced local ownership

The PfR Uganda programme has been able to engage meaningfully with national policy processes on climate change adaptation, wetlands management and disaster risk reduction, in part because it involved new partners with experience in national level advocacy early on in the identification phase of PfR SP. The PfR Uganda Alliance has also increasingly put local contracted organisations on an equal footing within the partnership, which for local partners provided not just access to funding, but also a platform to propose ideas, influence agendas and engage in joint reflection.

Regional and global programmes: The approaches of regional programmes were mainly focused on influencing regional policy and institutions as a way of effecting long-term change. Regional programmes targeted regional policy makers and where possible engaged with regionally and internationally active CSOs, such as Oxfam or the IFRC. Interviews with stakeholders suggest that there is a real interest in the work done by PfR. In view of the fact that most regional programmes only came into full swing as of 2018, it is too early to expect to see tangible results in terms of ownership among the regional partners the Alliance members engaged with.

As for the global level, the GPG promoted IRM and it worked with Alliance members from the PfR countries but did not proactively involve other national or local country partners. Working downwards, towards the national levels as discussed under EQ 4, the GPG aimed to strengthen the ownership of global policy frameworks among different national and local implementing partners but these activities were mainly undertaken under the lead of the country teams, working at the national level. This included making PfR implementing partners aware of the bigger agendas at play and becoming more familiar with, and more effective at, international policy forums. Some examples were highlighted under EQ 5. While this has created interest and has supported the creation of ownership of global policy frameworks at the national level, it cannot be stated with confidence, based on the evidence collected, that this has indeed created strong ownership for global policy frameworks at the national level. The evaluation team was not able to assess to what extent PfR's engagement at global level led to more ownership of IRM among actors operating at the international level.

JC 6.2: PfR partners are able to lobby and advocate for IRM on their own and without the support of the PfR

All programmes: The extent to which PfR partners are able to lobby and advocate for IRM on their own in the future and without the support of PfR remains to be seen. PfR partners, under this JC, refer to contracted and non-contracted CSOs, CBOs and other actors from civil society such as the media.

The real proof of the pudding is the sustaining of IRM in the strategic and budgetary sphere, in terms of i) the formulation of IRM-related strategic and operational objectives at the country level and ii) the mobilisation and allocation of financial resources for these objectives. **PfR has worked on these issues across countries but findings show that countries with strong public policy and public investment capacities are more likely to integrate IRM than those with less strong enabling environments.** In a variety of PfR countries, ranging from Indonesia with strong and stable state structures to Mali with a government confronted with conflict and instability, Alliance members and their national and local partners also lobbied for the inclusion of IRM-related budget lines into national and sub-national development plans. These are important preconditions to facilitate the allocation of public funding for such objectives but it

depends in the end on the ability and willingness of national governments, and possibly other international partners, to mobilise such budgets.

Accessing international cooperation agencies and development banks was done to some extent but this has not been strongly addressed so far, as was discussed under EQ 5 (box 15). Efforts were made also at the global and regional levels. However, such engagements require a long breath and dedicated human resources with experience in the international funding domain, which Alliance members were not able to mobilise in sufficient numbers.

Most important, however, is whether the assisted organisations now have the capability to continue and sustain the advocacy for IRM. It can be stated with confidence that PfR SP worked hard across the programmes to shape the preconditions which will be relevant in the future to sustain IRM-related activities. Alliance members as well as local stakeholders worked with local structures and helped to strengthen them, such as national civil protection platforms, CSO networks or community coalitions. Training, technical advice and the provision of knowledge inputs accompanied such engagements. As a result, some of the supported CSOs are now in a position to sustain such lobbying and advocacy activities – either at the sub-national level or both, at the sub-national and the national levels. The ability to do so differs, however, greatly among PfR countries. Findings in this regard were described under EQ 3, 4 and 5, and in the annexed country reports, which provide multiple examples from different PfR countries and regions as well as from the global level. **As a generic finding it is safe to state that there are a good number of implementing partners in low income countries and low middle-income countries who would have the capacity to continue with the lobbying and advocacy for IRM if they can further mobilise external financial resources so that experienced staff and operational costs can be met.** Opportunities for mobilising financial resources from within such countries are generally limited, but as in the case of Indonesia, governments may be willing to finance civil society organisations if they are regarded as offering complementary services and expertise. **It is also safe to state that there remain quite a number of CSOs and CBOs having benefitted from PfR, which could not continue on their own without further capacity strengthening assistance and accompaniment. This is particularly the case for implementing partners in highly fragile and conflict-prone countries.**

4.7. EQ 7: Efficiency and coordination

EQ 7: To what extent were the internal governance mechanisms, management approaches and working processes of the PfR Alliance efficient and well-coordinated

The evaluation question about efficiency and coordination was assessed from the perspective of four indicators: i) governance; ii) timeliness, cost and focus; iii) management and coordination and iv) reporting and learning.

Summary response: PfR SP has overall worked efficiently and with a good level of coordination. The governance and strategic steering of the programme, despite some challenges, resulted in a constructive collaboration of the different Alliance partners throughout the project period. However, this has not come easily, and the implementation mechanism has a number of fault lines that have weakened efficiency and coordination. Some of these have been identified and addressed over the period of implementation but a number remain relating to the overall

management structure and related decision-making processes, the adequacy of technical and strategic backstopping, and the resources available at country level to provide for full-time coordination. Rather complex but conceptually sound management systems, which had to be set up in response to donor requirements, in particular PME, have risked overwhelming the system and limited the utility of systems for internal learning and external accountability.

On governance: The key characteristics of the Alliance are that different organisations joined to create a loose organisational set-up (the Alliance) to serve a common purpose and to generate benefits together. This structure allowed at the same time retaining the individual identity of the Alliance members and a certain level of internal control, while the common purpose of PfR SP was never lost from sight. The characteristics of an alliance structure pose a number of challenges in terms of governance and management, with a high level of distributed responsibilities and flat hierarchy. Premium is placed on consultative decision-making rather than having de facto a primus inter-pares to adjudicate and take final decisions. This way of working has necessitated a high level of cross-Alliance engagement in various structures and committees (comitology), which overall has been valued for respecting the interests and needs of each member but at times has created inefficiency, and possibly lack of decisiveness. The upside of such an organisational set-up was the ability of each Alliance member to connect to, or bring in its own networks, thereby multiplying the lobbying and advocacy on IRM to complementary communities and professional circles.

On timeliness, cost and focus: PfR SP has been an ambitious enterprise which placed considerable demands on Alliance members both individually and collectively to tool up to the new way of working. An underlying challenge has been to manage the balance between coherence and diversity. With the passage of time, the Alliance found its modus operandi and a certain equilibrium but time was lost at the start adjusting from PfR I to PfR SP. This meant that full scale implementation did not happen straight away, and a certain amount of "catch up" is now happening to meet commitments made. A clear lesson of experience is the under-estimation of the effort required to make the shift to the new way of working, and an under-investment in a strong centre to backstop the regional and country programmes with strategic and technical support. Whilst tools and templates were there, as well as guidance notes and training, on-going support was not necessarily sufficient. A recurring question is whether the programme has spread itself too thinly, over-reaching itself, rather than maintaining focus in selected areas. This question is replicated at all levels with trade-offs to be made between what to work on, where to work geographically, and with whom to engage. For the regional and global programmes, it has been more to do with clarifying the why, the what and how of a regional programme and matching this to limited delivery capacity. For headquarters, the question is whether it makes sense to work in so many countries and regions, and how opportunities for learning and cooperation between PfR countries can be fully taken advantage of.

The way budgets have been distributed have made it difficult to plan and deliver optimally. Budget allocation is based on the parity principle rather than on need, impacting on allocative efficiency. This also has implications for the role of the ToC in influencing what gets done, as it would appear that budgets are allocated to some extent independently of the rationale of the ToC.

On coordination: The term "working together but keeping an own identity" possibly best describes the way of working, which is consistent with the ambition and the need to balance coherence and diversity. However, this does not happen without a firm commitment to stay together and to take important decisions jointly, which the Alliance managed to realise. Equally, decisions about the investment of

resources at the overall programme level and the strategic use of those resources had to be taken jointly. Some challenges were noted with regard to human resources. While the staffing levels at headquarter appear to be adequate, and a considerable number of committees have been established, helping to shape ownership and commitment among staff, their strategic use to backstop the needs of regional and country programmes has been found wanting, particularly with respect to supporting core processes of lobbying and advocacy, capacity strengthening and knowledge management and learning (KM&L). These characteristics are somewhat reflected at country level where mechanisms have been put in place that promote collaboration and coherence, but which also respect the independence of each Alliance member. This however required having a full-time rather than part-time country coordinator, especially in those countries where several Alliance members are active. This was not the case everywhere, impacting on the ability of country coordinators to provide the level of strategic oversight needed, over and above meeting accountability requirements.

On reporting and learning: While the programme has set up elaborate tools and processes to support monitoring and learning and has encouraged as much as possible a bottom-up and participatory approach, it has taken long for the system to bed itself in and considerable modifications have had to be introduced along the way. The programme has been able to capture a substantial amount of information from country, regional and global levels, but has struggled to find an effective way to summarise and communicate the headlines to stakeholders, including MFA, through the Annual Reports.

A particular challenge reported at the country level relates to the understanding of "outcomes". The outcome harvesting conceptual framework does not appear to have been adequately internalised by country stakeholders. As a result, countries have struggled to make full use of what is otherwise a very appropriate reporting framework to use in conjunction with ToCs. Unfortunately, country stakeholders have found the reporting requirements to be heavy and time-consuming, a compliance exercise rather than necessarily an instrument for programme learning. Making the link between M&E and learning has not been easy. This has gradually improved since 2018 after the appointment of a part-time KM&L position to cover the entire programme. Structurally, the interface between those responsible for learning and those responsible for PME remains sub-optimal. However, it is noted that initiatives are being taken to develop skills in story telling among programme participants as a way to support communications, visibility, reporting and internal learning.

JC 7.1: The PfR Alliance was governed and managed appropriately and ongoing and past lessons related to governance and management were identified and taken up[9]

<u>Overall programme:</u> The governance of the PfR Alliance is complex and needs to be seen in light of being constituted by five PfR Alliance members of which each has its particular (historical) background, organisational culture and professional characteristic, or "DNA". These aspects differ among members having their legacy in disaster (risk) management, community-based development or in the domain of evidence-based engagement for environmental protection. Organisations differ also in terms of size, their networks, governance and institutional structures, funding, and – most importantly when discussing local leadership below – different types of relationship with local organisations originating and

[9] The evaluation team rearranged the findings per JC to present the results of the assessment in a more logical flow. JC 2.4, from the evaluation matrix, which deals with overall governance issues, is presented as JC 7.1. The former JC 2.1 is now JC 7.2, the former JC 2.2 is now JC 7.3 and the former JC 2.3 is now JC 7.4.

operating in the PfR countries. Some Alliance members have their "own" organisations in the countries concerned, registered as a national CSO but functioning as an extended arm of headquarters in the Netherlands, others have alliances with national CSO – the relationship of the Netherlands Red Cross with different National Red Cross Societies would be an example of the latter type.

Concerns for the resilience of vulnerable people in different parts of the world as well as their potential to contribute to sustainable inclusive economic growth, brought the five PfR Alliance members together when the MFA made funding available for different types of partnerships in 2011. PfR I was born against this background, which can be seen as both a pragmatic way to respond to shifting Dutch funding arrangements for Netherlands NGOs as of 2010/2011, as well as a deliberate step to explore ways of working more comprehensively together on issues of shared concern in order to create synergies and achieve better results.

Pragmatism and the earlier mentioned shared concerns about climate change, the impact of disasters as well as resource scarcity were identified as the key building blocks of this collaboration of Dutch organisations, and shaped the governance and management arrangements of the Alliance at headquarters level as well as in the programmes at country, regional and global levels. The key characteristic of this Alliance is that different organisations joined to create a loose organisational set-up (the Alliance) to serve a common purpose and to generate benefits together. **Overall, Alliance members were able to retain their individual identity and control over their operations but at the same time had to relinquish some of this identity and control, particularly with respect to finances and compliance, in order to work within the framework of the Alliance.** While several interviewees expressed a wish to better streamline operations, to pool resources more, or shape more coherence across programme trajectories, there were no voices pleading for a completely different set-up, for example a federation or a foundation with its own organisational legal identity and purpose.

The functioning of the SG, as the principal governance structure of the PfR, should be seen against this background. Representatives of the five Alliance members come together between three to four times per year to exchange and discuss strategic, process-related and cross-programme relevant issues but these exchanges respect each other's' organisational identity. Difficult issues are brought up but – if there is no consensus – these have not been pursued further, nor resolved by the unilateral decision of one PfR Alliance member. The latter happened only once during the course of the PfR SP when an Alliance member withdrew from a country but this was done in a way that did not impede PfR's work in this country.[10] According to several interviewees, the depth of strategic discussions and management exercised by the SG could be improved. One interviewee mentioned that the SG does not steer enough, which was characterised as 'challenging' for certain issues. The SG's perspective is that this was done deliberately at times to actually shift responsibility and ownership towards lower levels in the organisation and to let decisions of a more operational nature to be taken at PWG level. In terms of decision making, the PfR Alliance agreement contains a stipulation that allows for a decision to be taken by the lead organisation, the Netherlands Red Cross, in case no consensus can be reached, but in practice this provision has never been applied nor did the SG feel that it had to be used.

[10] The budget was transferred to the other remaining Alliance members active in this country.

This governance set-up brings with it both disadvantages and advantages. The complex decision-making process of the PfR Alliance concerning its engagement in Latin America has been noted during interviews and does not speak in favour of such a governance construct. On the positive side, the respect for each other and the recognition that each organisation has its distinct DNA has helped to keep the PfR Alliance together. Trust has grown and the interest to join hands and to continue together has been reinforced over these years.

Beyond this, the chosen organisational set-up has allowed each Alliance member to connect to, or bring in its own networks and thereby multiply opportunities to lobby and advocate for IRM in complementary communities and professional circles thereby enhancing overall programme results and effectiveness. This point was stressed on several occasions by PfR stakeholders and underlines the upside of the Alliance structure. By maintaining an overall loose collaborative set-up, additional results and impact could be achieved, which enhanced the overall effectiveness of the programme and which – according to judgements made by PfR stakeholders – outbalanced some downsides in terms of efficiency.

An important element in the governance and the strategic management of the PfR Alliance is the PWG. Members of the PWG are staff drawn from each of PfR Alliance member who are responsible for PfR within their respective organisations. The PWG also comprises members of the Coordination Team NL. The "extended" PWG" comprises PfR staff working in global positions, i.e. on humanitarian diplomacy and capacity strengthening, plus the leads on knowledge management and PME. The extended PWG came together as of the beginning of PfR SP. Its functioning and composition was formalised in May 2019 when four senior staff members working in country and regional programmes were appointed as additional members of the "extended PWG". The PWG generally meets once per month and bridges between the SG meetings and the daily work of the Coordination Team NL. The central place of the PWG in the PfR governance and management structure can be understood when consulting the PfR Mid-Term Stock Taking meeting report, held in October 2018, which was organised and led by the PWG.

The PWG accompanies the work of the country teams on issues which are of wider (partially strategic) concern and which go beyond day-to-day management. The PWG proposes adjustments and country decisions on which the SG then takes a final decision when needed. Interviewees highlighted that the PWG was the forum in which relevant discussions took place and which allowed Alliance member staff to signal issues which are of importance to their respective organisation as well as the Alliance as a whole. It also identifies issues, which need the attention of the SG members from their respective organisations. Though several interviewees mentioned that PWG discussions were often tedious, sometimes turning in circles and not always leading to clear decisions or guidance for the Coordination Team NL, the country leads or the regional leads – an issue that was attributed to the collaborative nature of the PfR Alliance. No concrete suggestions were made by interviewees as to how this should be changed. Overall, due to the nature of the programme, which requires intense collaboration and interaction between the different partners, the PWG (building on experiences gained during PfR I) has proven to be a very relevant governance and management organ from the beginning of PfR SP. It was also an important place where more trust was shaped over time. It also helped to create a better mutual understanding among the different Alliance members.

Regional and global programmes: With the exception of four country/regional leads, as mentioned above, other PfR country leads and regional leads are not part of the PWG. But they are associated with wider (strategic) discussions once per year during the CL/RL week that takes place in January of each year. CL and RL also inform their respective PWG members on relevant issues that require discussions in the PWG. Interviews with some CL/RL indicated that there is an appetite for being more involved in strategic discussions and the management of the PfR Alliance.

JC 7.2: The PfR programme has been delivered in a timely manner, against reasonable overhead costs and, given the resources available, been spread appropriately across regions and countries (incl. the focus on facilitating Southern ownership and South-South cooperation, and linking/ creating synergy of work at the different levels, i.e. local to regional to global).

Overall programme: The change from PfR I to PfR SP demanded a new way of working for Alliance members, including closer interaction at headquarters, regional and country level. It also required working in a way that would maintain a delicate balance between shaping coherence on one side, and encouraging diversity and the wish of Alliance members to retain a certain independence on the other side. Alliance members felt also in need of activating their own networks and to promote IRM as part of this shift. **The change from PfR I to PfR SP came somewhat suddenly and interviews indicated that not all Alliance members were sufficiently prepared for this change.**

At country level, the shift was bigger for some countries, like Mali where the programme was fundamentally reformulated, than for Indonesia where it was easier to build on the legacy of PfR I. Developing new tools for strengthening lobby and advocacy capacities, training of staff and implementing a new approach so that staff in all 10 PfR countries, 4 regions and the Global programme looked into the same direction was time consuming and costly. As mentioned above, considerable efforts and time had to be invested also for the formulation of country-specific Theories of Change (ToC) and trajectories. Consequently, the programme started to work gradually as of 2016 and could only take up its full speed as of 2017/2018.

PfR SP worked mostly in the countries that had benefitted under PfR I. However, the country programme in Nicaragua was discontinued while Haiti and South Sudan were added as new countries in order to give focus on promoting IRM and community resilience in more fragile and conflict affected countries. The continuation in countries where PfR Alliance members had a track record of work, knowledge of the local context and established networks made sense from an efficiency perspective though, at hindsight, questions were raised why Haiti was added to the programme because the country required considerably more investment than PfR SP could offer.

In terms of geographical spread of PfR SP within countries, a certain logic was applied within most countries that has enabled linking of interventions at national, sub-national and community levels. The size and demographic distribution of most countries, however, allowed for a limited coverage only and presented an inevitable challenge with respect to making trade-offs between spreading widely or working intensively in specific localities. The Indonesia case found that the selection of four provinces to work in was inherited from PfR I but the criteria used to select those areas were considered robust. The same can be said for two of the three trajectories in Mali, each engaging in different regions of the country, though the selection of the third trajectory – as some interviewees commented – was not sufficiently underpinned by strong selection criteria. In Uganda, one trajectory focused on the practice area and is implemented mainly in the centre and North-East of the country where PfR Alliance members had

worked before. This trajectory partially feeds into the work of the three policy-focused trajectories, which operate mainly at the national level.

In terms of exchange between PfR countries, PfR SP made an effort to comply with the ambitions of the programme. Highly appreciated exchanges were organised, for example, between Indonesia and Kenya with visits in each of the two PfR countries. A similar exchange was organised between Uganda, Mali and the Philippines. **Various exchanges between PfR countries took also place in the context of the regional programmes but those, with the exception of the HoA Programme, were mostly ad-hoc and linked to selected conferences at the regional level.** In West Africa, one part of the regional programme aims to set up and run cross-border collaborations between Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea Conakry but the results so far have been very modest, mostly related to a lack of a clear engagement strategy (ToC) and insufficient resources. In Latin America, regional dynamics have been hampered by a fragmented and incoherent engagement. Activities were implemented in Spanish-speaking Guatemala, French-speaking Haiti and a shift from the Guatemala country level to the regional level during PfR SP. A firm judgement on the engagement of PfR SP in these two regions (West Africa and Latin America) cannot be made at this stage but questions need to be raised whether scarce resources were strategically well allocated and not spread too thinly. Exchanges among Asian PfR countries at the regional level have been more regular though the evaluation scope did not allow to go much in depth on the benefits and challenges of the Asia regional programme (see also findings under JC 4.3 on work in Asia).

The **GPG** started work in 2016 building on activities that had commenced at the tail end of PFR I. It however took some time for Alliance members to start working effectively together because of the many developments unfolding, namely the dynamics of global policy processes as well as the challenges of reorienting PfR towards the new functioning of the programme at the operational level, creating new partnerships, linking to country teams and concluding on joint priorities among organisations with different organisational agendas. Challenges of ensuring an effective linking between the local, national, regional and global levels were already mentioned during the PfR Mid-Term Stock Taking in October 2018 as a priority issue to be addressed. These challenges still exist today as has been discussed under JC. 4.2.

Overall, and looking from a birds-eye perspective, a portfolio of EUR 50 m for the PfR SP programme to be implemented over a period of five years is barely adequate. This has been the view of several interviewees, though views in this regard were expressed cautiously. The programme was spread across 10 countries, four regions, and the global level, with activities realised by five Alliance members, each implementing a trajectory under its lead at country, regional and global programme level. While PfR SP is not a traditional project, but rather a facility to promote change, and while it is recognised that change can be leveraged with comparatively small amounts of funding if used strategically, there appears to be a certain mismatch between ambition and resources available. For the amount of money available, it was too thinly spread and, as evidenced from findings presented in the following sections, not enough budget was allocated for human resources to ensure an appropriate support for the implementation of the programme (the issue of overhead costs is discussed in the next section).

JC 7.3: The PfR programme has been operationally coordinated across the PfR Alliance members at global, regional as well as national levels

Overall programme: Under this JC, findings are recorded with regard to the entire programme's coordination mechanisms; the management of its operations, including human resources; and financial management and associated coordination mechanisms.

The creation of various coordination and management mechanisms and groups at headquarter level in which each PfR Alliance member is represented needs to be understood against the background of an Alliance that wanted to grow gradually together but at the same time to ensure that nothing happened without each other's consent and participation. A myriad of coordination arrangements was created to ensure that "every Alliance member is informed and can have a say on everything", as one interviewee put it. In addition to the necessary SG and PWG (discussed earlier), there is the PfR's PME Group, the Knowledge Management and Learning/ Communication Working Group, the Global Policy Group, all at headquarters level, and the Capacity Strengthening Reference Group, which includes 10 people from the country teams. Some of these groups are more active than others but the very set-up, while shaping ownership and commitment, creates coordination and overhead costs that should not be underestimated. Having so many groups and exchanges with representatives of different Alliance members in each group also enhances the risk of miscommunication as the evaluation team experienced during the course of the evaluation.

In terms of managing day-to-day operations, the current structure caters for two full-time coordination positions at headquarter level but this arrangement does not fully allow to connect fully with the more strategic overall management and articulation of such a complex programme. The high work pressure relating to compliance-related tasks prevents the team to connect with content-related issues across the programme and to follow up on possible changes that need to be made. Exchanges with country and regional leads take place on a day-to-day basis but focus mostly on managerial tasks. There are also the "thematic" global full-time positions for capacity strengthening and humanitarian diplomacy linked to the GPG plus a 50% position dealing with knowledge management and learning (KM&L) for the entire programme. For PME, an overall coordinator is employed but this person can only spend a limited percentage (33%) of his/her time for PfR SP. In addition, each Alliance partner has a part time (between 20% and 50%) staff member to support the PME of their respective programmes. This might suggest at first glance of a programme that is well staffed but findings from the evaluation indicate that the support provided through these all-programme positions have not been sufficient to effectively accompany the diversity of country and regional processes and to support the ambition of connecting the local, national, regional and global levels in support of IRM. Findings from the cases and complementary interviews with staff from different PfR countries also highlight that more country level practical support would be needed, in particular with regard to knowledge management, learning and communication, capacity strengthening, gender and investments.

PfR SP is informed by a set of financial management and accountability mechanisms which are applicable for all partners. **As for the budget allocation, a two-pronged approach was applied to allocate funding across the partners and regions.** First, budget has been assigned according to the parity principle among the Alliance members. Second, based on country, regional and global plans (including anticipated results) the budget was further allocated resulting in smaller and larger budgets for the respective 15 sub-programmes of PfR. These two steps were taken at the beginning of PfR SP, principally top down while consulting with staff at the country and regional levels. The budget was then further broken down per trajectory within the respective global, regional and country programmes. **This contradicts, however, the logic of working with a ToC that is at the heart of PfR SP. Ideally, the budget allocation should be determined by needs as identified by the ToC rather than based on a top-down sharing among Alliance members.** This system provides for relatively little flexibility and space for budgetary adjustments across trajectories and even between countries because opportunities or demands for engagement can be intense during certain periods while rather limited during others. **Though PfR SP could benefit from an unused "11th country budget" which had been included in the beginning of the programme.** As no

11th country was identified, funds from this budget could be used for unforeseen demands and allocated from headquarter level in line with identified needs.

In the case of Uganda, for example, the assignment of budgets based on parity initially caused delays (i.e., budget allocated to one trajectory that could not be used for a particular reasons while in another domain there was a need for spending funds but not enough funding was available), at times negatively impacting the advocacy activities of local partners. Problems related to the top-down allocation of budgets were recognised at headquarters level and flexibility has increased over the years as trust grew, procedures were simplified and Alliance members, in some countries, became more willing to share budgets. In the case of Indonesia, the generally flexible approach to planning and budgeting that the programme allows and that enables adjustments of each ToC are noted. However, budgets are not pooled and remain tied to each PfR Alliance member, though scope for funding joint activities have been identified. From the HoA Programme it is reported that a system is in place that puts each partner in charge of its own activities. While efforts are made to always discuss and agree upon activities, this means that the programme functions in a system of "working separately together" with the risk of creating silos if not well managed by one coordinator. To counter such bottlenecks, PfR SP could make good use of the above mentioned "11th country budget". The use of these funds was driven by a joint analysis and allocation of resources at overall Alliance management level.

Working with such a set-up requires a lot of exchange and goodwill between different partners so as to be able to agree jointly on priorities and on the way forward for implementation. It requires a good mutual understanding, informal exchange and trust, which had to be built over time and which has been shaped at overall PfR programme governance and management level. However, this way of working appears to be only present in a minority of PfR countries. In some countries, budgets and expenditure are openly shared, in others only budgets are shared but without being transparent what the budgets have been used for and how one PfR Alliance member could make use of potentially unspent resources available from another member of the Alliance. At times, as has been reported from several countries, change processes can be tedious and do not advance fast in one trajectory while in other trajectories there are demands that cannot be met because of budget limitations. One PfR Alliance member explained that such unbalance has led to the decision of staff members to turn their back on PfR. **Despite such outliers noted, the overall message emerging from the different programmes at country, regional and global level is that a spirit of collaboration has been nurtured over the course of PfR SP's implementation and that PfR Alliance members have so far found a modus operandi to work constructively within the limits of an imperfect system.**

Country, regional and global programmes: In this section, specific aspects and findings pertaining to the operational coordination and management of the programme at country, regional and global levels are presented.

In PfR country programmes, staff in lead positions encounter very high work pressures. They have a downward responsibility to coordinate the programme strategically and lead management processes at country level. They also have a double upward responsibility; first, to interact with the region and the global levels, content wise, to ensure programmatic coherence, and second, with the global management level for accountability purposes. Most of these positions are only part time. Whilst the part time arrangement is sufficient to coordinate and to fulfil administrative tasks, it does not allow for strategically leading often complex country processes that need to be linked, in addition, to regional and global dynamics. **Each trajectory is led by one Alliance member at country level who reports financially to its headquarters and content-wise to the country lead as well as headquarters. As such, the country lead has never**

a full overview of the programme, resources used and budgetary space remaining for areas that might need more investments. The principal coordination mechanisms are the bi-annual PME workshops plus informal exchanges in between if required. Interviews clearly highlight that, on balance, cooperation between the different partners at country level is constructive and mechanisms were found to deal with (upcoming) tensions though, as mentioned above, cooperation in some countries is better while in others not all interactions proceed smoothly. This was also noted during exchanges with different country teams.

At the PfR regional programme and global programme level, coordination and management is even more challenging because of human resources constraints. For Latin America, West Africa and Asia, regional programme coordination are additional responsibilities for PfR Alliance staff members. For the HoA Programme, there is one full-time coordinator plus seven positions from the different PfR Alliance members with each assigning some 15% of their time for regional work. This can explain why the link between country programmes and the regional programme is not systematised as earlier discussed under JC 4.3. At the level of the GPG, the human resources situation is similar to the HoA programme. There is one full-time senior position to coordinate the humanitarian diplomacy work whereas several other positions of the GPG are only part time. The PfR Mid-term Stock Taking of October 2018 also noted that the coordination of the GPG needed to be addressed as a priority area. This issue, however, does not appear to have been resolved.

This human resourcing construct, whereby some Alliance members only allocate a limited percentage of their staff to a programme, creates efficiency constraints. Due to the collaborative nature of the programmes, which is a characteristic of the entire PfR SP programme, each Alliance member has the ambition to contribute but – de facto – can only engage to a limited extent because the allocation of human resources does not allow to do so. A lot of the time allocated to staff members is then devoted to coordination related tasks, because everybody needs to be informed and have a say on the entire aspect of the programme. This then goes at the expense of more productive work. There are pay-offs resulting from these human resources arrangements (e.g., the ability to connect with a range of other IRM-related processes outside the global or regional programme related work was mentioned) but in the view of the evaluation team this does not compensate for an overall fragmented set-up that impacts on efficiency and effectiveness.

Another issue is regular staff changes and – as was reported by the GPG – positions that are not quickly filled if an Alliance member leaves the job (in one case, a position to be filled by one Alliance member was vacant for 9 months). This was signalled as an issue of concern during the PfR Mid-term Stock Taking of October 2018 but, as far as the evaluation team could assess, no remedies have been found so far. The reasons for these regular staff changes could also not be discovered by the evaluation team.

JC 7.4: The PfR support has been monitored for accountability and learning on a regular basis to identify and report on results and blockages/problems at the three intervention levels (national, regional, global) and notably at South-South cooperation level

Attention to putting in place a robust system of PME was at the centre of PfR's concern since the start of PfR SP. This was partially informed by the demands of the MFA for financial accountability as several interviewees mentioned as well as the strong technical and service delivery focus of PfR I which was an experience with which Alliance members entered into the PfR SP. By contrast, attention to KM&L and how this could be incorporated into PME was accorded less priority at the start of the programme.

The PME process: The programme has used several tools for monitoring, accountability and learning of which the PME process, including the above mentioned bi-annual and highly appreciated PME weeks, has been the main one. Exchanges taking place in the context of this PME process were described as useful for a conversation about best practices and possibly refocusing of activities. But comments received about the reporting obligations and the reporting format to be used were much less positive. Each programme needs to submit twice per year a report along a standard reporting format, which is compiled to the best of the country team's abilities. Results of this exercise differ substantially from country to country and within the respective country reports from trajectory to trajectory. PME reports tend to provide detailed documentation of individual activities and outputs, yet do not necessarily present progress in a more systematic and aggregate way at the outcome level. As a result, it proved challenging for the evaluation team to grasp the essence of the progress taking place in the bi-annual country reports, despite the volume of data and information contained, sometimes exceeding 100 pages. Interviewees confirmed that aggregating these reports into a coherent report at headquarters level was laborious and time-intensive.

Alliance members at country level were mostly critical of the reporting framework. In Uganda, the PME reporting template was found heavy and time consuming to complete. In Indonesia, the principal stumbling block seemed to be the correct understanding of "outcomes", which created difficulty for participants to know how to document results, a problem that was only satisfactorily resolved in 2019. Guidance received from headquarters was not always considered clear and constant – at times demanding more detailed information, at other times demanding more summarised information. Beyond the PME process, interviewees from Uganda mentioned parallel requirements to report via other tools such as the global activity log sheet, and parallel reporting requirements for PfR local partners.

Overall, evidence points at limited knowledge and capacities on outcome harvesting and the development, use and review of the ToC leading to a sub-optimal use of the system, even to confusion. This is unfortunate, as the underlying reporting concept of the framework should be straight forward to use and relevant to a lobbying and advocacy programme, building on the three core outcome harvesting (OH) evaluation questions (what are the outcomes; why are they relevant and what contribution did PfR have in reaching these). From the findings it is evident that the conceptual underpinnings of the OH methodology, which are present in PfR's reporting concept, were not sufficiently well communicated and internalised across the different programmes. The reporting practice also shows that the country reports are used mainly as a reporting tool rather than as a tool to stimulate learning.

The Annual PfR Programme Reports are the place where the bigger lines can be traced and clearly show that PfR management was able to devote more time to their production as of 2018. Useful information is recorded and telling stories are documented. This Annual Report format is useful for purposes of public outreach, accountability and fundraising but it is not suitable for communicating the essence of the essence to officials at the level of the MFA who have little time to read a voluminous Annual Report and who are in need of easy-to-present and concise information to update their hierarchy.

The strong accountability orientation of the PME system mentioned above has been subject to a wider discussion and research in the Netherlands about burden sharing between the MFA and CSOs which also applies to organisations benefitting from the D&D funding framework. An IOB evaluation of 2017 finds that efficiency for the MFA improved as the administrative burden decreased while – for alliances such as PfR – this burden became heavier (IOB 2017 p. 128). Interview reports and sources consulted for the evaluation on PfR SP confirm this finding.

KM&L: In 2017, a decision was taken to create a global part-time position on KM&L, funded by the Climate Centre. The decision to create such a position was based on the desire to boost internal learning and to show towards the outside world what PfR SP was achieving. Based on interview records, questions can be raised whether this decision was undertaken with a fully shared understanding among PfR Alliance members as to the strategic relevance of such a function. **A comprehensive understanding of KM's positioning in the PfR SP implementation process cannot be traced clearly. KM&L remained also rather delinked from the PME function, most notably, the KM&L coordinator has never been a member of the PME group.**

Over time, however, the PfR SP programme became more "learning-sensitive". It invested in the design of a better conceptual understanding of PME and learning and in the creation of tools to support PME at the overall programme as well as country and regional levels. Guidance notes and strategies on PME and communication were drafted and training modules were developed and implemented. Conceptual work and guidance on KM&L were further developed, though the draft and incomplete KM&L strategy formulated in 2016 was not completed. A PfR online library was set up, containing case studies, research reports and videos on IRM-related issues. The programme also discussed the capacity strengthening approach in 2018 and formulated an updated capacity strengthening strategy linked to the design of a new tool, the Capacity 2020 Goal documents. With the assistance of CARE, the programme introduced the gender marker self-assessment tool. Confronted with new challenges in contexts where violent conflicts prevail, a study is ongoing to set out pathways for working in a more conflict sensitive manner in such situations.

Various meetings and exchanges facilitate learning. A property of PfR SP are the regular formal as well as informal exchanges among Alliance members. These take place in the context of a myriad of meetings and working groups at headquarters level (see below) as well as during the country and regional PME workshops, organised twice yearly in each country. The programme organises in addition an annual "leads week" during which all persons working in global coordinating and thematic positions meet with country and regional leads who gather for this purpose in The Hague. Most of these events focus strongly on learning and on the further improvement of the programme's planning and implementation. PfR SP conducted also a Mid-Term Stock Taking in October 2018, which revealed relevant findings that informed the planning of the remainder of PfR SP. In terms of learning between PfR countries and regions, exchange visits between different PfR country teams were organised as mentioned above. These were highly appreciated. For example, the Kenya team exchange visit with Indonesia brought about valuable lessons learned on how to upscale their work on vulnerable groups in urban areas, engage national governments and work with communities to reduce urban risk as part of the New Urban Agenda.

In terms of knowledge documenting and sharing, PfR SP initiated during the recent months a number of write-shops in different PfR countries to strengthen the storytelling and story-reporting capacities of the country teams. This is laudable and certainly useful in view of new fundraising efforts for IRM. PfR has also produced written material such as evidence-based briefing notes and several videos to tell stories from the field and has used them as tools for lobbying and advocacy at country and regional levels. However, this has been introduced rather late in the programme.

So real progress has been made leading to the above stated observation that PfR SP became more and more "learning sensitive" over the course of its implementation. There is nevertheless scope to further integrate KM&L into the core domain of the programme, by linking it more strongly to the capacity strengthening for lobby and advocacy work, and by using it more strategically for communication and public relations.

5. Conclusions

This section draws conclusions from across the findings described and analysed under the seven EQs. Each conclusion builds on several sections of the evaluation matrix to highlight a set of issues, which emerge prominently and which will require additional attention if the Alliance is to continue with its work. The conclusions shape the basis against which the recommendations are formulated in the final section of this report. The conclusions are clustered according to the four objectives of the evaluation as formulated in the ToC (box 19).

Box 19: Objectives of the evaluation

1. **To assess the validity of PfR's Theory of Change**, including Key Assumptions made, in relation to capacity strengthening of CSOs and engagement with stakeholders in IRM;
2. **To assess the effectiveness, relevance and sustainability of PfR in strengthening the capacity of CSOs** to lobby and advocate for Integrated Risk Management (IRM) in the policy, practice and investment domains;
3. **To assess the effectiveness, relevance and sustainability of PfR's engagement with stakeholders in IRM**: to understand the extent to which a) outcomes have been achieved that are steps towards the PfR objectives (changes in policies, practices and investments in favour of IRM) and b) what the contribution of PfR has been towards achieving or not achieving these planned outcomes;
4. **To review the governance arrangements of the PfR programme and to generate actionable recommendations for future PfR programming**, with a specific focus on facilitating Southern ownership, Southern leadership and South-South cooperation, and linking/ creating synergy of our work at the different levels (local to regional to global) through identifying good practices and bottlenecks.

Cluster 1 – Conclusions in response to evaluation Objective 1: *"To assess the validity of PfR's Theory of Change, including Key Assumptions made, in relation to capacity strengthening of CSOs and engagement with stakeholders in IRM"*

Conclusion 1 – The ToC marked a good start for PfR SP but was insufficiently built upon and worked with as a strategic tool during the course of the programme's implementation

This conclusion builds on JC 1.5, JC 3.1 and JC 3.2

PfR's ToC has been a useful tool to communicate the basic intentions of the programme to Alliance members across the globe and helped to translate the essence of the programme to diverse IRM stakeholders in the respective countries, regions and at the global level. It also allowed for a broad bandwidth of approaches so that intervention strategies could be adapted to country contexts, needs and priorities. This was highly appreciated by stakeholders from across country programmes and regions.

The ToC however displayed a number of weaknesses. **First, the ToC focused primarily at what was to be done at the country level (including sub-national dynamics) while not making clear how this level should relate to the regional and global levels and vice versa.**

Second, the ToC was built on an (overall linear) assumption that better IRM-related policies, enhanced investments and improved practices would be brought about by strengthening the lobbying and advocacy capacity of civil society organisations, in particular the Alliance's implementing partners. Evidence from the field revealed a more complex picture, namely; the need on the one hand to take advantage of windows of opportunity to engage directly with government stakeholders without first waiting for the capacity of implementing partners to be strengthened, and on the other hand, to recognise the capacity strengthening needs of government actors as an integral part of any influencing/ engagement strategy. Neither of these aspects were reflected in the generic ToC.

Third, it is noted that the generic ToC – despite PfR's focus on knowledge management and learning and generic ToC practice to review assumptions built into the ToC on a regular basis – has not been updated since the start of PfR SP to take account of lessons of experience gained from almost 5 years of implementation, in particular to reflect the multiple pathways that the programme has used to promote IRM. In practice, evidence suggests that the generic ToC has been overly simplistic and uni-directional in the way it expected policy processes to be influenced. Those are in reality highly complex, sometimes providing unique opportunities to move ahead or to find alternative pathways, sometimes they are blocked for a variety of reasons which might point to the need for working with different types of actors. The failure to adjust the ToC to better reflect these realities means that it has lost some of its utility as a tool to steer the programme.

In a number of countries, ToCs and their related key assumptions were reviewed and adapted during the implementation period. But in the absence of an overall updated PfR ToC, these country learning processes rather made implicit than explicit reference to the realities of their country contexts and displayed a certain disconnect from the overall ToC. It was also difficult to relate to the higher regional and global programmes in the updated country ToCs because these higher levels did not prominently figure in the generic ToC.

In the view of the evaluation team, more could therefore have been done to use the ToC (at generic and country levels) as a strategic tool, in order to critically question the underlying assumptions of the programme and to draw consequences from the analysis made. This could have assisted country programme stakeholders to better take distance from day to day operational challenges and to reflect on two critical strategic questions: "Are we doing the right things and are we doing them right?" That said, and as presented throughout this report, there is ample evidence that country programmes have demonstrated an intimate knowledge of their policy and institutional environments and have carefully selected strategies and employed tactics to achieve significant results.

Conclusion 2 – There is broad agreement that the PfR programme is highly relevant and of added value in line with its objectives

This conclusion builds on EQ 1, EQ 2 and EQ 5

Stakeholders working in the domain of disaster risk reduction, ecosystem management and climate adaptation at the global, regional and country levels expressed a shared and highly commendable view about the relevance and added value of the PfR programme. Such views were expressed by actors from the ministries and departments in the Netherlands as well as PfR countries, from officials working in regional organisations and civil society. The four global policy agenda's which PfR relates to and which set the broad framing for IRM lobbying and advocacy and IRM-related issues are considered strategically well chosen. They allow PfR to enter global and regional fora and events and to influence policy objectives and monitor their implementation. They also shape legitimacy for the engagement of Alliance members and

implementing organisations at the national and local levels, where community level resilience is promoted and for which PfR is appreciated. This helps particularly in countries where civil society engagement on policy and investment related matters are traditionally not always welcomed.

This multi-layered approach across countries, regions and the global levels and the promotion of IRM, a dedicated "brand" of PfR, has created a niche for which PfR is recognised and which helps to distinguish it from a multitude of other actors. PfR's ability to bring experiences and practice examples from the local level into exchanges at the regional and global events was mentioned as a particular asset of the programme. But PfR was largely careful with advertising IRM or to push it. Overall, an adequate balance was found between i) holding on to PfR's IRM concept and using it as a compass and ii) linking it to the respective country contexts in which the programme was active, i.e. feeding the IRM concept and principles into ongoing IRM-related initiatives but without naming them explicitly.

An issue that required continuous attention was how to adequately select the content-related priorities - informed by the global policy framework, such as DRR, climate adaptation or eco-system management - that the programme should focus on. Due to the different interests, networks and professional profile of the respective Alliance members, it was at times challenging to agree on such priorities from an all-PfR perspective and to find a compromise vis-à-vis the preferences expressed by individual Alliance members.

Conclusion 3 – PfR deployed a sophisticated approach to lobbying and advocacy but there is space to add a political lens to the analysis of country, regional and global processes

This conclusion* builds *on JC 1.3, JC 4.1, JC 4.2 and JC 4.3

The lobby and advocacy approach deployed under PfR SP could be generally characterised as "constructively engagement" with government, which is fully recognised as one of several available approaches described under the MFA's second partnership funding, the D&D. It included information sharing or the sensitising of relevant actors through trainings, discussions or studies, provision of technical assistance and facilitation of multi-stakeholder consultative and planning processes. This overall collaborative approach built on the existing networks of PfR Alliance members and their local partners and their past ways of engaging with country authorities. This generally government-friendly lobby and advocacy approach was very welcomed by country actors dealing with IRM-related agendas and – by working as supportive partners with national, sub-national and local governments – the PfR Alliance got the attention as well as support from these government entities.

More challenging and at times politically-sensitive questions and issues were recognised and brought into the dialogue with decision makers (sometimes in a subtle manner, e.g. by one Alliance member instead of all members together). **But IRM stakeholders avoided taking governments boldly to task for actions or decisions taken or not taken, and held back from campaigning against actions of investors or private sector actors which were considered threatening to the environment or livelihoods.** The evaluation team recognises that there are reasons for that because there might be a risk of losing (government) support or because of a highly volatile context, the tragic example from Guatemala where two stakeholders were murdered (but not relating to PfR advocacy according to the findings) displays the risks of taking on such a more confrontational approach. Findings from Kenya and India show that there is scope to develop at times, and depending on context, a more structured and tactical approach that challenges government and investors to rethink plans that could affect livelihoods or the environment or to make

available funding available to combat vulnerability. **This points to the advantage of including in the analysis of planned or ongoing work a more "political lens" that invites critical questions of the political economy, and which can possibly lead to a better understanding of strategic opportunities and tactical steps that one might want to take in particular contexts to tackle certain issues.**

<u>Cluster 2 – Conclusions in response to Objective 2:</u> "*To assess the effectiveness, relevance and sustainability of PfR in strengthening the capacity of CSOs to lobby and advocate for Integrated Risk Management (IRM) in the policy, practice and investment domains"*

Conclusion 4 – Capacity Strengthening - a strong focus, but the programme needs to further refine its capacity strengthening approach and instruments

This conclusion* builds *on JC 1.5, EQ 3 and JC 4.1

In line with PfR's overall ToC, the Alliance invested strongly in the capacity strengthening of implementing partners at country level and a capacity strengthening strategy was developed at the beginning of PfR SP. The work was generally informed by good practice, including attention given to upfront diagnostic work, participation and the tailoring of the approach to the country context and the needs of the respective organisations.

The capacity strengthening work of PfR SP was conceptually guided by the D&D funding framework set up by the MFA, which focused squarely on civil society capacity strengthening. As noted above in conclusion 1, this focus was reflected in the PfR SP's ToC as well as in the programme's capacity strengthening strategy document, both of which positioned the strengthening of implementing partners' capacity centre stage.

Lessons of experience have however pointed to the need to adopt a multi-actor approach that went beyond the strengthening of implementing partners' capacity alone and that included the needs of other role players including other sections of civil society as well as critical government actors. The absence of a more inclusive approach to capacity strengthening that could provide guidance on how to address the capacity of other relevant actors needs to be linked to the analysis of PfR's ToC, which, as noted earlier, was not subjected to a critical review of its underlying assumptions.

In practice, much was actually done under the banner of lobby and advocacy to strengthen government capacity including technical advisory support, development of knowledge products, training and workshops. But such activities were not based on a clear intervention strategy including diagnostic work but was more ad hoc and reactive during the process of implementation (for example, organising a sensitisation event with government officials for which resources and expertise had to be found and mobilised to respond to their capacity gaps). The value of this way of working should not be negated and such an emergent approach has its role to play. **That said, a more comprehensive capacity strengthening approach that conceptually includes all actors upfront within a capacity strengthening trajectory can be expected to yield more effective outcomes.**

This analysis does not contradict the finding that these implementing partners remained a very relevant entrance point for the lobbying and advocacy of IRM in multi-stakeholder and complex environments. The assumption of working with them as key actors of IRM-related change – in line with the underpinnings of the MFA's D&D programme – remains valid. Working through such CSOs and

strengthening their capacities was particularly relevant as the Alliance members are not meant to stay and – ideally – to put future IRM lobbying and advocacy as much as possible into the hands of local organisations. Strengthening their capacities to perform and to sustain their engagement beyond PfR SP was necessary with a considerable number of CSOs and CBOs but not with all, as some were already well capacitated (organisationally) and had experiences with lobbying and advocating, which some of the Alliance's CSO-partners in the field could even learn from.

At the technical level, a range of capacity strengthening tools were developed, and training was provided to allow the tools to be used for monitoring, self-assessment and planning. **The Dialogue Capacity Framework (DCF), a cornerstone for implementing the CSO capacity strengthening approach, was well received, but Alliance members and implementing partners had different experiences using it.** Some stakeholders found it was not easy to work with when applied as a self-assessment tool.

Questions were also raised on how to approach the capacity strengthening needs of non-contracted partners, government actors, CSO networks or other actors from civil society. An updated capacity strengthening strategy was formulated in 2018 to point Alliance members at the key purpose of the programme, i.e. the strengthening of capacities for lobby and advocacy of implementing partners. In line with this update, the DCF's relationship with a complementary capacity strengthening tool, **the Capacity 2020 Goal documents, was developed over the course of the programme but there is no clear evidence that this update became a living property of the programme.** Proposed so-called "joint Advocacy Capacity Strengthening Strategies" in a PfR capacity strengthening analysis (2019) were so far not followed up.

Conclusion 5 – Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation: A complex and laborious system was created with good elements to be further explored. Donor accountability demands put a strong footprint on PME but knowledge and learning elements gained gradually ground during the life of PfR SP.

This conclusion* builds *on JC 3.3 and JC 7.4

PME was a central element of PfR SP from the onset. **The PME workshops held twice per year by all programmes developed into an asset for the programme and became the platform for a variety of exchanges going beyond PME.** The workshops provided important platforms to discuss and link up with work related to capacity strengthening of CSOs, KM&L and more strategic and programme-wide exchanges. **PME reporting was undertaken regularly but it proved cumbersome and laborious to use and is in need of simplification.** The many sections to be filled resulted also into a detailed reporting about the implementation of workplans and outputs at the expense of a more strategic level reporting.

The strong "accountability footprint" of the PME approach (informed by heavy donor accountability demands as perceived by the Alliance) **can be noted throughout the implementation of PfR SP but attention to KM&L gained more ground over time** in line with the original intention to promote learning through joint reflection and analysis. This, however, has not led to a more systematic and stronger link with KM&L despite good outcome harvesting questions raised as part of the PME reporting formats. A comprehensive outcome harvesting approach was in fact never pursued. The Alliance settled instead on an "outcome monitoring" approach which indicates a certain preference towards more reporting and accountability instead of learning. **The system, as presently implemented, never got fully owned by Alliance member staff at different levels and did not fully become a tool to work with for programme monitoring and reflection, adaptation, planning and learning.** The report was filled in because it had to

be filled in. The PME events, during which a multitude of exchanges could take place in a workshop setting, however, compensated for this to some extent.

While efforts were made towards the latter part of PfR SP implementation to give more attention to KM&L, for example through write-shops or the collection of more impact stories, it has so far not received a more central place within the programme. This is institutionally manifested, for example through the separation of PME and KM/L into different working groups, but also by KM&L's stronger orientation towards public relations and communication. While KM&L was connected with the entire PfR programme since the beginning of PfR (e.g., documented cases from the field were used for different dialogue trajectories), its potential for linking it more structurally with PME has so far not been explored. A KM&L implementation plan to operationalise the draft KM&L strategy (drafted in 2016) was formulated in 2017, but **the absence of an updated KM&L strategy that could have positioned KM&L more clearly within PfR SP and explain how it connects with the remainder of the programme is notable**. At country level, Indonesia provides the only example of a country team assigning a full-time KM&L officer to coordinate KM&L and to give it a more strategic role to play.

Conclusion 6 – The programme displayed concerns for and developed well-targeted actions to address inclusiveness and vulnerability. It also adopted a stronger position on gender mainstreaming over the course of the programme

This conclusion* builds *on JC 1.4

Concerns for the vulnerable and the need to include different vulnerable groups into PfR's work was evident from all country level programmes. The issue of vulnerability is part of PfR's impact statement and was on the radar of the programme since the beginning of 2016. The work with vulnerable groups and efforts made to include different stakeholders, in particular at the community level, could build on activities executed under PfR I but also on related work of Alliance members. While attention for vulnerable and marginalised communities was strong in the design of the programme, it was less explicit in the monitoring and evaluation of the programme's activities and efforts, making it somewhat difficult to track results across all programmes. However, the need for putting more emphasis on vulnerability was recognised by the programme and resulted in a study on resilience and vulnerability conducted in 2019 and the subsequent development of inclusive resilience building guidelines in 2020.

Attention to gender, while strongly mentioned in the 2016 PfR SP fund application document submitted to the MFA, saw a rather slow start. But efforts were made over the course of the programme to improve, in particular through the introduction of a gender marker assessment, which CARE shared with all Alliance members. With some noteworthy exceptions, the focus on gender was not sufficiently resourced, and has not been structurally rolled out across the entire programme. Staff of Alliance members as well as contracted and non-contracted CSOs and CBOs expressed the need for more orientation, training and technical advice to facilitate gender mainstreaming in the context of IRM lobbying and advocacy.

Conclusion 7 – Ownership of IRM is growing among organisations funded by the Alliance, but also those associated with PfR activities. Prospects for the sustainability of IRM-related lobbying and advocacy at country level depend on context but remain uncertain at this moment.

This conclusion* builds *on EQ 6

The overlapping nature of PfR's work, connecting sectors and different policy frameworks, while following a comprehensive approach, i.e. working on policy, investment and practice, is innovative and has attracted a wide range of stakeholders active in IRM-related domains. This has shaped ownership and local leadership, as has the participatory approach deployed by the Alliance and the flexibility of adapting the broad framework to country context and priorities. The ability to connect with colleagues from other countries in Africa, Asia or Latin America and to practice exchanges between PfR stakeholders across countries was an additional factor in support of building ownership. Most importantly, however, was the content orientation of IRM, which addresses concerns living among a variety of local actors who – in certain contexts – are not heard or not sufficiently heard. Moreover, it tapped into the concerns of policy makers and technocrats who are mindful of the need to balance economic growth, environment and social protection and who need to find ways to domesticate global commitments and real-life threats.

But sustainability is uncertain and will depend largely on the ability of IRM leaders within civil society to attract and mobilise human resources, ideas and funding to pursue efforts further (though it also depends on reform champions within government and their readiness to commit budgets which is however grossly outside the sphere of civil society influence). There is scope in countries where civil society organisations are stronger that these will be able to sustain lobby and advocacy activities by finding funding sources on their own. Though these organisations are few in number, which suggests that – overall, across countries – the lobbying and advocating for IRM-related policies, investments and practices remain uncertain to be sustained without further external financial support. **So far, the attention to strengthening the fund-raising capacities of national CSOs has received little attention in PfR's approach and the evaluation team did not come across strong findings dealing with a possible exit strategy for the Alliance.** The updated Capacity Strengthening Strategy (2018-2020) stressed the need for thinking about an exit (and referred to ongoing reflections in Guatemala) but none of the "Capacity Strengthening Goals 2020" documents shared with evaluation team reflected on this explicitly.

At the regional and global levels, sustainability of action – without funding provided by the MFA – can only be guaranteed if Alliance members can resource activities through other funding channels. Among Alliance members, there appears to be a strong ownership for the IRM approach, which is a niche and a domain in which not many other organisations or coalitions have a comparative advantage to engage.

Conclusion 8 – Implementing the IRM approach across three levels – country, regional and global – has been a well-recognised innovation but remains overall a work in progress

This conclusion* builds *on JC 1.2, JC 2.1 and JC 4.3

PfR I was implemented at country level and initial steps were taken as of 2015 to engage with selected global policy frameworks of relevance to IRM. **With PfR SP, a decision was taken to work across the three levels (country, regional, global) and to upwardly connect PfR country activities with regional and global policy processes and investment issues and vice versa, i.e. downwards. This approach was highly welcomed by the MFA**, in particular, and seen as an innovative approach that would allow to bring practical country experiences relating to disaster risk reduction, ecosystem management and climate change adaptation into policy arenas at the higher level. At the same time, it would help to implement the objectives of these policy frameworks downward. The inclusion of the regional level was welcomed in particular as this was coherent with efforts by the international community to ensure that these objectives and their implementation got better anchored at the regional level in Asia, Africa and Latin America and connected to country processes.

The Alliance set out a high ambition level for its work which has, by the end of PfR SP, only partially been met. The programme scored high on connecting country processes upward and provided useful inputs to global events as well as a number of regional initiatives linked to global policy frameworks. Inputs in relation to the Paris Agenda (UNFCCC) and the Sendai Framework on DRR were regularly provided, other frameworks were also dealt with but to a lesser extent. This work has been tedious but systematic. PfR's GPG managed to find appropriate entry points and relevant networks to connect with resulting in IRM-related changes that can be traced. The GPG also engaged in selected activities in support of country processes but those were more limited and ad-hoc (attempts in this regard were also made by the HoA programme). **The GPG's ability to deal with related downstream activities was, in these respects, more limited because of capacity constraints (5 officers spread across 10 countries and 4 regions) and the diverse policy contexts which had to be dealt with.** Capacity in the country teams was not sufficient to adequately translate the follow-up work from higher levels into country contexts.

The regional programmes started from scratch in 2016. In the case of the HoA programme, it took Alliance members some two years to develop the programme and actively engage regional actors directly. This is because working at the regional level required internal reflection and assessment to identify relevant issues for regional engagement, mapping the appropriate targets and identifying good entry points for engaging the right actors. Policy engagement also requires investment in visibility among those operating in the policy and praxis space; and building relationship with regional bodies and others the programme wants to influence. Moreover, working with semi-political bodies like the AU, IGAD, EAC and NBI requires to carefully manage and manoeuvre organisational interests as well as political issues. For example, the AU and IGAD have the mandate and also do cover ecosystem management, climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction, but these topics are not high on their priority. The fact that strategic decisions are made by their member states also means some processes, let alone achieving outcomes, take long to finalise.

As for the other three regional programmes, questions need to be raised about returns on investment. It took these programmes a rather long time to understand regional policy priorities on IRM, to clarify what to do at the regional level and how to engage. Various trajectories were formulated but how these would be guided by a ToC at the regional level and how these trajectories would be connected upwards to the global level and downwards, towards the countries, was not clear. For the West Africa and Asia programmes, the Alliance members were also unable to resource activities appropriately. An issue applicable to the West Africa regional programme, in particular, though to a certain extent also for the HoA and the Asia regional programmes, is that the connections between the countries and the regional programmes are not clear and how the regional programmes build on the countries in the region. Vice versa, it is not clear why the country programmes would need the regional programmes to do their in-country IRM work better. The situation is somewhat different in the case of the Central America programme, which builds entirely on the national programme in Guatemala. Beyond, these regional programmes, with the exception of the programme in the HoA, are insufficiently coordinated and resourced and not well embedded in a more structured engagement. **Looking at the regional programmes it appears as if they had been approached as standalone programmes without strong linkages to the country and global levels.** Finally, an issue relating to all country programmes relates to the linkages of the country programmes with the Global programme (a dimension that is addressed in the reporting format and regularly responded to) and how they connect. This has not been anchored in the respective country's ToC. It should also be noted that the reporting templates do not ask questions on how country programmes relate to regional processes.

Cluster 3, Conclusions in response to Objective 3: ***"To assess the effectiveness, relevance and sustainability of PfR's engagement with stakeholders in IRM: to understand the extent to which a) outcomes have been achieved that are steps towards the PfR objectives (changes in policies,***

practices and investments in favour of IRM) and b) what the contribution of PfR has been towards achieving or not achieving these planned outcomes"

Conclusion 9 – IRM-related lobbying and advocacy for improved policy and enhanced practices was successful but results relating to investments, a domain conceptually not fully clarified among PfR stakeholders, were fewer.

This conclusion* builds *on EQ 5

The achievements of PfR SP resulting from lobbying and advocating for better policies, enhanced investments and improved practices on IRM differed substantially across the different PfR countries, the regions and at the global level. Not surprisingly, country context and the availability of PfR resources at the different levels were important factors for shaping success. **Overall, PfR SP scored well on promoting IRM-related policies and practices at country level whereby the latter, in particular, could build on work that had been initiated under PfR I.** PfR could in some of these countries also build on initial lobby and advocacy work undertaken under PfR I, though this was not a dominant finding across the evaluation. Achievements in relation to policy change at the national level under PfR SP ranged from "impressive" in a country like Indonesia, to "very limited" in fragile countries like Mali or Haiti. However, some limited policy-related changes at the sub-national, local and community levels could be recorded from those countries as well. Practice-related achievements were highly valued among policy makers and practitioners working at the sub-national, local and community levels, and even at the national level, decision-makers valued PfRs ability to translate policy into practice at the community level. Wishes were expressed by local stakeholders for more funding for practice-related work in the future, though this would risk shifting the programme again more towards becoming a service delivery mechanism.

Working at the regional levels has proven tedious and the ability to influence policy change and investment related processes have been difficult. Questions about value for money need to be raised and a reflection should be undertaken about the extent to which the Alliance – as a relatively limited group of like-minded organisations – can mobilise enough power and energy to leverage change in regional contexts, which themselves have capacity challenges to deal with. Success was piecemeal whereby those regions with more PfR resources allocated, scored more and better than other regions.

At the global level, PfR was able to strategically engage in processes pertaining to selected global policy frameworks and it became a well appreciated additional actor to global policy exchanges, in particular for its ability to bring in views and experiences from the country level. Its strategic orientation, the priorities it followed and why they were followed at a certain moment in policy processes, however, was not always clearly communicated to Alliance members and other PfR stakeholders. A ToC for the global lobby and advocacy work was only formulated in 2019. The ability of the Global programme to link to the regional and country levels was limited and more of an ad-hoc nature.

Achievements relating to the investment domain, across the programmes at global, regional and country level, have lagged behind though in a number of PfR countries relevant preconditions were shaped, which can potentially help to mobilise investments in the future. An upfront problem was that the IRM investment domain was not properly defined resulting in different interpretations – was this for IRM-related investments, for making investments IRM-proof or for shaping the preconditions necessary so that governments and the private sector could act and invest in an IRM-sensitive manner. Constrained by available resources, the newness of the programme's investment-focus (which started off in 2016, only) and

the overall limited experiences in relation to mobilising investments for IRM or making investments IRM-proof, attention was directed mostly to the "lower hanging fruits", which could be found in the domains of IRM policies and IRM practices. It is well noted, however, that scoring in the policy and practice domains was mostly tedious, hard work and not easy to realise.

Conclusion 10 – The Alliance managed to strengthen its own capacity and was successful in strengthening the capacity of implementing partners to lobby and advocate for IRM at the sub-national and local levels in particular. At the national, regional and global levels, Alliance members were the principal actors to lobby and advocate for IRM.

This conclusion* builds *on EQ 4

Working predominantly from a lobby and advocacy angle was new to most Alliance members working at country level but also at the regional level. This explains why at the beginning of PfR SP, the Alliance had to build its own capacity and understanding on how to engage in the different policy contexts, tap into relevant networks and work with stakeholders they had not necessarily worked with before. It also explains why it took the Alliance, overall, some time to get the implementation of the programme fully started. The Alliance could make use of its own lobby and advocacy experiences spread across the different Alliance members but made also use of available expertise residing in non-Alliance organisations, mostly CSOs that have traditionally worked in the lobby and advocacy domain, at country level. The acquired knowledge was then used when engaging on lobbying and advocacy with other organisations and for dedicated capacity strengthening activities like trainings, advisory work or workshops.

In line with the overall ToC for PfR, the focus of capacity strengthening was directed towards implementing partners but also selected non-contracted CSOs and CBOs as well as CSO and CBO platforms. The selection of the type of organisations and platforms or coalitions to work with varied considerably from trajectory to trajectory and from country to country. It depended mainly on context and opportunities. **Depending on the country, PfR SP was successful in strengthening CSOs working at the sub-national and local levels to an extent that some of them could undertake lobby and advocacy activities fully on their own, while others – in particular the smaller organisations or those starting from scratch in this trade – got strengthened but not to an extent that they could do this without the closer accompaniment of an Alliance member.**

In other countries, the Alliance collaborated with experienced CSOs to promote IRM at the national level. Several of those required little support because they possessed already considerable experience and expertise in lobby and advocacy work. Questions were raised among Alliance members at country level, why these organisations were in the focus of capacity strengthening while other actors – in particular within government – needed much more strengthening to understand IRM and know how to translate this into national policies and regulations. **Some Alliance country teams recognised the need to focus more deliberately on government stakeholders and included capacity strengthening interventions as part of their strategy of "constructive engagement." This approach was recognised as effective and also shared as such in reports with the MFA despite PfR being funded under a scheme of the MFA to strengthen civil society rather than governments.**

Across PfR countries, staff of Alliance members in-country became the prime (though not exclusive) actors for lobbying and advocating IRM at the national level, working either on their own or accompanying national CSOs/ CSO platforms. This was due to implementing partners as well as non-

contracted partners having a mandate to work at the sub-national and local levels or not having the capacity (yet) to engage with central government though in a number of countries, like Uganda or the Philippines, PfR collaborated with experienced national CSOs which engaged at the national level. In the regional and the global programmes, lobbying and advocacy was nearly exclusively performed by staff of Alliance members. Questions should be raised to what extent there is scope for including national CSOs who are not part of the Alliance, more pro-actively at such higher levels.

Conclusion 11 – The collaboration with non-PfR partners, including the Netherlands MFA, was only partially successful

This conclusion builds on EQ 2

PfR SP's ToC foresaw that IRM-related policies, investments and practices could only be promoted if Alliance members and their partners would engage with a multitude of actors at country level, but also regionally and globally. The actors in question comprise governments, the private sector, civil society (including traditional faith-based leaders, CBOs, media and knowledge facilities like universities or think tanks) and international cooperation agencies and development banks.

PfR SP engaged strongly with government actors at different levels and found ways to interact with these constructively. The programme also established strong linkages and sought cooperation with non-IRM partners from civil society, including the media, who were potentially relevant to reinforce ongoing lobby and advocacy activities for IRM. The engagement with knowledge institutions and the private sector was more limited and depended on opportunities arising from a particular country context.

International development cooperation actors, such as bilateral agencies or multilateral development banks, were much less on the radar of PfR SP actors at the country and regional, though with some exceptions. This has also been evident from results in the domain of IRM investments and fundraising which is discussed under Conclusion 9. Engagement with these international actors was not strongly pursued, possibly due to limited experience on how to tap into these circles or the lack of a track record in working with such actors beyond the MFA. Notable was also the absence of a strong drive to establish connections with parallel funding initiatives within the sector, even from colleagues working within Alliance members. **Overall, the approach towards resource mobilisation was characterised by project thinking, whereby PfR actors did not purposefully seek resource mobilisation opportunities from the wider national and regional funding community and rather worked within the confines of the PfR project.** There were however some notable examples where Alliance members at country level partnered with other international NGOs active in the field to leverage funding and to undertake joint activities. At the global level, various contacts were made with UN organisations and alliances, such as the Partnership for Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction (PEDRR) and development banks (Asia Investment Infrastructure Bank and the World Bank) to influence policies, which created selected off-springs for research and new partnerships.

Collaboration of Alliance members with the MFA at headquarters level has been constructive and very positive though much more limited than the MFA officials would have liked. The availability of time and overburdened desks at the MFA caused this situation. In terms of relevance, PfR SP is considered "spot-on" and in line with government priorities. **In contrast, the absence of a strong collaboration between NL Embassies and the PfR SP programme and vice versa is somehow surprising** as the project has been funded by the concerns of the Netherlands about disaster (risk) management, ecosystems

degradation and climate change. Contacts are closer and partially successful in some countries, such as the Philippines, but the general pattern is a very limited contact or even a complete absence of contacts despite some of these countries being a priority for the external relations of the Netherlands.

Logistical issues on the side of the Embassies were mentioned, including regular staff rotations and limited time and human resources, but also a lack of ownership of the partnership on their part. Apparently, priority was given to programmes which are managed and accompanied from the Embassy level, PfR comes then only as the second or third priority. As a result, and despite trying, expectations among staff of Alliance members to seek and shape a strategic partnership with the Embassy in the PfR country concerned are low or even absent.

Cluster 4, Conclusions in response to Objective 4: ***"Review the governance arrangements of the PfR programme and to generate actionable recommendations for future PfR programming, with a specific focus on facilitating Southern ownership, Southern leadership and South-South cooperation, and linking/ creating synergy of our work at the different levels (local to regional to global) through identifying good practices and bottlenecks."***

Conclusion 12 – The governance of the Alliance is complex, but it somehow works

This conclusion* builds *on EQ 7

At headquarters level, in The Netherlands, core staff of the Alliance, across the five member organisations, confirmed that working through an Alliance agreement was constructive and overall successful but at times challenging. This was because everybody having a stake in this programme was required to accept that a balance had to be found between shaping coherence while at the same time giving space for diversity to flourish. Building on the positive experiences gained during PfR I, this challenge was overall met during the implementation of the PfR SP. Core staff found that – despite the imperfections of such an Alliance structure – it was possible to collaborate institutionally, to keep implementation on track and – above all – to promote IRM-related issues as a shared concern of the different Alliance members. Mover, as stressed by PfR members at headquarters level, this form of collaboration helped to shape synergies and allowed Alliance members to connect effectively with the respective other Alliance networks beyond the domain of IRM.

There is, nevertheless scope to improve this functioning because one can observe a certain tendency to let diversity prevail over coherence. The experience of working with the ToC, as discussed above, serves as one example. Members of the PWG, in which the PfR Global Coordinator is an ex-officio member, also expressed the wish that difficult strategic management issues prepared for the SG would be addressed more forcefully so that clear decisions could be taken and made known to all members of the Alliance. The SG was seen at times as playing too much of a "balancing" role. To be more "steering" as a SG requires of course the pro-active and constructive engagement of all Alliance members so that clear decisions could be taken, which has not always been the case.

The Alliance governance structure created many dialogue opportunities within both more formal as well as informal settings. This created a way to better bond and to establish connections and interactions with the networks of the respective partners. **PfR stakeholders stressed that this way of working has contributed positively to the implementation and overall effectiveness of PfR SP. At the same time,**

it led to the creation of a myriad of working groups to ensure that "everyone would be informed about everything" as noted during interviews. While this can ensure that all parties concerned had an opportunity to contribute to all developments of the programme, the benefits of maintaining so many groups were questioned as it risks to create a multitude of costly and at times unnecessary communication layers and a source of misunderstanding. Views were expressed that some of these groups could be rationalised, which the evaluation team would agree with. Accompanying all these groups and processes adequately has also been a challenge for the Coordination Team NL.

The involvement and engagement of a number of colleagues from PfR country and regional programmes on strategic management issues intensified over the course of PfR SP. This happened through their increased participation in the "extended PWG" and shaped a good base for planning a stronger local involvement and for creating more ownership for the promotion of IRM beyond the Netherlands. **The relevance of having highly qualified professionals in country coordination positions and their importance for providing inputs to governance and strategic management issues was confirmed during the evaluation.** The level of trust shaped and the modus operandi found at headquarters level to govern the programme has however not yet fully trickled down to the country levels as discussed further under Conclusion 14.

Conclusion 13 – Resources for managing and guiding the partnership administratively and on content issues were insufficient

This conclusion* builds *on JC 7.2 and JC 7.3

The first one-and-a-half years of the programme was a period of "getting into the job" and to get PfR SP reoriented towards a more collaborative way of working. These hurdles were overall well met and procedures and a routing were established that allowed for an administratively smooth implementation of the programme. **But human resources for key coordination positions at headquarters level and for respective programmes at country, regional and global levels were not always sufficient.** At headquarters and country level, available resources were inadequate to enable the link between daily administrative and financial management related tasks and more strategic management related issues, including strategic communication. As for PME, having a person who can only work for some 33% on PME for the entire programme (in addition to the PME support by the respective Alliance partners) is clearly not enough as the many observations on the PME system also highlight. Country team coordinators, in as far as the evaluation team could analyse, have been clearly overburdened with the variety of tasks they have to perform. The decision to appoint them on a part time basis impacted negatively on the overall coordination at country level and on connecting the country programme with higher regional and global levels. The positive off-springs of working part time on country coordination, such as the ability to work on certain content issues, did not outweigh the challenges these arrangements brought about.

The Alliance created several global positions for capacity strengthening, human diplomacy and knowledge management (funded by the Climate Centre and part-time). **These positions were clearly relevant to reorient PfR SP towards the implementation of a learning-based lobby and advocacy approach but given the many countries and regions where the programme is implemented, plus the engagement at the global level, these were not sufficient to serve all the needs and demands from the respective engagement levels.** Attempts were made to compensate gaps by supporting these global positions with additional experts, for example by asking Alliance members with experience on lobby and advocacy to provide a training, but such arrangements were ad-hoc and could serve one country, only. Demands for

training and guidance were also made in relation to gender but could only partially be met. The human resourcing of the GPG, including its coordination arrangements, were signalled as an issue for improvement during the PfR Mid-term Stock Taking in 2018 already, but did not get sufficient further attention by Alliance members.

Conclusion 14 – The financial management arrangements of the partnership highlight the "centrifugal" risks of the Alliance structure

This conclusion* builds *on JC 7.1 and JC 7.3

The Alliance agreed on a financial management arrangement through which the overall budget was allocated according to the parity principle (top down) but taking into account plans originating from countries, regions and the global level (bottom up) specifying the respective areas of work per trajectory for which one of the Alliance members is responsible. Financial allocations to countries, in particular, were revised based on emerging new country level priorities or lower absorption rates. Each Alliance member reports back on the spending per trajectory to its respective headquarter. This arrangement, underpinned by other institutional factors limiting collaboration like the lack of strategic focus, supports a certain "siloing" of PfR SP and generates "centrifugal tendencies" in so far as **it encourages each partner to work on its own without seeking stronger linkages with other parts of a country programme**. Incentives to work more collaboratively are not built into this approach.

At headquarters level, a way of working has been found to manage this imperfection of the Alliance set-up, which is based on trust and a certain understanding that solutions need to be found. But in some (but not all) countries where the same level of mutual trust is not so firmly established, it has prevented Alliance members from finding more effective collaborative arrangements. The fact that in most countries budget spending is not transparently shared among Alliance members does not help. Resources can be shifted between trajectories within a country and there was a certain freedom to allocate funds from the unused "11th country budget" per country but this depended on the good-will and a positive spirit for collaboration. Where country teams cannot find an agreement, representatives from headquarters step in to find a solution and to take a decision. In conclusion, this arrangement has somehow worked during PfR SP also recognising that some of the current financial arrangements have been unavoidable due to compliance requirements.

Final and overall conclusion 15 – The overall achievements of PfR SP are largely positive and in line with expectations but the real mission of the Alliance deserves further discussion and clarification.

This conclusion* builds *on EQ 1 to EQ 6

Taking a step back and looking at PfR SP from a bird's eye perspective, the Alliance managed overall quite well to start up this programme and from there to implement it effectively. PfR SP had a considerably different focus compared to PfR I, it required a significant overhaul of past approaches and a search for new solutions. Some of this searching and testing took time but over the course of the programme's implementation – broadly speaking as of 2018 – PfR found some type of rhythm and routine in terms of its internal governance as well as on managing implementation. **The new way of working exposed several flaws, as discussed above, but the Alliance displayed strong interest in learning and made corrections where possible.** The programme remains highly ambitious, however, and

resources were clearly not sufficient to score on all fronts. **The wide geographical spread and the engagement across country, regional and global levels could not be covered adequately with the available expertise.** It appears that Alliance members, from the beginning, were rather optimistic and implemented the programme against an assumption that a more distant accompaniment would be sufficient, i.e. that technical support for capacity strengthening, knowledge management and learning could be realised through a combination of global positions and some expertise mobilised punctually for country level engagements. Change processes are, however, highly country and context specific and also new for a range of local actors who have a track record in delivering services. They also take time to mature for which an implementation period of 3,5 years (after subtracting the time needed to set up the new way of working) is short. Complex policies or investment-related engagements on IRM-relevant topics do require more structural presence and accompaniment in the region as well as on the ground at country level.

In line with the Netherlands funding framework for D&D, PfR concentrated on the strengthening of civil society lobby and advocacy capacity. This focus assumed that the influencing of IRM-related change with regard to the policy and investment domains, in particular, can be addressed when strengthening civil society actors. **The findings from the evaluation confirm, however, that lasting change requires a constructive and well-informed engagement between civil society and government actors.** The latter actors, however, were not prominently conceptualised in the PfR's ToC leading to questions on how to deal with this group while officials from government were in need of strengthening capacities relating to IRM as well.

This observation leads to a series of questions which deserve attention. To what extent was PfR funded and undertaken as a civil society capacity strengthening programme? And, looking at PfR from a different angle, to what extent was it to lobby and advocate for IRM with a view to bring a more holistic thinking about ecosystem management, disaster risk reduction and climate adaption into relevant policy circles, investment decisions and related practices? Or was it both, a capacity strengthening programme to enable civil society to better engage strategically on IRM and to realise change? But can this be done without the simultaneous engagement with government, possibly also other international development agencies stimulating simultaneously change? It appears as if the Alliance has gotten caught up a bit in these questions as the ToC – discussed under Conclusion 1 – does not clearly express itself on these questions.

6. Recommendations

Our conclusions lead us to the following forward-looking recommendations, taking into account the possibility that the Alliance may receive funding for a continuation of PfR. For each conclusion, one key recommendation is formulated. Each one is accompanied by several actionable points as well as a suggestion on who might take action.

Cluster 1 – Recommendations in response to evaluation Objective 1: ***"To assess the validity of PfR's Theory of Change, including Key Assumptions made, in relation to capacity strengthening of CSOs and engagement with stakeholders in IRM"***

Recommendation 1 – Revisit and update the PfR's overall Theory of Change (ToC) to take into account lessons of experience and the realities of a programme that works in many different contexts and spans the local, regional and global levels.

- Revisit the assumptions made in the existing generic ToC and update the ToC based on experiences and practice that have evolved over past years and communicate this via an updated overall ToC document to PfR stakeholders.
- Develop specific learning trajectories for periodically integrating diverse country-specific learning and advocacy strategies and other lessons learned into the global ToC.
- Take note in the ToC that the programme spans across different levels, from local to global, and explain how the respective programme levels should connect with each other.
- Clarify in the ToC better on how to engage with implementing partners and non-contracted partners having a stake in the domain of IRM and their role to be played on lobbying and advocacy.
- Clarify also the engagement with other actors from civil society as well as with government actors and how these engagements should be undertaken from a capacity strengthening perspective to better influence IRM-related policies, investments and practices.
- Discuss an updated ToC with possible (new) PfR donors to clarify that capacity strengthening for lobbying and advocacy needs to be done in exchange with government actors, taking into account their capacity gaps and requirements.
- Enhance efforts at country and regional levels to work with the ToC, update it regularly and provide additional training and/or technical advice on how to link the ToC with the trajectories and work plans.

Action to be taken by: SG (for discussions with donors), extended PWG; country, regional and global teams

Recommendation 2 – Build further on the niche developed by PfR in the domain of IRM but further clarify the priorities that should be followed based on objectives derived from the global policy frameworks.

- Use the good track record of PfR that has been built in relation to IRM-relevant topics for external communication, fundraising and the lobbying and advocating for IRM at country, regional and global levels and build on achievements realised to date.
- Clarify among Alliance members, each having its own sectoral interests, which objectives of the global policy frameworks the Alliance works on should be priorities overall and strategically promoted above others.
- Identify (headquarter, regional and country level) which of these priorities can be purposefully be promoted at the respective country and regional levels.

Action to be taken by: Extended PWG; staff working on communication

Recommendation 3 – Enrich context and actor analysis relating to PfR engagements with questions pertaining to political aspects of the country and institutional environment in which activities are planned and implemented.

- Make use of established practices by international cooperation agencies in the domain of political economy analysis (PEA) which asks questions about history of ongoing processes, institutional frameworks, actor interests, actor interdependencies and risk of conflicts. This should be done to better understand the environment of engagement.
- Include such PEA questions in existing assessments and use them systematically for the planning of new engagements or during implementation when activities are reviewed.
- Link such questions – where appropriate or necessary – to conflict analysis questions and make use of the emerging learning and forthcoming study within the Alliance on conflict sensitivity.
- Include in each analysis – in as far as possible – different options for influencing IRM-related policies, investments and policies (ranging from collaborative approaches to constructive and more vocal engagements).

Action to be taken by: Extended PWG; country, regional and global teams

Cluster 2 – Recommendations in response to Objective 2: ***"To assess the effectiveness, relevance and sustainability of PfR in strengthening the capacity of CSOs to lobby and advocate for Integrated Risk Management (IRM) in the policy, practice and investment domains"***

Recommendation 4 – Update PfR's capacity strengthening strategy and toolbox, to reflect the multi-dimensional character of capacity strengthening processes and make resources available to support the capacity needs of all relevant actors involved in IRM policy, investment and practice processes.

- Promote the capacity strengthening strategy so as to make it a living document among Alliance members, further update it where needed and link it clearly with the updated ToC recommended under Recommendation 1.
- Develop specific capacity strengthening learning trajectories to systematically learn from existing practice and recognise in the capacity strengthen strategy and derived instruments and reporting, that capacity strengthening goes beyond the rather narrow confines of strengthening implementing partners, non-contracted partners and CBOs.
- Further stress in the capacity strengthening approach that capacities need to be strengthened for lobbying and advocacy as well as for sustaining the implementing partner's organisational capacity, in particular the organisation's ability to mobilise and manage financial resources.
- Formulate for the country programmes one annual planning, reporting and monitoring format for capacity strengthening that integrates the essence of the Dialogue Capacity Framework with the more recently created Capacity 2020 Goals.
- Report on the achievements of capacity strengthening support once per year, in line with the detailed recommendations made under recommendation 11.

Action to be taken by: Extended PWG; capacity strengthening specialists at global and country levels

Recommendation 5 – Simplify the Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation approach to make it less "accountability heavy" and more learning focused. This can be achieved by integrating PME with KM&L more structurally, operationally and institutionally, and by providing further guidance and support on the use of the outcome harvesting methodology.

- Continue with the established practice of holding two PME workshops per year per programme but widen the scope of these workshops systematically across PfR towards becoming PMEL workshops which increase learning and knowledge sharing about wider issues, such as capacity strengthening, gender sensitivity, investment mobilisation, etc.
- Formulate a PMEL strategy that lies the foundations for a new approach to PME and KML and that will help all PfR stakeholders to understand the integrated character of PME, learning and knowledge sharing and guide the creation of updated instruments, like reporting formats, writing guidelines, training, etc.
- Simplify the internal PME reporting system, focus it on outcome reporting and reduce reporting for accountability to one report per year and dedicate one of the bi-annual workshops to reporting, in particular.
- Use the second bi-annual workshop for strategic planning for the next year and use the outcomes of these workshops for the formulation of an annual work plan which sets out strategic goals (i.e., the compass on where to go and how to do it) instead of a detailed activity plan. The detailed planning and monitoring of activities per trajectory should be left in the hands of the respective trajectory teams and managed by the trajectory leads.
- Explore and test storytelling per trajectory as an approach to annual reporting and step down from the practice of reporting on an endless list of activities undertaken and outputs realised in the current annual reporting format (the latter, however, could be done as part of the ongoing trajectory work and details could be collected which might be relevant for the IATI reporting).
- Create a different PME/KM&L reporting template that gives more flexibility and space to reflect on content related developments, providing also the possibility to report more in a story telling manner.
- Test the storytelling approach as an instrument to use more prominently during the lobbying and advocating for IRM.
- Produce a more user friendly and more concise Annual Report format that can be absorbed more easily by MFA officials.
- Consider producing a more elaborate Annual Report version for accountability purposes (similar to the current format) and a shorter version that can be used for lobby and advocacy at the same time.
- Advocate towards funding agencies to reduce heavy focus on accountability and to accept more innovative type of reporting approaches such as outcome harvesting and story-telling.

Action to be taken by: Extended PWG, staff members dealing with external communication

Recommendation 6 – Promote gender mainstreaming across the programme by building on the constructive steps already taken, including the gender marker assessments, and by developing a gender mainstreaming strategy and guidance note. Further strengthen current approaches to inclusiveness and vulnerability by supporting the implementation of the inclusive resilience building guidelines.

- Approach gender more systematically across the entire PfR programme and build on the ongoing testing of approaches and instruments, like the gender marker, and the experiences of Alliance members on promoting gender issues.
- Clarify what is meant with the promotion of gender sensitive approaches in the context of IRM and formulate a strategic document that can orient PfR's work on gender towards the future.

- Adapt guidance and instruments to regional and country context by taking into account cultural elements as well as the learning from other organisations on gender in these contexts.
- Allocate budget for the financing of gender expertise at the appropriate levels, in line with recommendation 13.
- Keep the basic message of PfR's impact statement that aims to enhance the resilience of vulnerable people and continue focusing on the vulnerable as done throughout PfR SP.
- Build on the recently accomplished PfR Inclusion Guide to further improve focus on vulnerable groups, including the elderly, disabled and resource-poor women and youth.
- Improve reporting results and outcomes of the overall impact of PfR on marginalised groups based on a clarification of definitions who exactly these groups of vulnerable or marginalised people constitute are and what precisely these groups are vulnerable to or from.

Action to be taken by: Extended PWG; country teams

Recommendation 7 – Draft a programme exit strategy to ensure a smooth handover to local partners and to ensure that alternative funding opportunities and capacity strengthening support are identified that can sustain efforts beyond the life of PfR SP.

- Include during the remainder of PfR SP and from the beginning of a possible further funding of PfR an exit strategy that maps out a roadmap on how the Alliance could withdraw from certain trajectories and countries so as to let national CSOs take over and undertake IRM-related lobbying and advocacy on their own.
- Build on the experiences with the EU-funded ECO-DRR project and search for complementary funding among international funds and development banks for other regions within PfR countries or in countries where the Alliance has not been active so far.
- Stress with international cooperation agencies and development banks the need for the further funding of IRM-related activities at the community level.
- Recognise the positive effects of PfR-to-PfR country exchanges and allocate future funding for other forms of exchange between PfR country and regional stakeholders, including country-to-country visits and (digital) KML learning seminars.

Action to be taken by: SG (for fundraising among institutional donors), extended PWG, country teams

Recommendation 8 – Connect IRM-related priorities derived from the global policy frameworks more strongly across the three levels (country, regional and global), pay particular attention to further develop and enhance the performance of the regional programmes and strengthen the translation and uptake of global IRM-priorities, derived from the global policy frameworks, into relevant country priorities and processes.

- Allocate resources but also strategic thinking on how these three levels (country, regional, global) can be better linked to each other during remainder of PfR SP and if future funding can be mobilised.
- Embed in the Theories of Change of each programme (country, regional, global) sections about how better linkages can be made between the different levels with a view to create synergetic effects. For example, connecting trajectories at the country level with matching trajectories at the regional and global levels, but also vice versa, how to connect trajectories from the global level with the country level.
- Make an analysis and action plan at the respective country levels (where global policy frameworks eventually need to "land") on how PfR could help more to connect the global framework objectives

with country agendas – for example through dissemination and educational events at country level, connected with media coverage and thereby creating momentum for further lobbying and advocating IRM.

- Enhance efforts in the GPG to connect with the regional and country levels so that the capacities of local (and regionally operating) CSOs to utilise global policy frameworks for their country-related lobby and advocacy work can be strengthened.
- Undertake a more detailed evaluation to clarify the successes and challenges of the four PfR regional programmes and to get a better view about a) the comparative advantages of PfR for working at these levels, b) returns on investment and c) lessons to be learned from within PfR but also from other (similar) CSO programmes operating at the regional levels.

Action to be taken by: SG and extended PWG; global, regional and country teams

Cluster 3, Recommendations in response to Objective 3: ***"To assess the effectiveness, relevance and sustainability of PfR's engagement with stakeholders in IRM: to understand the extent to which a) outcomes have been achieved that are steps towards the PfR objectives (changes in policies, practices and investments in favour of IRM) and b) what the contribution of PfR has been towards achieving or not achieving these planned outcomes"***

Recommendation 9 – Retain PfRs focus on influencing IRM policies and practice, but strengthen guidance on how to support the investment domain including how to strategically lobby and advocate for IRM investments. A stronger strategic focus should be accompanied by the mobilisation of relevant expertise to spearhead this area of work at global, regional and country levels.

- Keep PfR's comprehensive approach on IRM which encompasses the policy, investment and practice domain.
- Clarify the conceptual understanding of IRM and investments (i.e., investments for IRM and/or making investmens IRM-proof) and provide guidance on how IRM investment-related lobbying and advocacy activities should be promoted.
- Study, document and share the positive results in the IRM policy and practice domain so that other countries can learn. This should be undertaken as part of an enhanced KML approach whereby the exchange between PfR country and regional stakeholders and learning is prioritised.
- If PfR is further funded, include in the budget resources that allow for the testing and piloting of IRM-related practices so that lobby and advocacy work can be enhanced with updated practice examples, but prevent that such funding is used for standard service delivery activities.
- Put extra efforts into the IRM investment domain, provide guidance on how to approach investments and fundraising, how to interact with the private sector and international actors and allocate resources (as mentioned under recommendation 13) for strengthening PfR's expertise in this area.

Action to be taken by: SG and extended PWG; KML staff; country teams

Recommendation 10 – Continue to focus on strengthening the capacity of national and local CSOs to lobby and advocate for IRM but invest more in their capacity to engage at the national, regional and global levels.

- PfR should invest more in bringing CSOs into lobbying and advocacy activities at the more complex national level (this is already the case in some countries, but not throughout the programmes).

- PfR should also find ways to bring national CSOs and CBOs, who are not part of the Alliance family, more systematically into events and policy related exchanges at the regional and global levels so as to make voices from the local level heard and listened to.

Action to be taken by: Extended PWG; country teams

Recommendation 11 – Seek more collaboration with non-PfR partners and donors in order to leverage funding, share experiences and scale up the lobbying and advocacy on IRM, also with the Netherlands MFA and its embassies in order to create synergies with resilience-related Dutch funding.

- Improve actor analysis to better understand, which national and international actors are active in an IRM-relevant sector, what their interests are and what opportunities of collaboration might exist (the analysis, proposed under recommendation 3, could be used for this aim).
- On the basis of this analysis, seek synergies and strengthen collaboration with other national and international actors that might be relevant to enhance IRM (in addition to PfR's established well-functioning collaboration with non-PfR partners – i.e., government and non-IRM civil society).
- Improve actor analysis to better understand, which national and international actors are active in an IRM-relevant sector and what opportunities of collaboration might exist (the analysis, proposed under recommendation 3, could be used for this aim).
- Get more familiar with the working of international cooperation agencies and development banks to find entrance points for fundraising but also for mobilising IRM-relevant investments, especially at country levels.
- Exchange regularly with the MFA in The Hague about progress and solicit the Ministry's support for alerting Netherlands embassies about PfR and the potentials of creating synergies with other initiatives funded by the Netherlands in relation to disaster risk reduction, ecosystem management and climate adaptation.

Action to be taken by: SG (for connecting with international funders) extended PWG; country teams and MFA

Cluster 4, Recommendations in response to Objective 4*: "Review the governance arrangements of the PfR programme and to generate actionable recommendations for future PfR programming, with a specific focus on facilitating Southern ownership, Southern leadership and South-South cooperation, and linking/ creating synergy of our work at the different levels (local to regional to global) through identifying good practices and bottlenecks."*

Recommendation 12 – Strengthen strategic leadership and management at SG and PWG level to ensure that diversity does not undermine programme coherence and further explore ways to enhance local ownership of the programme.

- Enhance efforts at SG by all Alliance members to work more closely together and to find solutions on difficult issues which are in the interest of the entire Alliance and accept that some of these might go against the individual interest of an Alliance member.
- Consider that on certain issues and where necessary the "de jure" right of the chair of the SG to take a decision, which has so far not been used, is also permitted "de facto" by all Alliance members.

- Plan for an enhanced participation of leaders from PfR countries and regions in the SG and the PWG and provide support so that local leaders, were needed, can catch up with tasks relating to governance and strategic management.
- Building on the good experiences of the current Annual Leads Week, establish an annual "PWG forum" during which representatives of all countries, regional and global programmes join with staff working in PfR global positions for strategic management discussions and decisions.
- Test out how the number of working groups could be reduced, for example by merging PME, KML and Capacity Strengthening into one working group with a manageable number of members who could accompany these three interlinking domains from a strategic perspective
- Transform the Global Policy Group into a full-fledged programme, resource it appropriately through all Alliance members and strengthen its coordination function.
- Set up a practice of "e-governance" through which exchanges on governance and strategic management are undertaken virtually and by default. Meet in person only in the more exceptional cases.

Action to be taken by: SG and extended PWG

Recommendation 13 – Better resource PfR in the domain of coordination and management as well as for positions which are key to implementing the content related aspects of the programme at regional and country levels, i.e. capacity strengthening, KM&L, gender and investments.

- Strengthen the coordination team so that it can play a better role beyond the daily management tasks and ensure that contacts with the PfR countries and regions extend beyond the respective country and regional lead. Such a decision should allow the team to play a stronger linking pin between the day-to-day management of the programme and the strategic management exercised by the PWG and the SG.
- Allocate more resources for mobilising content-expertise on capacity strengthening, PME, KM&L and communication at regional and/or country levels, strengthen their positions and ensure that local and regional individuals (preferably with a CSO background) are mobilised on a priority basis.
- Create the position of a global gender adviser plus advisors at the regional levels as well as advisors at country level for strengthening the domain of fundraising and the lobbying and advocacy for investments.
- At SG level, take a decision that all Alliance members allow their respective country and regional leads to exercise their work on a full-time basis.

Action to be taken by: SG and extended PWG (note: these additional positions should be created if PfR continues; the number of positions that can be created evidently will depend available funding; if funding continues at the same level than PfR SP, however, the current number of coordination, management and content-expertise staff is not considered sufficient).

Recommendation 14 – To mitigate the centrifugal forces built into the financial management of the Alliance, examine the different financing scenarios that accommodate MFR requirements and institutional interests of Alliance partners with a particular focus on opportunities and constraints embedded in more pooled and flexible funding arrangements.

- If PfR is further funded and more responsibilities are shifted towards the local level, i.e. to countries and/or regions, set up clear guidance and protocols on how the different Alliance members at country

level, in particular, should work together on budgets and financial management. This should include guidance on how to increase transparency on budgeting and allocations between Alliance members.

- Set up mechanisms for capacity strengthening in the sphere of financial management at local level during a next phase of PfR so that – gradually – more and more responsibilities can be shifted from headquarters in the Netherlands to the local levels.
- In dialogue with the MFA, discuss with officials from the content domain (Directorate Inclusive Green Growth) and financial management (accountancy) how experienced bottlenecks relating to the transfer of financial management responsibilities to the local level can be solved.
- For a continuation of PfR SP, aim at the inclusion of a substantial flexible and un-allocated amount of resources in the budget (similar to the "11th country budget of PfR SP) to allow for unforeseen upcoming demands originating from local, regional or global trajectories.

Action to be taken by: SG and PWG members dealing with financial management issues

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Final recommendation (15) – Discuss with international cooperation agencies and development banks to what extent a continuation of PfR may include (as part of its capacity strengthening approach) complementary support to government actors as part of a multi-stakeholder approach.

- Alliance members should discuss with funding agencies and developments what extent a continued funding of PfR would allow to make complementary funding available for supporting governmental actors, as changes and improvements on IRM policies and investments can only be realised in a process of multi-stakeholder exchange as experiences from PfR SP show.

Action to be taken by: SG and Coordination Team NL

7. Annexes

Annex 1 – Terms of Reference (ToR)

Annex 2 – Methodology

Annex 3 – Evaluation Matrix

Annex 4 – List of interviewees

Annex 5 – Bibliography

Annex 6 – Case study Indonesia Programme

Annex 7 – Case study Mali Programme

Annex 8 – Case study Uganda Programme

Annex 9 – Case study Horn of Africa Programme

Annex 10 – Case study Global Programme